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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I investigate the question how, and to what extent, can the office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) be held accountable, under international law, for its contribution
to the harm to the environment and lives of refugees resulting from refugee encampment in refugee camps that
it helps create, fund, and manage? I use the term “accountability” in this dissertation to mean
answerability, responsibility, and liability for internationally wrongful acts or injurious consequences arising
out of acts that international law does not prohibit and making good for the loss or injury suffered as a result
of such acts or omissions.
Thus, using data from primary and secondary sources and borrowing from certain
theoretical paradigms and schools of thought, I theorise about the policy-context; the decisionmaking processes that produce refugee encampment; the locus of accountability for the injurious
consequences of refugee encampment in refugee-hosting states in the global south; the
international rules and principles for protecting refugees and the environment; the rules and
principles constituting the regime of accountability under international law; and the strengths and
limitations of the regime. In tandem with theorising these aspects, I identify practical implications
or observable implications that flow from each theoretical proposition I posit and buttress these
with evidence from both primary and secondary sources.
I demonstrate that the UNHCR is the architect of refugee encampment in many refugeehosting states in the global south and show how it appropriates the framework governance of these
states on refugee policy and practice. I argue that accountability for the consequences of refugee
camps on the environment, refugees, and host communities must, therefore, follow the locus of
power (in the sense of effective control) and be laid upon the author of the framework decisions
that produce refugee encampment. My central thesis is that because the UNHCR, albeit a
subsidiary organ of the United Nations (UN), is an independent actor on the international plane,
with considerable power and influence, it should be held accountable for its authorship of the
framework decisions which produce refugee encampment, which refugee encampment in turn
results in harm to the environment and damage to the lives of refugees living under deplorable
conditions of encampment; some for over twenty-five years.
I theorised and developed my arguments in the dissertation in two main parts. In the first
part, consisting two chapters, I explain its conceptual framework. This I do by summarising the
problem and identifying the main themes in the conversations in the most relevant literature. More
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specifically, in Chapter 1, special attention is paid to the conceptual and theoretical issues
surrounding refugee camps, harm to the environment, and accountability. In Chapter 2, the same
kind of attention is paid to questions of theory and method. In part two of my dissertation, I
identify and locate the sites where the framework decisions on refugee encampment are authored
(Chapter 3); review the rules and principles constituting the regime of accountability under
international law (Chapter 4); and explain how the rules and principles constituting the regime of
accountability under international law may be applied to framing the accountability of the
UNHCR for its acts of refugee encampment and the latter’s consequences on the environment and
the conditions of life of refugees in camps (Chapter 5).
I conclude the analyses in the dissertation in Chapter 6. The main conclusion is that, in
theory at least, the UNHCR can be held accountable, under international law, using two possible
legal routes: (a) internationally wrongful acts, and (b) liability for injurious consequences of
activities that international law does not prohibit. In practice, however, both legal routes have gaps
or limitations. In the first place, third parties face several procedural and substantive obstacles in
seeking remedies against IOs for their internationally wrongful acts, in general, and the UNHCR
in particular with respect to refugees. Most IOs have not developed internal procedures for settling
third party disputes of a private law character. Where IOs, including the UNHCR, have internal
mechanisms, such mechanisms are often inaccessible to third parties, such as refugees. And the
option of private law litigation in domestic courts is also unavailable because IOs tend to enjoy
near absolute (or even absolute) immunity from every form of legal process in national courts. The
result: a huge gap of accountability in international law. The international law on the privileges
and immunities of IOs creates the space for impunity and double standards whereby, on the one
hand international law demands that those who violate its precepts should be held answerable, but
on the other hand, it selectively shields certain natural and juridical persons from being held
accountable, giving them an unduly privileged status and in effect mocking the idea that all persons
are equal before the law.
The decision of the United States (US) Supreme Court in Jam v. IFC, 139 S. Ct. 759 (2019),
on face value, however, seems to herald a new dawn of restrictive immunity for IO in national
courts. The Court held that the scope of immunities from suit that IOs can enjoy in the US under
the International Organisations Immunities Act (IOIA) of 1945, is restrictive because the IOIA
entitles IOs to ‘the same immunity’ that foreign government dignitaries on US territory enjoy.
Since the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1975 (FSIA) restricted the immunities from suit
that foreign governments are entitled to while on US territory, the same standard also applies to
IOs. I am cautiously optimistic, however. This landmark decision is of a national court, albeit the
iii

highest court of the land, may have limited international impact. Moreover, the Court left it open
to IOs to ‘always specify a different level of immunity,’ if a given IO ‘would be impaired by
restrictive immunity.’
The second limitation concerns the second legal route, liability for injurious consequences
of activities that international law does not prohibit. The rules and principles that the International
Law Commission (ILC) developed are limited to addressing accountability for activities
considered most dangerous or hazardous with a transboundary reach. Technically, therefore, the
UNHCR’s refugee encampment activities may not fall within the ambit of these rules.
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CHAPTER 1: THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND CONCEPTUAL
ISSUES

1.1 Introduction
In this dissertation, I investigate the question how, and to what extent, can the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) be held accountable, under
international law, for its contribution to the harms to the environment and lives of refugees
resulting from refugee encampment in refugee camps that it helps create, fund, and manage?
In other words, can the UNHCR be held accountable, under international law, for:
1) harm or damage to the environment resulting from refugee camps; and 2) harm
to the lives of refugees in the camps that it helps creates, fund, and administers? In
so doing, I sought to understand how under existing rules of international law and
politics the international accountability of the UNHCR may be achieved. By
“accountability” in this dissertation I mean answerability, responsibility, and liability
for internationally wrongful acts or injurious consequences arising out of acts that
international law does not prohibit, and making good for loss or injury suffered as a result of
such acts or omissions. I return to a detailed conceptualisation of accountability in
subsection 1.3.3 of this chapter.
Thus, using data from primary and secondary sources, I theorise and identify
practical implications about the policy-context, the decision-making processes that
produced refugee encampment, the locus of accountability for injurious
consequences of refugee encampment in the global south, international rules and
principles of protecting refugees and the environment, and the rules and principles
constituting the regime of accountability under international law.
I demonstrate that UNHCR is the architect of refugee encampment in refugeehosting states in the global south and it often appropriates the framework of
governance on refugee policy and practice of these States. I argue that
1

accountability for the consequences of refugee camps on the environment, refugees,
and host communities must, therefore, follow the power and processes that produce
refugee camps. My central thesis is that because UNHCR is an independent
international legal person and actor on the international plane, 1 exercising
significant power and influence, and is the architect of refugee encampment in
refugee-hosting states in the global south, it should be held accountable for its
decisions which produce refugee encampment, which in turn results in destruction
of or damage to the environment and damage to the lives of refugees living under
deplorable conditions of encampment.
I have drawn insights from two sources of data: documents and fieldwork. In
addition, I have gleaned theoretical insights from different schools of thought,
especially Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), The New
Haven School or Policy-oriented Jurisprudence, Socio-Legal Studies or
Approaches, and Political Economy, to explain and defend some propositions I
advance on how and why the UNHCR should be held accountable for the
consequences of its decisions that produce refugee encampment and harmful
consequences of camps on the environment and the conditions of involuntary
dependence of refugees on external aid in the camps, often for long periods. 2 The
conclusions drawn from the data on refugee encampment are limited to similarly
situated camps.
It is appropriate at this point to say something about the structure of my
dissertation. I have divided the dissertation in two main parts. Part I, the Conceptual

1

The Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations claims that subsidiary organs of the United Nations, such
as UNHCR, do not have a separate international personality. I return to this aspect in Chapter 5.

2

See, e.g., UN News, “UN-run Camps for Somalia Refugees in Kenya enter 20th year of existence” (2012),
online<https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/02/404012-un-run-camps-somalia-refugees-kenya-enter20th-year-existence>.
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Framework, consists of two chapters, while Part II, Accountability, has four. In
Chapter 1, I define the research problem and review and critique some of the key
conceptual

and

theoretical

conversations

surrounding

refugee

camps,

environmental degradation or damage, and the accountability of international
organisations (henceforth, IOs), including of their subsidiary organs that perform
functions on the international plane. I conceptualise the term ‘accountability’ in
more detail than other terms because it is the main premise upon which my main
research question and discussions and analyses in the dissertation rest. I end this
chapter explaining the potential contribution of my dissertation to the existing body
of knowledge in the area of my study.
I address issues of theory and method in Chapter 2. Here, I deal, briefly, with
the challenges of identifying the most appropriate theoretical approach and method
for answering my main research question and why I chose to rely, in the main, on
a particular theory and method. I explain theory, method, and school of thought as
understood in this dissertation and I argue that bodies as work that are organized
under monikers such as Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL),
Law and Economics, Feminists Approaches to International Law, Legal
Positivism, etc, are actually schools of thought about law not theories or methods
of international law as is often conventionally understood. I conclude this chapter
with explaining my methods of data collection and their limitations.
Chapter 3 is the first chapter of Part II on accountability. In this chapter, I
sought to further develop the research problem I defined in Chapter 1 and address
the question how and by whom the decisions that produce refugee encampment in
some refugee-hosting states in the global south are made. Understanding this
question is central to answering my main research question, namely, how the
UNHCR can be held accountable under international law for the injurious
consequences of the refugee camps it helps to create, fund, and administer, on the
environment and the conditions of refugees living in the camps. If the UNHCR has

3

no role and part at all in the decision-making processes that produce refugee
encampment, then my main research question is moot.
Here, I posit and develop two countervailing theoretical propositions that shed
light on the decision-making processes and structures that produce refugee
encampment. I then identify some observable or practical implications that flow
from each theory. Given space limitation, I choose to focus on the most relevant of
these implications for my research question. I return to explain some of these
practical implications in Chapter 5, when discussing the accountability of UNHCR.
But in the main, I demonstrate (deploying Okafor’s theory on the seizure of the
‘framework governance’ of global south countries), that the UNHCR has, in subtle
ways, appropriated the framework governance of refugee policy and practice from
refugee-hosting states and governments and is the main ‘author’ of the framework
decisions that produce refugee encampment, especially in the global south in
countries such as Kenya, where I conducted fieldwork. I argued that because the
UNHCR appropriates the framework governance of refugee policy and practice in
many refugee-hosting states in the global south, the case for its accountability under
international law, is made stronger, for the consequences of the harms of refugee
encampment on the environment and the suffering of refugees in camps that it helps
create, fund, and administer. I develop the specifics of this aspect of the argument
of the dissertation in Chapter 5.
Chapter 4 is the second chapter of Part II of the dissertation. In Chapter 4, I
focus on the rules and principles constituting the regime of accountability under
international law. I posit and develop two countervailing theoretical propositions
about international law and accountability which allow me to identify and analyse
the content and scope of the rules and principles governing the accountability of
states and IOs. In the first place, I theorise that international law provides a legal
route, or a legal regime, for engaging the accountability of actors who violate its
precepts. In the second place, I hypothesise that from a TWAIL perspective,
international law, at least in its living form, is hegemonic and imperialistic and
4

therefore is ill-equipped to provide an equitable legal route for engaging the
accountability of actors who violate its precepts. I then identify, for each theory,
some of its practical implications that allow me to draw specific inferences about
the rules and principles governing the regime of accountability under international
law. I conclude that the rules and principles governing the accountability of IOs
require some reformulation and recalibration that de-emphasises the economic
aspects of human and social relations and balances several disparate competing
interests, including formulating general principles on a duty of care for all entities
vested with power and authority.
In Chapter 5, I address the question how the UNHCR can be held
accountable, under international law, for the harms or injurious consequences on
the environment of its encampment of refugees and for the conditions of refugees
in these camps. Building on the themes in Chapter 3, I theorise that accountability
for the harms or injurious consequences on the environment of refugee
encampment and the conditions of refugees in the camps, must follow the locus of
the framework governance of refugee policy and practice in the refugee-hosting states
in global south. I demonstrate two possible legal routes for holding the UNHCR
accountable under existing rules and principles governing accountability under
international law. In so doing, I address possible challenges with respect to
questions about UNHCR’s status, capacity, and obligations under international
law as necessary conditions for engaging its international accountability. In
addition, I also discuss the nature of the internationally wrongful acts and injurious
consequences arising out of activities that international law does not prohibit and
the question of attributing or imputing to the UNHCR wrongful acts and omissions
that constitute a breach of its international obligations. I examine some private law
options for holding UNHCR accountable and the obstacles involved.
I conclude in Chapter 5 that the UNHCR as an independent legal entity has
obligations incumbent upon it, both under its Statute and the 1951 Refugee
Convention (on the one hand) and under general international law (on the other).
5

I argue that it is, therefore, legitimate to hold the UNHCR accountable for
breaching its obligations under international law. Since the UNHCR has
appropriated the framework governance of refugee policy in some refugee-hosting
states in the global south and authors the framework decisions that produce refugee
encampment, it is the right entity to be held accountable for the consequences of
refugee camps on the environment and the deplorable conditions of life for refugees
under encampment. There is ample evidence to demonstrate that the UNHCR has
effective control of the refugee camps systems that it helps create, fund, and
administer in some refugee-hosting states in the global south and that the wrongful
acts of its organs and agents are attributable to it. I then identify some of the
procedural and substantive issues involved in using existing rules and principles
constituting the regime of accountability under international law to hold UNHCR
accountable. I further conclude that in theory, at least, it is feasible to use private
law options to engage the accountability of the UNHCR this option tends to be
moot, however, because IOs enjoy near absolute immunity from to the jurisdiction
of national courts. The US Supreme Court decisions in Budha Ismail et al v
International Finance Corporation [Jam ] delivered in February in 2019 seem to herald
a new dawn of restrictive immunity for IOs. I return to this case in Chapter 5, but
suffice to point out here that from an international law vantage point, the decision
has no real significant impact on the immunity of IOs whose charters and specific
instrument guarantee for them absolute immunity, a fact that the majority of the
Court recognised.
I conclude the discussions in the dissertation in Chapter Six.

6

1.2

The Problem and the Context: the UNHCR’s Approach to Refugee
Protection

The UNHCR is the United Nations’ (UN) refugee agency whose primary
competence is to provide international protection to refugees.3 In addition to this
primary function, it assists States find durable solutions to the refugee problem 4
and, to a limited extent, provides protection to conflict or war-induced internally
displaced persons (IDPs).5
The UNHCR, many refugee hosting States in Africa, and other key actors
involved in refugee protection, such as international non-governmental
organisations (INGOs), use refugee camps as a technology of choice for
administering humanitarian aid to refugees, especially those in the global south. 6
While refugee camps, vary in their sizes and use from country to country and if
used for very temporary periods of less than six months and to accommodate a
smaller number of refugees, are not invidious per se, in the long run they cause far
more harm than good to both refugees, local communities, and the environment.

3

See, Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Res 428 (V), UNGAOR,

5th Sess, Supp No. 20, UN Doc. A/1775 (1950) at 46
4

Ibid.

5

See, e.g., Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Res A/53/125, UNGAOR, 53RD
Sess, Supp No. 49, UN Doc A/53/49 (1999) at 233 - 234 para 16.

6

A caveat is in order here. Not all aid for refugees in refuge-hosting states in the global south is provided
through refugee encampment, however. Some urban refugees do receive assistance from UNHCR through
its implementing partners, but this is an exception to the general rule, at least, in some of the main refugeehosting states in the global south, such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Indeed, UNHCR is reluctantly,
however, conceding the reality, especially after the Syrian refugee crisis, that many refugees live in urban
settings and in 2014 developed a policy on alternatives to refugee camps. In addition, the relentless
campaign of civil society organisations to end refugee encampment in the global south appears to also
influence UNHCR to, at least rhetorically, shift its position on refugee camps. I return to these aspects in
Chapter 3.
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Indeed, there is, however, ample evidence that refugee camps have adverse impacts
on both the environment and refugees. Some studies have shown that refugee
camps negatively affect the environment.7 Even the UNHCR and some
governments concede that refugee camps adversely affect the environment.8
More specifically, it is now well known that the presence or an influx of
refugees into a neighbouring host State and their subsequent encampment in
refugee camps leads to damage to the environment and natural resource depletion
with possible dire social and economic consequences to both refugees and host

7

See, Andreas Braun, Stefan Lang, and Volker Hochschild, “Impact of Refugee Camps on Their
Environment: A Case Study Using Multi-Temporal SAR Data” (2016) 4:2 Journal of Geography,
Environment and Earth Science International 1, DOI: <10.9734JGEESI/2016/22392>; also see, e.g., Bhajan
Chandra Barman, “Impact of Refugees on Host Developing Countries” in Sourav Kumar Das and Nidhi
Chowdhary, Refugee Crises and Third-World Economies (New Delhi: Emerald Publishing (India) Pvt Ltd,
2020) at 103 – 111; Sarah Deardorff Miller, “Assessing the Impact of Hosting Refugees” (2018) World
Refugee Council Research Paper No. 4; Bonaventure Rutinwa & Khoti Kamanga, “Impact of Refugees
on Northwestern Tanzania” (Dar es Salaam: Centre for the Study of Forced Migration (CFSM),
University of Dar es Salaam, August 2003); John Kakonge, “A Review of Refugee Environment-Oriented
Projects in Africa: A Case for Environmental Impact Assessment” (2000) 18:1 Impact Assessment & Project
Appraisal 32; Karen Jacobsen, “Refugees’ Environmental Impact: The Effect of Patterns of Settlement”
(1997) 10:1 Journal of Refugee Studies 19; Shally B. Gachurizi, “The Impact of Refugees on the
Environment: The Case of Rwandan Refugees in Kivu, Zaire” (1996) 15:2 Refuge 24; Asit Biswas &
Quiroz Tortajada, “Environmental Impact of Refugees: A Case Study” (1995) 14 Impact Assessment &
Project Appraisal 21; Ian Smith, “An Environmental Argument Against Mozambican Refugee Camps in
Malawi” (1993) 13:6 Refuge 7.

8

See, e.g., UNHCR, UNHCR Environmental Guidelines (Geneva, UNHCR, 1996); UNHCR, UNHCR
Environmental Guidelines (Geneva: The Environment Technical Support Section, UNHCR, 2005);
Government of Kenya (GoK), “The Refugee Bill”, Kenya National Assembly Parliamentary Debates Official
Report (20 November 2003) at 3983.
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communities.9 One of the most serious environmental problems caused by refugee
camps is deforestation and soil erosion within and around the refugee camps. For
example, the influx of Rwandan refugees into the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) in the 1990s caused extensive deforestation and soil erosion in Goma
and the vicinity, North Kivu, and South Kivu.10 It is not, however, inevitable that
the mere fact of refugees entering a neighbouring country leads automatically to
environmental harm. The harm to the environment results from the prolonged
concentration of large numbers of refugees in a designated location, a refugee camp,
usually isolated from host communities.11 For example, the Dadaab Refugee
Complex in Kenya that the UNHCR helped create is:
‘located in an ecologically fragile area characterized by low
rainfall, prolonged droughts and seasonal flooding when it
rains; the area has no surface water hence over-reliance on
underground water and …has been in existence for over a
protracted period of time which, when coupled with the high
population density, has resulted in significant environmental
degradation.’12
UNHCR has recognised the harm that the Dadaab camp complex has done
to the environment and thus mobilised other actors to draw a funding proposal
and raise United States dollars six million, four hundred thirty thousand

9

See, e.g., UNHCR, “Project Proposal for Environmental Rehabilitation of Dadaab Refugee Hosting
Region, Kenya” (undated, available on file with author; document obtain during fieldwork in Kenya,
February – April 2018) [Project Proposal].

10

See, e.g., Biswas & Tortajada, supra note 7 at 27 and 31; Gachurizi, supra note 7.

11

This author’s personal experience, first, as a former Ugandan refugee in Zaire, now Democratic Republic
of the Congo and second, with the presence of refugees from Kenya, Sudan, and Congo in Kigumba, in
southern Uganda from the 1950 up to the 1970s demonstrate that when refugees are allowed to disperse
across the country of refuge and settle amongst host communities in much small numbers, the impact on
the environment and natural resources is minimal.

12

Project Proposal, supra note 9 at 3.
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(US$6,430,000) to rehabilitate ‘the Dadaab Refugee Camp Complex and its
environs for the benefit of the refugees and host communities.’ 13
Refugee camps are also sites where human rights are often violated and
people’s dignity undermined, in large part because of the very nature or foreseeable
consequences of encampment.14 In fact, the European Court of Human Rights has
ruled in the case of Abdisamad Adow Sufi and Abdiazizi Ibrahim Elmi (hereinafter, the
Sufi case), decided in 2010, that conditions in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya
amount to torture within the ambit of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.15 I return to this case in Chapter 5.

13

Ibid., at 2.

14

Maja Janmyr, Protecting Civilians in Refugee Camps: Unable and Unwilling States, UNHCR and International

responsibility (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014), Protecting Civilians in Camps]; Tori Hogan, Beyond
Good Intentions: A Journey Into the Realities of International Aid (Seal Press: 2012); Michel Agier, Managing the
Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government (Cambridge, United Kingdom; Malden,
Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2011); Sarah K. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the
Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Guglielmo Verdirame & Barbara
E. Harrell-Bond, Rights in Exile: Janus-Faced Humanitarianism (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005);
Zachary A. Lomo, “Refugees in East Africa: Developing an Integrated Approach”, in Bekoe, D.A (ed.),
East Africa and the Horn: Confronting Challenges to Good Governance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publications,
2005); Barbara E. Harrell-Bond, “Are Refugee Camps good for Children?” (2000) UNHCR New Issues in
Refugee Research Working Paper Series); T.M., Yousif, ‘Encampment at Abu Rakham in Sudan: a personal
account’ (1998), 2 FMR 15; Natali Dukic & Alain Thierry, “Saharawi Refugees: life after the camps” (1998),
2 Forced Migration Review 18; Wim Van Dame, “Do Refugees Belong in Camps? Experiences from Goma
and Guinea” (1995) 346 Lancet 360; Mohamed W. Dualeh, “Do refugees belong in camps?” (1995) 346
Lancet 1369; M. Dualeh, “Do refugees belong in camps?” (1995), 346 Lancet 1369.
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November 2011).
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The UNHCR and other actors involved in refugee protection have continued
to use refugee camps despite the evidence that camps do harm the environment, the
lives of refugees, and local communities.16 That raises some fundamental questions:
(a) why the UNHCR and other actors in refugee protection insist on using refugee
camps when they know of its adverse effects on the environment and the negative
impact such camps tend to have on the conditions of refugees in the long term; (b)
whose idea it was and is to deploy refugee encampment, UNHCR or refugeehosting states?; (c) how the decision that the refugees should be assisted only in
camps was or is arrived at, or how the decision that the camp is the best technology
for providing international protection to refugees was or is arrived at; (d) whether
refugee encampment is an outcome of deliberations within the UNHCR as an
organisation or States as corporate wholes or it was or is simply the decision of
certain individuals and processes within the UNHCR or institutions of government;
(e ) what role, if any, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), especially the
foreign ones, play in the decision to encamp refugees; (f) the extent, if at all, that
the local communities where the refugee camps are located participate in the
decision-making processes that produce refugee encampment; and (g) who should,
ultimately, be held accountable for the adverse or injurious consequences of refugee
camps on the environment and the conditions of refugees living in these camps.
For reasons that will become clear in Chapters 3 and 5, I believe that the
UNHCR should be held accountable for the consequences for refugee encampment
in refugee-hosting states in the global south. And the critical question is how can it
be held accountable, under international law?

16

In 2014, UNHCR issued a policy document on alternatives to refugee camps. This policy must be
understood in context and I take it up in Chapter 3.
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1.3

Conversations in the Relevant Literature and Conceptual Issues
It is pertinent to clarify the meaning and scope of the most relevant concepts

that I use throughout this dissertation: ‘refugee camp,’ ‘environmental harm
(damage)’ and ‘accountability,’ i.e., accountability under international law. In
addition to these key concepts or phrases, however, I will also explain two other
concepts used in the relevant literature, ‘organised refugee settlement’ and ‘selfsettlement’ or ‘self-settled refugees’. The latter set of concepts are often used in the
literature in contradistinction to refugee camps and so it is appropriate to explain
them.
1.3.1

Conceptualising the Refugee Camp

The conversations that attempt to define and conceptualise a refugee camp in the
relevant literature are either descriptive or analytical or both. Descriptive
approaches to framing the meaning of a refugee camp tend to explain its elements
or features.17 Analytical approaches, in contrast, go beyond the elements or features
of a camp; they use conceptual maps to theorise the camp, refugee or otherwise, in
its wider social, economic, and especially political dimensions.18
Analytical approaches to framing what constitutes a camp, refugee or
otherwise, are useful to my dissertation for two reasons. In the first place, they
provide some practical and theoretical insights into understanding the underlying
assumptions of refugee encampment in ways that allow one to contextualise these
assumptions and foreground the subtle drivers of power and interest dynamics. In
the second place, they provide useful deductions that may help address the key

17
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See, e.g., Richard Black, ‘Putting Refugees in Camps’ (1998) 2 Forced Migration Review, 4 – 7.
See, e.g., Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti & Cesare
Casarino (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2000); Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign
Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazan (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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question of the accountability of the main actors in refugee protection for the
harmful consequences of encampment on the environment, refugees, and their host
communities and countries.
Scholars in the humanities and social sciences disciplines (other than law)
have provided most of the conceptualisations of the refugee camp. Legal scholars,
and especially international refugee law scholars, have so far not been able to
provide conceptualisations of the refugee camp. Malkki and Agamben, I believe,
provide the most compelling conceptualisation of the camp that I find most relevant
for my dissertation.19 Malkki and Agamben both approach the camp from the prism
of power and asymmetrical power relations and politics.

1.3.1.1

The Refugee Camp as a Technology of Power and Control

Malkki, an anthropologist, reflects on refugee camps in her seminal review article
on what she termed as ‘a critical mapping of the construction-in-progress of refugees
and displacement as an anthropological domain of knowledge.’20 While the thrust
of her article lay in the then emerging interest amongst anthropologists in studying
refugees and displacement, her treatment of the refugee camp is the most relevant
to my dissertation.
For Malkki, the refugee camp is not merely some innocuous or innocent
isolated space or place teeming with humanitarian actors helping thousands of

19

For the most recent attempts to analyse and conceptualise the refugee camp, see, e.g., Simon Turner,
“What is a Refugee Camp? Explorations of the Limits and Effects of the Camp” (2015) 28 Journal of Refugee
Studies 1; Dan Bulley, “Inside the Tent: Community and government in the refugee camps” (2014) 45:1
Security Dialogue 63.
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Liisa Malkki, “Refugees and Exile: From Refugee Studies to the National Order of Things” (1995) 24
Annual Review of Anthropology 495 at 495.
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hapless refugees as most people often assume. The refugee camp, Malkki asserts, is
a ‘device of power’ or a ‘technology of power.’21 She traces the origins of the
refugee camp to the chaos of the Second World War (WWII) that started in 1939
and ended in 1945. Malkki argues that “the refugee” as ‘a special category and legal
problem of global dimension did not exist in its full modern form’ until after, the
WWII.22
Moreover, ‘certain key techniques for managing mass displacement,’23 namely
the refugee camp, also emerged during and after WWII. I argue, however, that
‘certain techniques for managing mass displacement’ did not emerge as recently as
after the WWII, but must be located in European modernisation and colonial

21

Ibid at 498 -99.

22

Ibid at 497 – 498. Malkki’s point that the refugee as a special category and legal problem of global
dimension did not exist in its full modern form until after the Second World War may be challenged for
being ahistorical. The refugee as a special category and legal problem of international dimension, albeit
limited to European experiences, was recognised as early as 1921, when the League of Nation became
seised of the matter and appointed a League High Commissioner for Russian refugees. In subsequent
years, it started developing the normative basis on which international action for refugee protection may
be anchored. Thus, on 12 May 1926, for example, the League of Nations adopted the ‘Arrangement
Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian Refugees, Supplementing and
Amending the Previous Arrangements dated July 5th, 1922, and May 31st, 1924’, which was the first nonbinding agreement by states on refugees that defined who was entitled to international protection. Two
years later, the League adopted the 1928 ‘Arrangement Concerning the Legal Status of Russian and
Armenian Refugees’ on 30 June 1928. This follows Dr Nansen’s appeal to the League’s General Assembly
to address the question of the legal status of the refugees, which previous arrangements did not address.
On these aspects, see, e.g., League of Nations, Official Journal (July 1926), 983, 985; and Official Journal
(March 1929), 483, 485. In 1933, the first international agreement on refugee protection, a precursor to
the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, was concluded. The Convention Relating to the International Status
of Refugees was adopted on 28 October 1933; it conferred a legal or juridical status of an international
character upon refugees. On the 1933 Refugee Convention, see, League of Nations, Official Journal
(February 1934) 109.

23

Ibid at 497.
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projects at the turn of the nineteenth century.24
Malkki submits that it was at the end of WWII that ‘the refugee camp became
emplaced as a standardized, generalizable technology of power in the management
of mass displacement.’25 The refugee camp is a ‘device of power’ precisely because
it not only enabled the ‘spatial concentration and ordering of people’ 26 but also
facilitated ‘the administrative and bureaucratic processes within its boundaries’. 27
Indeed, as a technology of power the refugee camp facilitated or enabled a number
of operations to be carried out, such as the orderly organisation of repatriation or
resettlement to third countries, the ‘“perpetual screening” and the accumulation of
documentation on the inhabitants of the camp’, ‘the control of movement and
black-marketing’ and ‘law enforcement and public discipline’.28
This framing of the refugee camp in the language of ‘devices’ and
‘technology’ of ‘power’ provides both a useful paradigm shift that invites one to
question whether those who exercise power in the camps are answerable for the

24

On historical origins of camps, see, e.g., Aidan A.H. Forth, Barbed-Wire Imperialism: Britain’s Empire of
Camps, 1876- 1903 (Chapel Hill: University of California Press, 2017); Marouf Hasian Jr., Restorative Justice,
Humanitarian Rhetorics, and Public Memories of Colonial Camp Cultures (Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); John Lawrence Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895 – 1898 (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Jonathan Hyslop, “The Invention of the Concentration Camp:
Cuba, Southern Africa and the Philippines, 1896 – 1907” (2011) 63:2 South African Historical Journal 251;
and Ian R. Smith and Andreas Stucki, “The Colonial Development of Concentration Camps (1868 –
1902)” (2011) 39:3 The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 417; Hannah Arendt, The Origins of
Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951).

25

Malkki, supra note 20 at 498.

26

Ibid.

27

Ibid.

28

Ibid.

15

consequences of that power on the refugees, the environment, and the host
communities. In other words, approaching the camp as a technology of power
allows questions of accountability to be legitimately superimposed on the dominate
narratives of humanitarianism, including questions about UNHCR accountability
for the injurious consequences of refugee camps on the environment and the
condition of refugees in encampment.
In the first place, representing the refugee camp as a ‘device of power’, for
example, provides useful conceptual maps that define a set of deliberate actions to
produce specific outcomes. A ‘device’ can be a thing made for a special purpose or
a plan or method with a particular aim. From this perspective, viewing the refugee
camp as a deliberate thing or plan or method created to provide protection to
refugees rules out any claim that the camp is essentially an unavoidable inevitability
or randomised occurrence beyond human control, for which alternatives are not
feasible. If that is the case, it is legitimate to ask pertinent questions, such as, ‘how
a particular camp was conceived, whose idea was it, what alternatives to the camp
were considered for achieving the same aims, namely, providing international
protection to refugees. These questions address issues of power and authority. If the
refugee camp is a device or technology of power and therefore manifests the
exercise of power and control, but not merely some neutral humanitarian space
where self-sacrificing individuals put their lives at risk to save the lives of refugees,
the case for the accountability of the actors who exercise power within and without
the boundaries of the camp is made stronger because with power comes
accountability.29

29

See, e.g., ILA, ‘Third Report Consolidated, Revised and Enlarged Version of the Recommended Rules
and Practices (“RRP-S”)’ (Committee on Accountability of International Organisations, New Delhi
Conference, 2002), at 2.
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1.3.1.2

The Refugee Camp as a ‘Hidden Matrix and Nomos
of Political Space’

Agamben provides an insightful variation of Malkki’s conceptualisation of the
refugee camp as a technology or device of power – the camp as ‘the hidden matrix
and nomos of the political space in which we live.’30 In other words, a camp, whether
designated for refugees or otherwise, is not merely an isolated piece of land
removed from the body politic of everyday life; it is a structure and device for
ordering of the lives of others, albeit hidden in plain view, within the same normal
everyday politics.
The camps, Agamben argues, whether the Spanish created ‘campos de
concentraciones’ in Cuba for suppressing the uprising of the people or the British
‘concentration camps’ for encamping the Boers during the Boer wars, ‘were born out
of a state of exception and martial law.’31

From this perspective, Agamben

theorises the camp as the space that opens up when the state of exception becomes the rule’
(emphasis in the original).32 The state of exception is a central theoretical paradigm
on which Agamben develops several conceptual maps for theorising politics and
the camp33; it is a central organising idea in Agamben’s theorising of the camp.
Agamben posits three other ways of looking at the camp: as ‘biopolitical
space’; as a ‘paradigm of political space’; and as ‘a marker of the political space of
modernity.’34 These three lenses of looking at the camp converge at the site where

30

Agamben (2000), supra note 18 at 37.
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Ibid at 37.
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Ibid at 38.
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On Agamben’s general theory of the state of exception, see, Giorgio Agamben, The State of Exception
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
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Agamben (2000), supra, note 18 at 40 – 41.
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power and politics intersect. Thus, the camp as biopolitical space, for example, is
‘a place in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any
mediation (emphasis in original).’ In other words, the camp as biopolitical space is
a place where power is exercised over its inhabitants without fear of resistance or
other forms of intervention.
As a biopolitical space, the camp is a product of biopolitics, and biopolitics is
about how power penetrates the body and lives of the subjects of the state35 or how
power controls the body – how the human being is subjected to power. When the
human being is subjected to power, he or she is denuded of power and is at the
mercy of those wielding power over him or her. They may protest, as refugees
sometimes do in the camps when abuses of their rights and freedoms reach
intolerable levels, but that is just about it because they cannot alter the dynamics
and asymmetries of power relations in the camp environment. Indeed, as
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond demonstrate, protests in refugee camps are often met
with harsh reprisals.36
Similarly, the camp as a marker of political space of modernity reminds
Agamben’s readers that the camp is not simply a historical state of exception tied
to Nazi concentration camps for Jews and Gypsies declared undesirable or Spanish
campos de concentraciones for Cubans or British concentration camps for Boers with
whom they were competing for the conquest of African peoples and their lands or
the British concentration camps for Kenyans during the Mau Mau rebellion against

35

Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazan (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1998) at 10.
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British rule.37 The camp is, and continues to be, recreated as a space of exception
today, where other human beings are made to live the bare minimum of their lives.
It does not matter where this state of exception is created but it is not merely a piece
of territory in some remote part of an African State hosting refugees. It could take
the form of the fenced spaces at some border town or some glamorous and neutrallooking hotel adjacent an international airport in the western countries, where
people whose applications for refugee status have been rejected and are being
returned, against their will, to their countries of origin. 38
The camp, whether conceptualised as a biopolitical space, or a paradigm of
political space or a marker of the political space of modernity, remains a state of
exception where the rule of law is suspended39 or as a state of exception, is ‘placed
outside the normal juridical order’40 and becomes permanent or normal. Yet, the
camp manifests the paradoxical status of exception because it at once excludes and
includes the rule of law, i.e., the camp is a space in which ‘the rule of law is
completely suspended’ and yet at the same time the camp is the creation of the rule
of law, precisely because the sovereign is assumed to exercise powers defined by
law, powers that allow him or her to declare that a state of exception exist that calls
for drastic measures.
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In this context, the camp is a ‘political-juridical structure’ within which
‘everything is truly possible in them.’41 The paradoxes become more complicated
when one considers the role of IOs such as the UNHCR in creating, sustaining, and
perpetuating the state of exception of the refugee camp, albeit behind the scenes. I
will return to this aspect in Chapter 2 when discussing, among other themes, the
processes that produce refugee encampment.
The ecological or environmental dimensions of the camp, however, has
received scanty attention from Agamben’s overall theoretical paradigm of the
camp, whose focus is on the politics and power dynamics and their consequences
for the inhabitants of the camp, the citizens, and modern politics in general. Yet, a
theory of the camp that does not integrate the injurious consequences of the camp
on the environment or that environmental aspects implies that the state of exception
on which it is premised is also underdeveloped and underutilised.
The theoretical insights afforded by Agamben’s theory of the camp are
relevant to my project in, at least, two aspects, despite this pitfall and other criticism
of his theorisation of the camp.42 First, the paradox of the camp as a state of
exception where the rule of law is suspended and yet the state of exception is created
by the exercise of power defined by law raises fundamental questions on how to
hold accountable the various actors in refugee encampment for the consequences
of their decisions and exercise of political power. Some of the refugee camps in the
global south, and especially in Africa, aptly capture this paradox as the Kakuma
refugee camp in Kenya, exemplifies.

41
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20

In Kakuma refugee, Verdirame shows that although in ‘theory Kenyan law
applies to Kakuma camp,’ this in ‘practice …seldom happens.’43 Moreover, the
refugee population in the camp, ‘although living on the territory of Kenya, is
administered by humanitarian organisations, independent of the government,
outside its judicial system, with no checks on power and, in effect, without legal
remedies against abuses.’44 Thus, Kakuma refugee camp, purportedly created on
the basis of law, is devoid of the basic tenet of law. If we proceed on the premise
that those who have the power to create the state of exception and sustain it bear
responsibility for what happens in the camps and must be held accountable, which
actor amongst those involved in Kakuma refugee camp should bear the fully
responsibility for what happens in the camps and the surrounding environment? I
surmise, it has to be the actor who authors the framework decisions the produce
refugee encampment. I will return to this aspect in Chapters 3 and 5.
Second, seeing the camp as a ‘political-juridical structure’ rather than merely
as humanitarian spaces where well-meaning individuals and organisations claim to
protect and save the lives of camp inhabitants allows one to raise questions about
role of law, power, authority and accountability of those in charge of encampment
of refugees.
1.3.1.3

The Refugee Camp versus the Refugee Settlement: A
Question of Semantics?

Another concept used in the conversations about refugee protection is the ‘refugee
settlement.’ This concept has never been adequately theorised, and it is sometimes
used interchangeably with that of the camp. From my earlier research work on
refugee rights in Uganda, it is evident that the UNHCR and government officials,
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including some non-governmental organisations, often claim that there is a world
of difference between refugee camps and refugee settlements. 45 They assert that
refugee settlements are better spaces than camps because refugees in settlements are
given land and produce their own food unlike camps where refugees depend
entirely on external aid. Moreover, there is some level of freedom for refugees in
settlements – they can leave the settlements and engage in trade with the local
community. Uganda, my country, is often cited as the classic example where there
are settlements and not camps.
My thesis, however, is that the difference between camps and settlements is
merely semantical because in practice refugees in both spaces share one common
aspect or characteristic: they are controlled in concentrated numbers in a relatively
small location. From research conducted in Uganda between 1997 – 2005, it was
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demonstrated that refugees in Uganda’s refugee settlements are not free to move
when they deem it necessary.46
There are several conditions, often arbitrary, that refugees must meet before
they can get permission to leave these Ugandan settlements. So, the apparent
freedom of movement for refugees in Uganda’s much touted refugee settlements,
must be understood in context. From the research in Uganda, two reasons account
for this apparent freedom of movement. First, institutional dysfunctions, i.e.,
inability of relevant agencies to enforce both the rules and policies on which
refugees were encamped in settlements. A police survey we conducted in Kampala
in 1998 demonstrated how police officers were not knowledgeable of the existence
of the now repealed Control of Alien Refugees Act, which imposed restrictions and
punishment for refugees. A second reason is the impact of activist researchers, and
especially the phenomenal research and advocacy work of the late Barbara HarrellBond, that exposed the refugee settlements in Uganda for what they real are:
controlled spaces in which the rights and freedoms of refugees were often abused
without fear because refugees had no access to remedies.47 Generally, refugees in
Uganda’s romanticised refugee settlements, as refugees in Kenya’s Kakuma and
Dadaab refugee camps, have no say in how to live their lives and are often subjected
to similar abuses of the human rights.48

46

See, e.g., Rights in Exile, supra note 14 at 181 – 182; Lucy Hovil, Tania Kaiser, and Zachary Lomo, ‘“We
are all Stranded Here Together”: The Local Settlement System, Freedom of Movement, and Livelihood
Opportunities in Arua and Moyo Districts” (2005) Refugee Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 14; Lomo, supra note 14, at 37 – 57.

47

Rights in Exile, supra, note 14 at 156 – 164; 186 -191.

48

See, e.g., Kaiser, Hovil, and Lomo, supra note 46; Lucy Hovil, “Free to Stay, Free to Go? Movement,
Seclusion, and Integration of Refugees in Moyo District” (2002) Refugee Law Project Working Paper No.
4.

23

Therefore, the refugee settlement, viewed critically and objectively, just like
the camp, and in the words of Malkki, ‘is a technology or devices of power.’ 49 Or,
to borrow from Agamben, a refugee settlement is a state of exception where the rule
of law is suspended,50 except that the plots of land (only about 0.03 hectares per
person)51 given refugees provide a perfect stalking horse for the absence of law and
freedoms for refugees in the settlements. In addition, in a subtler sense, both camps
and settlements symbolise the idea that refugees are a temporary problem whose
solution lies in the provision of humanitarian aid vide a care and maintenance
paradigm or mechanism in anticipation of repatriation to their countries of origin.
Against this background, I use the terms ‘refugee camps’ and ‘refugee settlements’
as synonyms.
Furthermore, refugee camps, as used in this dissertation, are limited to those
that are officially established or created with the involvement of the UNHCR, either
directly or indirectly. Conclusions drawn throughout the dissertation are specific
and limited to similarly situated camps.
1.3.2

Conceptualising Environmental (Harm) Damage

A proper discussion of environmental degradation damage would require a robust
conceptualisations of what constitutes the environment, and this would in turn
require an engagement with the literature in environmental sciences, an
interdisciplinary field of study and research which concentrates on the influence
that humans wield on the environment and how resulting problems from such
influence can be addressed or resolved. Engaging with environmental degradation
to that level is beyond the modest goal and scope of my dissertation. Therefore, I
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focus here on conceptualisations of environmental degradation in the sense of harm
to the environment and in the context of refugee encampment and the United
Nations concerns about the damage to the environment.
In the context of refugee encampment, Jacobsen, for example, argues that
what constitutes ‘environmental degradation is partly in the eyes of the beholder.’ 52
She rationalises this assertion submitting that what local people and refugee
perceive ‘as necessary or even sustainable use of natural resources may be seen by
national governments and international agencies as threats to conservation of
particular ecosystems.’53
Leach made similar observations in 1992 about the marked lack of consensus
amongst actors of what constitutes environmental degradation. She discerned that
perceptions of what constitutes environmental degradation, or an environmental
problem differed radically between local people in Sierra Leone on the one hand
and the national government and international agencies on the other. According to
the local community, ‘conversion of tropical forest to agricultural use or
replacement with secondary forest under a modified bush-fallow system would not
represent environmental degradation’.54 International actors, however, saw ‘the
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loss of virgin forest as ‘degradation’, contributing to a loss of biodiversity and a
valued natural habitat.’55
Black does not explicitly conceptualise what constitutes harm to the
environment but problematises notions of environmental degradation associated
with the presence of refugees in a given area. He questions the ‘extent to which the
presence of refugees in given region leads to permanent environmental change’ 56 or
a ‘set of short term changes which might disappear once refugees return to their
country of origin.’57 Indeed, Black uses the concept of ‘environmental degradation’
only when quoting or referring to what others have said. Instead, he prefers to talk
about ‘environmental change’ instead of environmental degradation.
Outside the refugee studies milieu, the United Nations defines harm to the
environment as the ‘deterioration in environmental quality from ambient
concentration of pollutants and other activities and processes such as natural
disasters.’58 In this definition, the key elements in environmental harm are
depreciation or reduction in the value or condition of the environment and the
causes of or factors that contribute to this reduction or depreciation. One of the
causes in the reduction of the quality of the environment is ‘ambient concentration
of pollutants.’ Ambient concentration of pollutants refers to outdoor pollution,
which includes water and land pollution, and air pollution. The sources of ambient
air pollution are natural and human activities. According to the World Health
Organisations (WHO), human activities far exceed natural sources of air
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pollution.59 Some of the human activities that depreciate the quality of the
environment, include fuel combustion from motor vehicles (cars and heavy duty
vehicles) and industrial facilities, such as manufacturing factories, mines, oil
extraction and oil refineries.60 In addition to ambient concentration of pollutants,
other activities and processes may also affect the quality of the environment. These
‘other activities and processes’ may include, for example, activities related to the
creation of refugee camps were a large concentration of people are housed in a small
location, which may result in depletion of resources within and outside the camp,
such as depletion of forests and ground water and pollution of water sources and
soil quality; logging activities where vast forests are destroyed in order to harvest
wood for commercial purposes or large agricultural activities where vast areas, such
as rain forests, are cleared to make way for mechanised, large-scale farming.
Therefore, harm to the environment does not simply happen most of the time
as a result of natural forces, but largely the outcome of human activities. It is the
result of actions and processes, which presumably involve decision-making, power,
and interests. These aspects of the UN definition are applicable to environmental
harm resulting from refugee encampment and refugee influxes in general.
Indeed, El-Haggar provides a conceptualisation of what constitutes
environmental harm that emphasise human activity:
Environmental degradation is the exhaustion of the world’s
natural resources: land, air, soil, etc. It occurs due to crimes
committed by humans against nature. Individuals are
disposing wastes that pollute the environment at rates
exceeding the waste’s rate of decomposition or dissipation
and are overusing the renewable sources such as agricultural
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soils, forest trees, ocean fisheries, etc., at rates exceeding
their natural abilities to renew themselves.’61
El-Haggar’s conceptualisation of environmental harm is relevant to my
dissertation because he makes it explicit that environmental harm does not just
happen; it involves deliberate decisions, calculated or careless of human beings in
their everyday life activities. Indeed, environmental harm in the context of refugee
encampment does not just happen; it is the consequence of some deliberate
decision-making processes that produce refugee camps which house thousands of
refugees in a particular areas, often with limited supply of fuel and other basic
necessities for supporting human life. In such circumstances, refugees are left with
limited options but to invade existing natural resources within the surroundings of
the camps in which they are housed.
Thus, environmental harm as understood in this study is the outcome of
human activities, such as the encampment of refugees. Or in the context of
sustainable development, environmental harm is the process of utilisation of land
and other natural resources that does not meet the threshold for sustainability
articulated in the United Nations Brundtland Commission Report.62 The
Brundtland Commission Report defined sustainable development as ‘the
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own.’63 In other words, sustainable development
is a:
‘process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the
direction of investments, the orientation of technological
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development; and institutional changed are all in harmony and
enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and
aspirations.’64

The creation of refugee camps for huge populations of refugees within a given
locality, the lumbering activities of individuals and corporations, national or
multinational, the mining activities of multinational corporations, the disposal of
chemical wastes, and the pollution of waterbodies resulting from both prohibited
or lawful activities of multinational corporations and governments, etc., are
examples of uses of land and natural resources that fails to meet the minimum
threshold of sustainability that the Brundtland Commission Report suggested. The
injurious consequences of the use of land and natural resources that does not
integrate or consider other variables, such as the health, education, clean air, water,
protection of natural beauty or grazing lands, and disadvantaged groups, often
manifest themselves in a variety of ways, including for example, deforestation,
accelerated soil erosion, loss of germplasm, depletion of certain natural resources,
droughts and increasing desertification, and the depletion of the ozone layer.
That refugee camps, such as the Dadaab refugee camp complex in Kenya, are
harmful to the environment is evident from its failure, right from the outset, not
only to integrate the immediate needs of refugees in emergency situations with their
future aspirations, but also the needs and aspirations of future generations of
refugees and local communities on whose area refugee encampment happens.65
Indeed, the UNHCR and the GoK both acknowledge that the Dadaab refugee
camp complex has had serious negative impact on the environment. The UNHCR
acknowledges that from ‘an environmental point of view’ the Dadaab refugee camp
complex ‘is located in an ecologically fragile area’ and given that ‘it has been in

64

Ibid. at para . 15.

65

Some proponents of refugee camps will argue that there is no scientific evidence to demonstrate that
refugee camps are injurious to the environment. On this aspect, see, e.g., Richard Black, supra note 54.

29

existence over a protracted period of time’ and ‘coupled with the high population
density, has resulted in significant environmental degradation.’66 Even Uganda’s
much lauded refugee camps or settlements constitute unsustainable use of land and
cause damage to or exacerbate existing environmental degradation. In 2019,
sixteen NGOs called for ‘urgent action to prevent and mitigate the impact of
environmental degradation around refugee settlements in Uganda.’67
In the literature, the resulting harm to the environment from refugee camps
appears to be construed in the sense of ‘ecological disaster’,68 ‘land degradation,’
‘deforestation, soil erosion, water contamination. In this dissertation I theorise
these as injurious consequences arising out of the activities of the UNHCR not
prohibited by international law or UNHCR’s lawful activities, and by lawful
activities here I mean the activities under its mandate to provide international
protection to refugees.

1.3.3

Conceptualising Accountability in International Law
1.3.3.1

Some Context

I believe it is imperative to start with some context before providing a
conceptualisation of accountability in international law. I use the term
‘accountability,’ as I stated in the introductory part of this chapter, to mean
answerability or responsibility or liability for wrongful acts or injurious
consequences of acts that international law does not prohibit and making good for
loss or injury suffered as a result. There is, however, no legal definition for, or
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conceptualisation of, accountability in international law.69 International lawyers
only recently began conceptualising accountability as a legal concept of
international law;70 but they quickly ran into some difficulties. In the first place,
how should the term accountability be construed when addressing questions
relating to IOs abusing their power and authority? Should accountability be
construed narrowly or broadly? Should it be used as a legal term at all or simply a
term of art?71 In the second place, if accountability is to be construed as a legal term,
what must be its content and scope, i.e., what must be its indicators or elements
and how different should these be from the standard elements comprising the
traditional terminology of the doctrine of responsibility in international law? These
questions elicited different answers from different scholars and organisations.
The International Law Association’s (ILA) Committee on the Accountability
of International Organisations (CAIO),72 for example, concluded in its first report
on the subject that a purely legal conceptualisation of accountability is not feasible
because, allegedly, of ‘the open-endedness flowing almost naturally from the notion
of accountability in general.’73 But a similar argument could be made with respect

69

See, e.g., Gerhard Hafner, “Accountability of International Organisation – A Critical View”, in Ronald
St. John McDonald & Douglas M. Johnston, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of
the World Community (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) 585 at 600.

70

See, e.g., ILA, Committee on Accountability of International Organisations, “First Report” (Taipei
Conference, 1998); Hafner, note 69; Bimal N. Patel, “The Accountability of International Organisations:
A Case Study of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons” (2000) 13: 3 Leiden Journal
of International Law 571; Deirdre Curtin, & Andre Nollkaemper, “Conceptualizing Accountability in
International and European Law” (2005) 36 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3

71

72

See, e.g., Curtin and Nollkaemper, supra note 70.
The Committee was dissolved in May 2004. On this aspect, See, ILA, ‘ ILA Committee’,

online<http://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/committees>.
73

ILA, supra note 70, at 586.

31

to “responsibility” because naturally it means different things to different people in
different situations and contexts.
The United Nations’ International Law Commission (ILC), by contrast,
makes no reference, explicit or implicit, to the concept of accountability as a
foregrounding concept to organise and articulate the rules and principles governing
how States or IOs should be held to account for their wrongful acts or the injurious
consequences arising from activities not prohibited by international law. In other
words, the ILC’s draft articles and commentary on the responsibility of States,74
international liability for consequences of injurious acts not prohibited by
international law,75 and the responsibility of IOs for their internationally wrongful
acts,76 do not explicitly or explicit use the term accountability.
International law scholars have also reflected on the concept of
“accountability,” but with varying views and conclusions. Hafner, for example, has
observed that part of the problem in conceptually framing the content of
“accountability” as a legal term of international law lies in the difficulty in
identifying the elements that must make up the term.77 He concludes that ‘despite
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its wider use, the term “accountability” escapes prima facie any clear definition.’78
Writing in a different context, Brunee agrees and argues that while international
lawyers are frequently invoking the concept of accountability, the term ‘has not
acquired a clearly defined legal meaning.’79 And Wellens observes that ‘[g]iven the
overarching character of accountability as a concept, an exclusively legal approach
to the problems and issues’ relating to the establishment of a comprehensive
accountability regime for international organisations is not feasible. 80 Curtin and
Nollkaemper, claim that ‘[a]ccountability is a broad term that reflects a range of
understandings rather than a single paradigm,’81 which until, ‘recently…did not
figure as a term of art outside the financial contexts of accounting and audit.’ 82
Dekker, by contrast, has observed that ‘[i]n international legal discourse the term
‘accountability’ still seems to be most frequently used as a synonym for the
traditional international legal concepts of responsibility and/or liability.’ 83
Hafner, in his detailed analysis of the accountability of international
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organisations, however, demonstrates that accountability and responsibility can be
conceptualised in terms of the other given the semantic similarities in their
definitions. He argues that some elements of accountability, such as the duty of
international organisations to comply with applicable law and to be held
accountable for violations of this law are traditional concepts of international law.
In this respect, he concludes, ‘no separate label such as “accountability” would be
required.’84 I argue that a ‘separate label’ such as ‘accountability,’ that integrates
the discrete aspects of the obligations of actors on the international plane for their
wrongful acts or for the injurious consequences of their acts that international law
does not prohibit under one concept is needed. I believe that a single concept, such
as accountability, will simplify or reduce, for want of a better term, what I would
describe as the technicalisation of the law of international obligations. Moreover, and
as I shall demonstrate in subsection 1.3.3.2 of this chapter, the ultimate goal of the
existing legal routes, the regime of responsibility and liability, is holding actors who
breach their obligations under international law answerable or accountable.
1.3.3.2

Framing Accountability as a Legal Term

How does one conceptualise accountability as a term of international law, given
the divergence of views in the relevant literature? I attempted to approach it from
the canons of statutory and treaty interpretation; I surmised that I could identify
one canon of statutory or treaty interpretation, such as the textualist approach, and
draw from its principles a template for conceptualising accountability. I was
immediately confronted with yet another challenge: why draw from one or this
particular canon of treaty interpretation when the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (VCLT) gives more than one principle of interpretation? 85 Even the
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textualist principle – or ‘ordinary meaning of words’ – of treaty interpretation has
its critics.86 I abandoned this procedure or method and thought of using the
dictionary meaning of the term accountability, but what is the difference? Still
ordinary meaning of words, right? May be not, because the dictionary meaning
requires me to simply flip open a dictionary and check for the term ‘accountability.’
This differs radically from construing the term ‘accountability’ as when used in a
treaty. But Hathaway and Foster observe, ‘how does one choose among
dictionaries, none of which has any particular legal standing?’87
Ultimately, I thought of two possible premises for addressing this challenge of
conceptualising accountability as a legal term under international law. First, I
thought about approaching the term accountability from the general rules and
principles governing obligations, national or international, legal or moral. I
surmised that relationships between actors often create rights and obligations which
are either explicitly defined in ‘positive law,’88 or moral rules.89 From this
perspective, certain wrongful conduct that breach obligations owed to other actors
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is either explicitly proscribed by law or moral rules and principles and entails
consequences to the actor who breaches an obligation.
Yet, certain activities or conduct may not be unlawful or ‘wrongful’ per se, but
nonetheless may produce injurious consequences on people and the environment,
for example. The injurious consequences of refugee encampment on the
environment and condition of refugees in camps that UNHCR helps create, fund,
and administer to provide international protection to refugees, is a good example
of this aspect. The activities of the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and their devasting impact on the economic condition and lives of the
peoples of the Third World, is another example. Do these entities owe any
obligations to the ordinary people that their activities impact in various ways?
Different legal systems have developed legal rules and principles for defining
and governing the obligations of various actors and the consequences that flow
from a breach any of the obligations. Similarly, international law has also
developed a regime of obligations for actors on the international plane, a breach of
which entail consequences. I found out, upon scrutinising the regime of obligations
under international, especially under the traditional regime of state responsibility
as understood, that the underlying idea is that of accountability.
The second premise I considered was the principles of justice and the justice
system. I surmised that the goal of a justice system, whether criminal or not,
national or international, is not only to vindicate wrongs but also to hold the
perpetrators of the injustice to account for their acts or omissions. If that is correct,
then it is feasible to draw from the principles of justice certain intuitions for
conceptualising accountability as a legal term of international law. Upon reflecting
on these two possible approaches, however, I realised that my main research
question does not necessarily lead me to interrogate issues of justice per se, vis-à-vis
UNHCR encampment of refugees, but rather question of how UNHCR can be held
to account, regardless of whether justice might be one of the outcomes.
36

Ultimately, I focused on the regime of obligation under international law, not
principles of justice, to conceptualise accountability as term of international law. I
theorise that accountability is the underlying theme of the existing international legal
routes or regimes for holding states and other actors answerable, under
international law, for their wrongful acts or for the injurious consequences arising
from their acts that are not prohibited by international law. If this is correct, what
implications flow from it? In the first place, it implies that the overarching objective
of the rules and principles of international law governing the conduct of states and
other actors is the issue of holding them to account for their acts or omissions. Thus,
whether a state or an IO is obligated to pay compensation or reparations for
violation of an international obligation, the overarching goal is to hold the state or
IO accountable for its acts or omissions.
My thesis that accountability is the underlying theme in the existing regimes
for holding subjects of international law accountable is not farfetched. QuentinBaxter, the then ILC Special Rapporteur on the topic of international liability for
the injurious consequences arising out of activities not prohibited by international
law, made a fleeting reference to ‘[t]he theme of accountability comes into
prominence precisely because there is a need for a new and imaginative effort to
reconcile the widest possible freedom of action with respect of the rights of others.’90
The context in which he made this statement relates to ‘whether lawyers concerned
with the problems of liability have to detach themselves from the mainstream of
international endeavour in order to apportion responsibilities for human failures.’ 91
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Quentin-Baxter and subsequent Special Rapporteurs never further developed
the theme of accountability on the topic and sceptics might argue that this is a
strawman’s attempt at buttressing the case for adopting accountability as a legal
terminology of international law. My response is that while accountability has not
been adopted, explicitly, as the concept for framing the rules and principles
governing how to hold actors on the international plane answerable for their acts
and omission that cause harm or injury to people, property, and the environment,
it is the underlying theme of the existing of regimes that seek, in Quentin-Baxter’s
words, ‘to apportion responsibilities for human failures.’92
Therefore, if accountability is the underlying goal of existing legal routes for
holding states and IOs answerable under international law it is logical, I argue, to
foreground it as the most accurate label for integrating under once concept the rules
and principles of responsibility for internationally wrongful acts and liability for
injurious consequences arising out of acts that international law does not prohibit.
Thus, understood from the perspective explained here, accountability becomes a
‘separate,’ but legal ‘label,’93 and takes a legal character as a term of international
law.
I believe that the misgivings about conceptualising accountability as a legal
term simply because of its alleged broadness or ‘overarching character’ ignore one
fundamental fact: that certain key legal terms in international law that international
lawyers take for granted today, such as the term ‘responsibility,’ were not always
legal terms or words of international law. Indeed, one scholar suggests that the term
‘responsibility’ became a legal term of international law only at the end of the 18 th
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century.94 The term ‘responsibility,’ for example, may mean specific things under
international law, but it has also various shades of meaning in other contexts. For
the ‘reasonable man on the street’95 or the businessman exporting merchandise
across borders or other professions,96 for example, the term ‘responsibility’ may not
mean the same thing as the accountability of a state for its internationally wrongful
acts as the international lawyer understands it.
And crucially, from a TWAIL perspective,97 the term ‘accountability’ rather
than ‘responsibility’, connects an actor to its wrongful actions or the injurious
consequences of its activities that international law does not prohibit; it connotes
the existence of an injustice and and calls for vindication, restoration, and
answering the requirements of equity and respect, especially in the context of harm
or damage that third parties suffer as a result of the activities of a state, an IO, or
an individual acting on the international plane.
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1.3.3.3

The Content and Scope of Accountability Under International
Law

I propose that the content and scope of a regime of accountability under
international law should comprise general principles of obligations in addition to
the existing rules and principles of international law embodied in two possible
regimes: the regime that the International Law Commission (ILC) created, and
specialised regimes, or self-contained regimes, with their own lex specialis on the
accountability of states and IOs.
The existing ILC regime comprise three sources of rules and principles
governing the accountability of states and IOs for internationally wrongful acts and
for injurious consequences arising out of acts international law does not prohibit. I
discuss these in Chapter 4. In addition to the ILC regime, there are the selfcontained regimes, with their own lex specialis, such as the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), the European Union, African Union (AU), and the
Organisation of American States (OAS), each with its own dispute settlement
mechanisms.
I use the expression ‘rules and principles of international law,’ instead of the
oft-used preference of the dichotomous concepts, ‘primary rules’ and ‘secondary
rules’ of international law, in most works on the law governing the accountability
of of actors under international law.98 I believe that the characterisation of the rules
and principles governing the regime of accountability of States and IOs as
‘secondary rules’ is misleading.
I argue with Linderfalk that the “primary rule” and “secondary rule”
dichotomy is flawed because it implies that the body of rules and principles
comprising the law governing the accountability of states and IOs as a set of
secondary rules is different, or of lesser legal character, and I would add, from the
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other rules of international law, so-called primary rules of law.99 In addition, I share
Bodansky and Crook’s view that explaining the ‘character of the [draft] articles
through the distinction between “secondary” and “primary” rules’ has not only
‘proved elusive and …unnecessary’ but also ‘arbitrary.’100
1.4

Accountability of IOs in the Relevant Scholarly Conversations

I now turn to reviewing the question of the accountability of IOs in the relevant
literature. The critical question is how can IOs be held accountable under
international law, for either internationally wrongful acts or the injurious
consequences arising out of their activities international law does not prohibit. I
focus in this section on conversations in the literature that attempt to answer this
fundamental question in relation to UNHCR.
There are few international law based studies on the accountability of
UNHCR and subsidiary organs of IOs in general, save Reinisch’s edited volume on
challenging the acts of international organisations in which there is a chapter
devoted to challenging acts of other United Nations organs, including subsidiary
organs, in national courts.101 I return to Reinisch shortly, but hasten to point out
that Wilde is possibly the one pioneering scholar to attempt to address the question
of the accountability of UNHCR under international law, albeit focusing on

99

Ulf Linderfalk, “State Responsibility and the Primary-Secondary Rule Terminology – The Role of
Language for an Understanding of the International Legal System” (2009) 78 Nordic Journal of International
Law 53 at 54 – 55.

100

Daniel Bodansky and John R. Crook, “Symposium: The ILC’s State Responsibility Articles, Introduction
and Overview” (2002) 96:4 The American Journal of International Law 773 – 791.

101

August Reinisch, ed, Challenging Acts of International Organizations Before National Courts (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010).

41

international human rights law.102 Writing in 1999, he argues that the UNHCR
should be bound by international human rights law when it is, in de facto control of
refugee camps because ‘it would be inconceivable that UNHCR, as a creature set
up by international law to promote international human rights law, was not bound
by international human rights law itself.’103
In addition, Wilde makes a strong case not only for the human rights
obligations of the UNHCR arising from its activities in refugee camps, but also for
the compatibility of human rights law with UNHCR’s mandate and for the
centrality of human rights in UNHCR’s obligation to promote durable solutions. 104
The key insights that I drew from Wilde’s article are first, how to inscribe the
obligations of UNHCR from a human rights perspective, which I discuss in Chapter
5. Second, Wilde identifies UNHCR’s de facto control of the activities in the refugee
camps as a basis for its human rights obligations under international human rights
law. My own research confirms Wilde’s observation and I theorise about it in
Chapter 3 and 5. The exercise of power and control, as the Nicaragua v. United States
case105 demonstrate, is critical to allocation of responsibility for internationally
wrongful conduct in international law.106
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Other than these two insights, however, my study differs from Wilde in at least
two important respects. In the first place, Wilde does not explicitly focus on the
question of the accountability of the UNHCR either for its internationally wrongful
acts or for the injurious consequences arising out of its decisions that produce
refugee encampment in many refugee-hosting states in the global south. I focus on
the accountability of UNHCR for the injurious consequences of its activities
involving the refugee encampment, both in terms of the harm to the environment
and the condition of refugees in the camps. Some thousands of human beings have
been compelled to live in refugee camps for decades, such as those in Dadaab
Refugee Camp Complex (DRCC) in Kenya, with no solution in sight, condemned
to poverty and dependence on international handouts. I believe this spectacle can
no longer be characterised as acts of charity or humanitarian work.
In addition, and crucially, Wilde reaches the same conclusion as other
international lawyers: ‘the liability of UNHCR to comply with this law [human
rights law] is more complex,’107 and therefore recourse will have to be made to
states, which, it is said, have the primary obligation in international law to protect
human rights. My project departs from this approach to framing the accountability
of IOs, which assumes that states are often the bad guys manipulating IOs for their
own national interests. I submit, however, that IOs, as subject of international law,
are capable of manipulating some states, especially those in the global south, to
achieve their own institutional interests. In this context, I argue that IOs which are
in possession of some scintilla of international personality and wield significant
influence and power, should be held answerable for either their internationally
wrongful conduct or the injurious consequences arising out of their activities that
international law does not prohibit. The exception to this assertion, in the context
international protection to refugees, is if the evidence indicates that the refugee-

107

See Wilde, supra note 102 at 121.

43

hosting states initiate and insist on refugee encampment and have effective control
of the camp systems in their countries. But as I demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 5,
effective control of the encampment system in most refugee-hosting states in the
global south rests with UNHCR.
After Wilde’s pioneering article on UNHCR’s human rights obligations in
refugee camps,

some works with specific themes on the UNHCR and the

accountability of IOs began to be published. Kinchin’s 2013 paper on the
UNHCR’s accountability in the context of its status as a subsidiary organ of the
United Nations (UN) is one recent work that explicitly focuses on the UNHCR’s
accountability. Kinchin argues that the accountability of the UNHCR should be
examined through its relationship with the UN according to a type of accountability
she described as organisational accountability instead of defining its accountability
‘through preconceptions of what that concept should entail’ (emphasis in
original).108 Taking a ‘relationship approach,’ she contends that the ‘UNHCR’s
accountability involves identification of its relationships,’ with the UN, ‘and asking
what accountability obligations arise from that relationship, based on a particular
type of accountability.’109 Thus, she focuses on the ‘UNHCR’s inter-institutional
relationships within the UN and poses the question, “what accountability
obligations arise when this relationship is considered through legal and
organisational accountability?”’110 Having reviewed the UNHCR’s relationships
with organs within the UN, the UN General Assembly (UNGA); the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC); the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services
(OIOS); the UN Security Management System (UNSMS); and the the Inter-
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Agency Standing Committee (IASC), she concludes that given this ‘complexity of
the inter-institutional relationship between the UN and UNHCR,’ it is, to
paraphrase her, ‘futile to draw bright lines around its nature.’ In this context of
plurality, the UNHCR’s ‘accountability must be understood in relation to that
context and not according to traditional notions that are an uneasy fit for the global
space.’111
Kinchin’s approach to the UNHCR’s accountability radically differs from my
study in, a least, two fundamental ways. In the first place, conceptually and
theoretically, her concept of the accountability of the UNHCR is premised on the
idea that there exists a ‘global space’ beyond the reach of international law, or in
her words, ‘[b]eyond the traditional boundaries of sovereignty and international
law,’112 which dictates approaching the accountability of IOs through ‘the
relationships of global decision-making.’113 In contrast, I approach the
accountability of the UNHCR, and that of all entities subject to international law
in general, from the premise that there exists a system of international law, albeit
not perfect, that defines the rights and obligations of all actors on the international
plane or in the world, which requires that those actors who violate its precepts must
be held answerable or accountable.
In the second place, Kinchin’ s approach conceptualises accountability
obligations of IOs as a function of the relationships within and between IOs,
especially those within the UN system. She makes no reference to international law
in this regard. She argues that ‘[i]t is the relationships of global bodies that produce
its accountability obligations an appreciation of those obligations, including how
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they interact and conflict with each other is crucial to the successful design and
implementation of effective accountability measures.’114 My project, however,
proceeds from the premise that international law creates the obligations of IOs. The
internal governance practices and relationships of each IO, while may be relevant
when questions about the allocation of accountability of an IO are being
considered, international law defines the obligations upon which accountability is
to be determined because IOs are a creature of international law.
Other than these differences, however, Kinchin’s discussion of the UNHCR’s
functional autonomy in the light of its hierarchical relationship with the UN
provided my study with useful insights when I discuss the basis of the UNHCR’s
accountability in Chapter 5.
Reinisch’s edited book I referred to earlier published in 2010, focused on
‘common issues concerning judicial review, the reception of international law in
the national legal order, policy matters as regards adjudication versus abstention,
and surrounding the question of controlling acts of international organizations.’ 115
The chapter on the other organs of the United Nations, including subsidiary organs,
was relevant to my study only with respect to the feasibility of using national courts
as possible avenues for enforcing the accountability of IOs.116

Simeon’s edited book on the UNHCR and its supervision of international
refugee law117 and Janmyr’s extended legal examination of the question of the
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accountability of UNHCR and its implementing partners for the violation of
human rights in refugee camps,118 are two recent examples.
Simeon’s edited book on the UNHCR’s supervisory function seeks to ‘provide
a clear roadmap on how the UNHCR could enhance its capacity to supervise
international refugee law and the provision of international protection to those
most in need – refugees and other forced migrants.’119 The seventeen chapters in
Simeon’s book focus on the UNHCR’s supervisory function, comparison with
other public international law supervisory models and the collaborative role of civil
society with the UNHCR in the supervision of international refugee law. None of
its chapters scrutinises the UNHCR’s accountability when it fails or subverts its
supervisory role.
Janmyr, by contrast, examines the accountability of the UNHCR in
international law for the security and violation of the rights of populations in
refugee camps in the context where the host state is ‘unwilling or unable’ to provide
protection. The scope and focus of the book are, however, limited to the
responsibility of UNHCR for camp security, especially in regard to military attacks
on refugee camps, and the violation of the rights of refugees and IDPs living in
camps. The book’s discussion of the responsibility of the UNHCR covers both
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) because the UNHCR’s
competence was expanded by the General Assembly of the United Nations to
provide protection to IDPs, albeit in limited scope. The book’s main argument is
that in certain contexts, the UNHCR could be held responsible for what happens
in refugee camps that helps administer or manage.
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While I benefitted greatly from some of Janmyr’s insights in this book, my
project differs from her work in four fundamental ways. In the first place, my work
employs a different conceptual approach; it adopts accountability as the concept to
foreground discussions of UNHCR’s wrongdoing while Janmyr adopts
responsibility, the traditional concept in public international law for enforcing the
obligations of states. As I demonstrate in subsection 1.3.3.2 of this Chapter, the
underlying theme in the doctrine of responsibility under international law is
accountability and therefore it is rational to foreground accountability as the
concept of international law for holding international actors, such as states and IOs,
answerable. A second reason I preferred the term accountability to responsibility is
that there is also the issue of liability for injurious consequences of activities that
international law does not prohibit. Here, as with responsibility, the underlying
theme of liability is accountability for the injurious consequences arising out of
activities that international does not prohibit. In this context, accountability is the
common theme, and therefore, the most appropriate term or concept for enforcing
the obligations of actors under international law. In other words, accountability
captures both the wrongful acts of actors and the injurious consequences arising out
of their activities that international law does not prohibit.
In addition, Janmyr’s analysis of the UNHCR’s accountability focuses on two
conceptual propositions, namely the ‘unable’ or ‘unwilling’ state, which are critical
in her project to the question of the allocation and determination of the UNHCR’s
accountability. By contrast, I focus on the sites where refugee encampment
decisions are made (Chapter 3) and demonstrate that that the notion of the ‘unable’
and ‘unwilling’ state does not do justice to the complex issues of asymmetrical power
relations that produced refugee encampment. Indeed, in the context of the global
south, the idea that refugee-hosting states are ‘unable’ or ‘unwilling’ to provide
protection to refugees in their territories is patently flawed. The evidence shows that
many of the states in the global south host a disproportionate number of refugees
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in comparison to the global north. I question these very conceptual categories as a
basis of allocation of responsibility between refugee host states and the UNHCR.
Thirdly, Janmyr adopts a theoretical framework from the legal positivism
school of thought on which to anchor investigation of her research questions, gather
evidence, and undertake analysis of the evidence. I, in contrast, adopt a conceptual
framework that attempts to integrate theoretical approaches from four schools of
thought: Socio-Legal, Political Economy, New Haven, and Third World
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). While legal positivism has important
merits, it’s obsession with the idea of the law as it is and legal analyses focusing
exclusively on the black letter of the law ignores not only the fundamental aspects
of the asymmetries of power relations between various actors but also the processes
through which law is produced, applied, or subverted. And while some strands of
legal positivism, such as ‘modern’ or ‘enlightened’ or ‘soft’ positivism have
departed from this dogmatic position acknowledging that social and political
context do matter in legal analysis,120 the fidelity to black-law analysis is still
predominant. A project on accountability of an IO such as the UNHCR that is
active in defending its interests on the international plane will, however, have to
delve beyond the black letter of the law and grapple with the asymmetries of power
relations, and the processes and structures within which various actors in refugee
protection flex their power in defending their turf; this is critical to our
understanding of the allocation of responsibility and hence accountability of each
actor.
Fourthly, Janmyr’s work focuses on the accountability of the UNHCR and its
implementing partners for violations of the human rights of populations in refugee
camps, namely refugees and IDPs. My study, however, centres on the

120

See, e.g., Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus, “The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View” (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 302.

49

accountability of the UNHCR for both harm to the environment resulting from its
acts or omissions in establishing, funding, and managing refugee camps and the
conditions in which refugees live in those camps. In other words, my dissertation
focuses on the accountability of the UNHCR for its internationally wrongful acts
and the injurious consequences arising out of its activities that international law
does not prohibit, on the environment and on the condition of refugees in
encampment. While I acknowledge that the UNHCR’s competence has been
broadened through successive resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly,
to include IDPs resulting from conflict, my dissertation concentrates on refugee
encampment and the resulting harm to the environment and the condition of
refugees; I use the term ‘refugee’ in the sense defined under international refugee
law. In a sense, the scope of my project focuses on the original competence of the
UNHCR, the provision of international protection to refugees, while Janmyr’s
work is grounded in the UNHCR’s expanded mandate.
The leading contemporary writers in international refugee law focus on the
rights of refugees and the obligations of States. While some reference is made to
UNHCR’s work and, in limited instances, its failures, the analytical focus and
substantive discussions of issues relating to the international protection of refugees
is the State – not UNHCR.
The three scholars in the area of refugee law are Hathaway, Goodwin-Gil, and
Atle Grahl-Madsen. Grahl-Madsen has published several books and articles on
international refugee law but his two-volume treatise is best known.121 Volume one
deals with ‘those rules of public international law which relate to refugees’,122 and
while there is no explicit discussion of UNHCR’s accountability, there is reference
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to it in relation to ‘the concept of ‘protection’ in the sense of paragraph 6 of the
UNHCR Statute.’123 In his second volume, Grahl-Madsen inquires, ‘into the nature
and extent of the right of States, under existing international law, to give asylum’,
and refers to the extent to which, ‘modern international law recognizes a ‘right of
asylum’ for the individual.’124 While the evolution of the concept of asylum is
treated in detail, its analytical focus is limited to ‘those rules of international law
which are of importance on the Western European scene.’125
Hathaway’s 2005 monumental work on the rights of refugees,126 premised
‘upon a theory of modern positivism,’127 for example, ‘seeks clearly to adumbrate,
in both theoretical and applied terms, the authentic scope of the international legal
rights which refugees can bring to bear in states of asylum’.128 This approach,
Hathaway argues, provides a firmer basis for synthesising ‘imperfect norms and
mechanism’ in order to pursue ‘meaningful state accountability in the present legal
context.’129 The thrust of Hathaway’s book is an affirmation of the importance of
the specific rights of refugees that had come under threat from both governments
and scholars who ‘too readily assume that generic human rights law is sufficient
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answer to the needs of refugees.’130 The book also makes clear what it is not about;
for example, it does not ‘seek to explain the work of the institutions charged with
the protection of refugees at the domestic or international levels’. 131
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, in the third edition of Goodwin-Gill’s book
published in 2007, seek to ‘describe the foundations and framework of international
refugee law by concentrating on three core issues: the definition of refugees, the
principle of non-refoulement, and the protection of refugees.’132 Unlike the first and
second editions, they now address the question of ‘the legal responsibilities of
international organizations in human rights matters.’133 Goodwin-Gill and
McAdam review the mandates and functions of international organisations (IOs)
created to provide protection to refugees, starting from the era of the League of
Nations to the United Nations (UN).134 They, however, do not address the question
of the accountability of these organisations for their internationally wrongful acts
or the injurious consequences arising out of activities that international law does
not prohibit. The thrust of the book, in general, is focused on the obligations of
States to protect refugees. I, however, greatly benefited from their discussion of the
UNHCR’s standing in general international law.135
In addition to the refugee law specific works, I also attempted to review two
works that focus on the accountability of IOs for human rights violations. In the
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first place, Verdirame’s book on the United Nations and Human Rights seeks to
address three factual, doctrinal, and philosophical questions about the
accountability of the United Nations for human rights violations, albeit it focuses
on the doctrinal questions.136 Verdirame deals with the operational side of IOs,
which international law scholars often ignore, and captures how the UN was
involved in a consistent pattern of egregious violation of human rights in its
humanitarian relief operations (UNHCR), peace support operations, international
administration of territory (Kosovo and East Timor, now Timor Liste), and
imposition and administration of sanction regimes.
Verdirame convincingly argues that international law imposes binding human
rights obligations incumbent upon the UN and its agencies. And while he welcomes
the International Law Commission’s draft articles on the responsibility of IOs as
providing a legal framework or legal route for engaging the accountability of the
UN and its agencies for violations of human rights, he concludes that realistically,
the draft articles are incapable of resolving the vexing question of the enforcement
of the human rights obligations of the UN.137 My dissertation, in some respects,
shares Verdirame’s perspectives and I would say, builds on his work, especially on
the aspects of the UNHCR’s administration of refugee camps. Verdirame focuses
on the legal aspects of the UNHCR’s administration of refugee camps, but I
demonstrate, using empirical evidence, how UNHCR’s administration of refugee
camps in some refugee-hosting states in the global south happens: the UNHCR
appropriates the the framework governance of refugee policy and practice of these
states. I also locate the sites within the UNHCR that make its appropriation of the
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framework governance of refugee policy and practice in the refugee-hosting states
in the global south possible.
The second work in the genre of accountability of IOs for human rights
violations I reviewed is Wouters et al’s, edited book.138 In this book, twenty-one
contributors explore how IOs may be held accountable for violations of human
rights or how such violations of human rights may be attributed to them. In addition
to discussing conceptual issues, such as whether accountability or responsibility
should be the legal route for holding IOs accountable for human rights violations,
the vexing question of whether IOs have human rights obligations since they are
not signatories to human rights treaties receives some attention. And crucially, the
book addresses questions about the mechanisms for enforcing the accountability of
IOs for violations of human rights and the immunity from the jurisdiction of
national courts of IOS, and whether a wrongful act should be attributed to an IO
or to its Member States or both and under what circumstances.139 Wouters et al,
like Verdirame, address the operational side of the work of IOs, focusing also on
the humanitarian and peacekeeping operations

and the international

administration of territory of the United Nations.
Of particular interest to me in this book was Sandvick’s chapter on the
UNHCR,140 which focused on how to frame accountability in the context of the
relationship between the UNHCR and refugees in the global south seeking
resettlement in the global north. While I greatly benefitted from the book’s chapters
on contentious legal issues, such as whether IOs are bound by international human
rights norms and whether members states of an IO are to be held accountable for
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the human rights violations attributable to the IOs, my work differs fundamentally
from the book’s discussion of the questions of accountability in the context of the
UNHCR and refugee resettlement. The chapter on UNHCR and refugee
resettlement frames accountability as measures or ‘governance tools’ designed to
‘achieve legitimacy for bureaucratic interventions.’141 In contrast, however, my
dissertation explicitly addresses the question of how, and to what extent, the
UNHCR can be held accountable, under international law, for its contribution to
environmental harm and suffering of refugees in the refugee camps that it helps
create, fund, and administer.
I also reviewed the relevant literature in the field of international politics and
relations and two works stand out: Loescher’s and Hammerstad’s work on the
UNHCR from an international politics and relations perspective. Hammerstad’s
2014 book142 ‘explores the rise and decline of the UNHCR as a global security actor’
in the ‘context of the dramatic shifts in perceptions of national and international
security that have taken place after the end of the Cold War.’143 Hammerstad takes
on critics of the UNHCR who argue that the UNHCR abandoned its non-political
mandate contending that by their very nature, refugees are always political issues
and so the UNHCR’s competence and work have always been ‘inherently
political.’144 She argues that what should be asked ‘are the political factors in the
UNHCR’s external environment that impede the agency from achieving its goals;
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what strategies does the UNHCR employ to overcome these impediments; and how
well have these strategies worked?’
The book’s central argument is that the ‘UNHCR’s leverage vis-à-vis more
(materially) powerful actors in the arena of international refugee politics (especially
the UNHCR’s donor states) can mainly be found on the ideational and discursive
level.’ In other words, the UNHCR’s leverage rested on its ability to generate ideas
and influence discourse on issues relating to refugee protection. The theoretical
orientation of the book is described as ‘cautious constructivism of the English
School kind.’145 This theoretical orientation allows Hammerstad to ‘show that the
study of ideas and discourse is of crucial importance if one is to understand the
reasons for and direction of UNHCR’s transformation.’
Hammerstad’s analysis of the UNHCR’s transformations in various contexts
provided me with insights that challenged my own conventional wisdom and
therefore allowed me to approach the question how far the UNHCR had or did not
have effective control over decision-making processes that engendered refugee
encampment in the refugee-hosting states of the global south. This has implications
for the question of allocation of international accountability for the UNHCR’s part
in refugee encampment and the consequences of refugee camps on on both the
environment and the well-being of refugees in the camps.
My study differs from Hammerstad’s in two aspects, however. In the first
place, the conversation in her book is about the reasons and directions that forced
the UNHCR to adapt and transform the way it implemented its competence to
provide international protection to refugees and to remain relevant to States. The
focus of my research question, on the other hand, is about how to hold the UNHCR
accountable for its actions or omissions, the external environment in which it is
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operating notwithstanding, that produce refugee encampment, which in turn
produced harm to the environment and untold suffering for refugees in camps for
many years, and in some camps, such as the Dadaab Refugee Camp Complex
(DRCC) in Kenya, for over 25 years, in fact, now 30 years. Secondly, Hammerstad
appears to suggest that it is wrong to criticise UNHCR for politicising its work and
abandoning the humanitarian imperatives that were meant to define its activities
on behalf of refugees and to discount the consequences of doing so for refugee
protection; instead we should endeavour to understand the reasons that compelled
it to adopt radical changes and transformations to implementing its statutory
obligations to refugees.146
I, in contrast, interrogated issues beyond the reasons that caused the UNHCR
to securitise refugee issues in a post-Cold War era in its calculated move to become
relevant to the states that created it. I argue, with Loescher, that partly on the
evidence of the UNHCR’s ability to independently manoeuvre the treacherous
terrain of international politics in order to serve its institutional interests, that the
UNHCR is not a passive actor on the international plane. And crucially, the
UNHCR enjoys some level of asymmetries of power relations with weak states and
non-governmental organizations, to an extent that it has, in some contexts,
appropriated the framework governance of refugee policy in those weak states. In
these contexts, I submit, that as an independent actor, other legal questions
concerning its status in international law notwithstanding, UNHCR should be held
to account for its actions or omissions that resulted in encampment of refugees with
injurious consequences on the environment and the condition of refugees in
encampment.
Loescher, possibly one of the first international relations scholars to use
insights from that field to interrogate the work of the UNHCR, published a ground-
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breaking book in 2001 that critically examines the role of the UNHCR in the past
fifty years in world politics and the strengths and drawbacks of its being politically
active.147 He observes that ‘[w]hile the UNHCR has had many successes over the
past 50 years, it has also had many failures.’148 Among its failures, is an
‘organizational culture that makes innovation and institutional change difficult’
and ‘[s]ome UNHCR senior management are arrogant and insensitive to the needs
of refugees.’149 Crucially, Loescher argues that beyond the ‘face value’ of the ‘selfpresentation’ by the UNHCR of its image and identity, the ‘UNHCR has not just
been an agent in world politics but a principal actor’ and ‘the notion that it is a
passive mechanism with no independent agenda of its own is not borne out by the
empirical evidence of the past half century.’150
Loescher’s book is not about UNHCR’s accountability for its failures. His
incisive analyses of the strategic manoeuvring that UNHCR engaged in in order to
survive, including expansion of its activities beyond Europe to Africa, however,
provided me with valuable ideas both in the initial stages of my research and writing
on how to frame and develop the question of UNHCR accountability for the harm
to the environment resulting from encampment of refugees and the deplorable
conditions under which refugees live in the camps.
I end the review of the conversations in the relevant literature with the
monumental works of Holborn. Indeed, Holborn, may be the earliest scholar to
have produced a substantive work on the UNHCR. In her book published in
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1975,151 Holborn explains the UNHCR’s activities ‘during its first twenty-two years,
1951 – 1972’152 in an ‘historical context and the environment within which the
UNHCR has worked.’153 It is the first comprehensive review of the work of
UNHCR since it started activities on behalf of refugees and States in 1951; it is a
monumental work comprising 50 chapters published in two volumes. Volume 1
covers 29 Chapters while volume 2 has 21 chapters. In the first volume Holborn
covers six thematic areas: from the early international efforts on behalf of refugees
(1921 – 1952), the establishment of the UNHCR, international protection, the
search for solutions in Europe, resettlement of refugee overseas, and refugees in
Asia, and the Near and Middle East. In volume 2 she continues with the theme on
refugees in Asia, the Near and Middle East and to this she embarks on refugees in
Africa, programmes for refugees in some select African countries sheltering the
refugees, and concludes with a chapter on some reflections on the growth of
UNHCR in 1972.
Holborn’s book was useful to my project in two aspects. Firstly, as one of the
earliest and oldest intellectual history on the UNHCR, it, in a general sense,
enriched my grasp of the historical contexts in which the UNHCR started
developing and nurturing relationships with various actors, including governments
and other international non-governmental organisations, in order to implement its
statutory functions of providing international protection to refugees and helping
states to find durable solutions to the refugee problem as understood in the first
twenty-two years.154 How she defines or characterises the nature of these
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relationships was of great interest to me in my search for understanding. Secondly,
her explanation of the activities of the UNHCR in Africa, especially its relationship
with African governments,155 provided insights for my understanding of the
UNHCR’s role in the encampment of refugees in Africa and how, from her
perspective, relationships between the UNHCR and refugee-hosting states in Africa
were constituted. Moreover, her work provided me with some backdrop against
which to place other more recent works, such as Loescher’s and Hammerstad’s that
I reviewed already.
My study differs from Holborn’s, however. The most obvious difference is that
her work is a grand historical narrative about how the UNHCR implemented its
competence during the first twenty-years since 1951. My project, by contrast, is
about UNHCR’s accountability, under international law, for its refugee
encampment activities and the resulting harm to the environment and the
deplorable, inhuman and degrading conditions in which refugees live in
encampment. While, as with Hammerstad, I agree with Holborn that the external
environment in which the UNHCR operates is sometimes treacherous, my study
argues that the UNHCR’s external environment in itself does not diminish the case
for accountability because its exercise of power and the enjoyment of certain rights
and autonomy entails its accountability for the use of that power and privilege. That
conversation on the accountability aspect of the activities of the UNHCR is missing
in Holborn’s monumental work.
1.5

Gaps in existing Relevant Literature and my contribution

Despite the evidence that refugee camps negatively affect the environment and
refugees, however, few studies, if any, on refugee law, policy, and practice in the
global south have explicitly addressed the question of the accountability of the key
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actors, especially those that have leverage and influence such as the UNHCR.
Wilde in his 1999 article and Janmyr in her 2014 book are possibly the only scholars
to address the question of the accountability of the UNHCR for the violation of the
rights of refugees in camps. Kinchin focused on organisational accountability of the
UNHCR and discounted the role of international law in framing the UNHCR’s
accountability. While Wilde focuses exclusively on refugees, Janmyr’s work
convers both refugees and internally displaced persons and a more detailed
examination of the questions of UNHCR’s international accountability than
Wilde’s. Janmyr, however, accepts refugee encampment as fait accompli that does
not involve accountability questions; she is only concerned with how to mitigate
human rights violations within the refugee camps.
And crucially, leading international refugee law scholars either focus on ‘rules
of public international law which relate to refugees’ and the ‘nature and extent of
the right of States, under existing international law, to give asylum’ 156 or ‘seeks
clearly to adumbrate, in both theoretical and applied terms, the authentic scope of
the international legal rights which refugees can bring to bear in states of asylum’.157
Yet others ‘describe the foundations and framework of international refugee law by
concentrating on three core issues: the definition of refugees, the principle of nonrefoulement, and the protection of refugees’.158 None of these monumental
international law based works address the question of UNHCR’s accountability for
its part in encamping refugees and the consequences of refugee encampment on the
both the environment and condition refugees.
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The international politics based studies on UNHCR159 either focus on the
alleged dilemmas and political environment in which it operates or simply praise
its work; none explicitly question UNHCR’s accountability for its role in the
decisions that produce refugee encampment and the injurious consequences of this
on the environment and the condition of refugees in camps, such as Dadaab and
Kakuma refugee camps in Kenya. In addition, works resulting from international
conferences often focus on international law and the role of international
organisations such as the United Nations and its agencies in resolving the problem
of refugee.160 The question of the accountability of these international agencies is
rarely addressed.
All these scholars, each in their own right, are perfectly justified in pursuing a
specific area or topic on refugee matters they consider most important to them for
a variety of reasons, some of which are given in their respective works. In this
context, my study makes a modicum contribution to the body of existing
knowledge, focusing attention in an area that could not fit in the previous scholarly
works on the UNHCR and international protection of refugees generally.
In the first place, specifically focusing on the accountability of the UNHCR
for harm to the environment and refugees resulting from its policies and practices
of refugee encampment, allowed me to interrogate the decision-making processes
and structures that produce refugee encampment in refugee-hosting states in the
global south like no other study, critical or not, about the work of the UNHCR.
None of the studies I reviewed in the preceding sections of this Chapter have
addressed this important aspect, namely, how the decisions that produce refugee
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encampment are actually arrived at and who are the actors that actually decides
that refugees, as a matter of course, should be assisted in camps only. The
conventional wisdom is that refugee encampment is the sole decision of refugee
hosting-hosing states in the global south.
Even Janmyr’s work, which asserts that the ‘phenomenon of refugee camps
lies at the heart of this book,’161 does not provide a methodical interrogation of how
the decision making processes the produce refugee camps are made and by whom
and the significance of this in implicating the question of allocation of international
accountability. But in Chapter 3, I demonstrate that the UNHCR is the architect of
refugee encampment in refugee-hosting states in the global south and has effectively
appropriated the framework governance of refugee policy in many of these states in the
global south. This is a significant finding because knowing exactly how the
decisions that produce refugee encampment are made or produced has two
important implications. First, if provides better insights for the continued campaign
to end refugee encampment in the global south and may strengthen the case for
alternatives to camps. Second, it raises fundamental questions about how the
UNHCR is in practice exercising its supervisory function and how its apparent
usurpation of the framework governance of refugee policy of many refugee-hosting
states in the global south undermines its other functions of seeking durable solutions
for the problems that refugees confront in these countries of refuge.
In the second place, my study is possibly the first to critically review the
UNHCR’s internal processes and structures for handling or dealing with refugee
emergencies and demonstrate how refugee camps are an integral component of is
refugee emergency preparedness strategy. Exposing these processes may provide
leads for further research that may in future confirm or refugee my theories. In
addition, understanding these internal processes and structures reveal how the
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UNHCR over the years has acquired exceptionally high skills and experiences in
innovating how to improve on delivering emergency assistance to people in need
of international protection, whether refugees or other categories of persons. In other
words, from studying the UNHCR’s internal processes and structures that produce
refugee encampment, I have contributed to a better understanding of the UNHCR’s
capacity and influence, which most studies have taken for granted.
In the third place, my study shows how the UNHCR’s accountability could
be enforced using two legal routes consisting existing rules and principles of
international law governing accountability: the traditional responsibility for
internationally wrongful acts route and the emerging route of international liability
for injurious consequences arising out of activities that international law does not
prohibit. Most of the studies on the accountability of IOs focus on the
internationally wrongful acts route. Where this route is chosen, the focus is on the
rules and principles governing the accountability of states, both under customary
law and the ILC’s draft articles on state responsibility and the rules and principles
governing accountability of IOs under the draft articles on responsibility of IOs.
My study, by contrast, in addition to the traditional legal route of
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, includes the legal route of
international accountability for injurious consequences arising out of activities that
international law does not prohibit. I believe that this latter legal route has more
potential for engaging the accountability of actors such as the UNHCR whose
activities international law does not prohibit, but do have serious injurious
consequences on people, both as individuals and community, property, and the
environment.
1.6

Conclusion
Refugee camps are not simply some innocent spaces where humanitarian

actors tirelessly work to save lives of human beings labelled refugees. For sure some
good intentions and work may be the initial driving force, but a careful scrutiny of
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what goes on in these spaces reveal the reality of what these places are: technologies
or devices of power and control at the hands of a few people who have a particular
vision of what it means to be humanitarian. Refugee camps have serious negative
impact on the both the environment, within and the surrounding areas, and the
people who live in them. The critical question is who should be held accountable
for the harm, both to the environment and the people living in the camp, resulting
from refugee encampment? How can that entity, if identified, be held accountable
under international law. This, and other related questions, are the central concerns
I sought to explore in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2 : THEORY AND METHOD

2.1 Introduction
How to develop my main research question and write my dissertation was one of
the most challenging dilemmas of my whole experience in undertaking this study.
At the root of this dilemma for me was the question or issue that Banakar and
Travers aptly capture: ‘the issue of methods and how methods are used by different
theoretical traditions.’1
I realised that as many scholarly methods exist as theoretical traditions and
schools of thought.2 Across the disciplines and, especially in law, there is no
consensus on which method and theory is the correct one for undertaking a
particular piece of legal research.3 What compounds the situation is that beneath
the apparently ‘objective’ contestations of theory and method are loaded political
undertones and biases.4 But for some scholars, such as Rubin, the issue of methods
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in law was settled long time ago until legal scholarship ‘irrevocably dismantled its
formalist home’ when some scholars started ‘to link law and other disciplines…’ 5

2.2 Method and Theory as Understood in this Dissertation
It is necessary to explain what school of thought, theory, and method as used
in the context of this dissertation mean and how that aided my search for answers
to the research question and the analyses in the various chapters.

2.2.1

School of Thought

I believe that human beings generally have a predisposition to “seeing things”
from a specific perspective or worldview or some may see things from different
but interconnected perspectives. This worldview may be shared with others, but
others may also contest it. I suggest, from this viewpoint, a school of thought, in
its simplest sense is a group of people who “see things” from the same perspective
or worldview. Indeed, I looked up what a school of thought means in one English
Dictionary, The Oxford English Dictionary,6 but discovered that there was more than
one definition. One particular definition struck me as compelling:
The body of persons that are or have been taught by a particular
master (in philosophy, science, art, etc.), hence in a wider sense,
a body of or succession of persons who in some department of
speculation or practice are disciples of the same master, or who

Hong Chui (eds.), Research Methods for Law, 2nd (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017) 231 at
236 – 237.
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are united by a general similarity of principles and methods…(my
emphasis)7

From this definition, a school of thought consists of a group of people who
share any of a set of philosophical, ethical, normative, legal, political, social,
economic, religious, artistic, and scientific ideas about being or about cause and
effect or substance of a certain phenomenon or phenomena in a given society or
society in general. The group or its members may develop or borrow from other
groups, procedures and system of ideas or statements to explain the phenomenon
or phenomena.
Alternatively, a school of thought is a group of people who simply hold a
certain world view about everything in human experience,

physical or

metaphysical, i.e., whether philosophical, ethical, normative, legal, political,
social, economic, religious, artistic, scientific, and are united in theory and
method. Thus, each school of thought has a world view and that world view
informs or conditions their views, beliefs, and ideas about society, law, economics,
politics, religion, etc. These, in turn, informs each school of thought’s choices and
development of methods and theories for studying and explaining the given
phenomenon, e.g., defining what law is and its sources and validity, whether a
court, a national court or an arbitration court’s decision enunciates a rule of
domestic law or of international law, what accountability entails or should entail
in international law.
Seen from this perspective, Scholasticism, Legal Positivism, Legal Realism
(both American and Scandinavian), Third World Approaches to International
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Law (TWAIL),8 Legal Formalism, The New Haven School, Critical Legal
Studies, Law and Economic, Feminist Jurisprudence, and International Law and
International Relations are schools of thought about law, national or
international, but not methods or theories of law. They each, for example, posit
theories to explain what law is or the essence of law, or certain legal issues , and
adopt some procedures or methods, but they are not theories or the methods of
law and legal analysis in themselves.
2.2.2 Theory

The term “theory” may be understood in a variety of senses and across disciplinary
boundaries in the English-speaking world. A quick look up in an English
dictionary of the meaning of “theory,” gives one interesting definition:
A scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an
explanation or account of a group of facts or phenomena; a
hypothesis that has been established by observation or
experience, and is propounded and accepted as accounting for
the known facts; a statement of what are held to be the general
laws, principles, or causes of something known or observed.9

I gleaned three broad senses or understanding of theory from this definition.
First, theory as a set of ideas or statements. In this category I could, for example, think
of several sets of ideas that are held to be the explanation of something, such as a
theory of colonialism; a theory of imperialism; a theory of power; a theory of
hegemony; a theory of natural law; a theory of law; a theory of international
liability, a theory of accountability, and a theory of accident causation. In each of
these theories, and without having to go into the details of each theory, there are a
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set of core ideas that are held as explanation for each of these phenomena:
colonialism, imperialism, power, hegemony, liability, accountability, and
accidents causation. There might be more than one theory for each of these
phenomena since in practice there are different schools of thought or worldviews
just about everything.
Second, theory as a hypothesis. In this sense, a hypothesis explains known facts
or facts to be established or discovered about a given phenomenon. But unlike
theory as ideas or statements, whereby a set of ideas are held to be explanation for a
given phenomenon, theory as a hypothesis is grounded in observations and
experience or experiments from which certain findings and conclusions about a
phenomenon are drawn. Some examples of theory as hypothesis grounded in
observation and experience from legal scholarship, include a theory of criminal
justice as a deterrence to crime, a theory of urban law enforcement, a theory of
commercial litigation, and a theory of accountability or responsibility. Examples
from the natural and physical sciences, include the theory of motion, the big bang
theory, the theory of photosynthesis or the theory of photosynthetic organisms, or
Isaac Newton’s best known theory of gravity.
A common feature of hypothesis based theories is their reliance on what I
describe as quantitative empiricism, that is to say, empirical observations or
experimentation that generate quantitative data, from which inferences are drawn.
Of course, theory as ideas or statements, namely, ideas that are held as an
explanation for a phenomenon can be generated from observation as well from
other forms of data or facts, such as interviewing a purposively selected category
of participants or collecting evidence of certain practices of states that have
matured into a custom and therefore rule of international law. In this context,
theory as ideas or statements can be said to relay on qualitative empiricism, that is to
say, empirical observation and data collected using qualitative methods.
Third, theory may be considered as a statement of generally accepted laws,
principles or causes of a given phenomenon that is known or observed. Some examples
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include, the theory of international accountability of States (traditionally, theory
or doctrine of state responsibility), the theories of the law of contract, and the
theory of evidence. In the natural and physical sciences, examples include,
Kepler’s three laws of planetary motion, Hubble’s law of cosmic expansion, or
the laws of demand and supply.
Thus, “theory” means simply a statement or set of statements or ideas that
explain facts about a given phenomenon and it is in this sense that I use it in this
dissertation. I believe, theory is conceptually different from method and a school
of thought.
2.2.3

Schools of Thoughts and their Theoretical Commitments
Relevant to this Study

A discussion of all the various schools of thought in international law is beyond
the scope of my dissertation. Instead, I chose the Socio-Legal Studies, TWAIL, the
New Haven School, and Political Economy schools of thought and their theoretical
commitments as the relevant framework to aid my explanations of the various
components of my research question, namely, how to hold UNHCR accountable,
and to what extent, under international law, for its contribution to harm to
environment resulting from encampments of refugees and the conditions of
refugees in the camps which it helps to create, fund, and administer.
There are several issues that I had to understand and explain in my
dissertation. I had to understand, for example, how decisions about refugee
encampment are made and who makes them. This is important because of the
issue of allocation of responsibility for the injurious consequences of refugee
encampment to the various actors involved in using refugee camps as a technology
for protection refugees protection. A conceptual analysis, for example, of relevant
UNGA resolutions establishing UNHCR and subsequent resolutions and
cooperation agreements that UNHCR concludes with refugee-hosting states in the
global south alone cannot help me achieve this task. In addition, focusing on States
as the bad guys would not expose me to the types of asymmetrical power relations
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that exist between UNHCR and some the refugee-hosting states in the global
south. I needed further facts or information or data to confirm or refute my
preliminary findings. In other words, a black-letter approach alone, as Legal
Positivism would demand, is not enough. The four schools of thought and their
theoretical commitments offered me a variety of lenses with which to examine and
analyse the issues.
I explain, albeit briefly, each school of thought and the aspects of its theory
that is relevant for my analyses and discussions of the issues in this dissertation
in the sections that follow.

2.2.3.1 TWAIL

The Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) appears to defy
precise definition as the proverbial elephant that some blind persons attempted to
define. Thus, some writers and scholars, say TWAIL is ‘a collection of scholars’
committed to ‘identifying the political, cultural and economic biases embedded in
the international legal project’10; it is ‘not so much a method as a political grouping
or strategic engagement with international law.’11
Indeed, some have aptly asked whether TWAIL is a theory or a
methodology.’ 12 Others say TWAIL is ‘a response to decolonisation and end of
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Luis Eslava & Sundhya Pahuja, “Beyond the (Post) Colonial: TWAIL and Everyday Life of
International Law” (2012) 45:2 Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee VRU 195 – 221 at 195.
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International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, or Both?” (2008) 10 International Community Law
Review 371; on a critique of TWAIL’s theoretical commitments or lack of thereof, see, e.g., John D.
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direct European colonial rule over non-Europeans.’13 Yet, others suggest that
‘TWAIL is a decentralised network of academics who share common
commitments in their concern about the Third World.’14 Another scholar says,
‘TWAIL agglomerates different critical scholars’15 and ‘not a uniform school of
thought,’16 but yet sought to explain the ‘purpose of this school of thought.’17
I believe, however, that these various renditions of what TWAIL means or
stands for, while not invidious per se, do not accurately capture the essence of
TWAIL as an intellectual endeavour. Describing TWAIL as a ‘response’ or a
‘movement’ or ‘theory’ or a ‘methodology’ or any other conjecture only serves to
undermining it as a serious alternative school of thought that seeks to not only expose
the inherent flaws within the existing international legal rules and principles and
legal order, but also provide alternative visions of an international law that
embraces the diversity of our earth, equity, and justice.

Haskell, “TRAIL-ing TWAIL: Arguments and Blind Sports in Third World Approaches to International
Law” (2014) 27:2 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 383.
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Therefore, I submit that TWAIL, properly understood, is a school of thought
of international law. It is a school of thought not because its members share the
same theories of international law; nay, it is a school of thought because its members
share (broadly) common experiences of western European colonial conquest and domination
and thus share a special worldview about everything, but most especially the international
system that colonialism created. In other words, TWAIL is a world view about
international law that historical and contemporary events shape and continue to
inform. TWAIL is neither necessarily antithetical to other schools of thought about
international law nor steeped in historical fallacy or fantasy, if you like, as a means
to create, for lack of a better word, a binary physical and intellectual separation
between the global north and the global south.18 No, TWAIL, as a school of
thought, seeks to mobilise the intellectual power of the peoples of the “third
world” or global south in collaboration with sympathisers in the global north, to
consistently expose the inherent flaws of existing international law and propose
alternative rules and principles of international law that not only redress historical
injustices committed against the colonised peoples and their descendants, but also
promote equity and justice for all peoples on earth.
Some of TWAIL’s leading and pioneering scholars and theorists include
Ram Prakash Anand, Oji Umozurike, Upendra Baxi, Isa Shivji, Mohammed
Bedjaoui, Georges Abi-Saab, Nagendra Singh, and Christopher Weeramantry.19
Contemporary TWAIL scholars and theorists include, Karin Mickelson,20 Vasuki
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74

Nesiah,21 B.S Chimni22, Antony Anghie23, James Gathii24, Makau Mutua25, and
Obiora Okafor.26 Some have collaborated and published works on TWAIL’S
promise and what it can offer in interrogating issues such as individual
responsibility.27 Some scholars, such as Okafor, have posited theories to explain
the asymmetrical relationship between “third world” States and supranational
entities that are the watchdogs of the capitalist model of social and economic
organising.28
TWAIL scholars, like in most schools of thought, have different theoretical
commitments, many of which are or steeped or anchored in different theoretical
models that other schools of thought, such as Marxist, post-colonial, feminist,
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Vasuki Nesiah, “Decolonial CIL: TWAIL, Feminism and the Insurgent Jurisprudence” (2018) 112 The
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constructivism, and liberal have enunciated. TWAIL’s theoretical commitment
may be summarised into two theses.
First, is what I would call the Historical domination theory. International law
masquerades as a liberal project committed to distributing universal goods for all
peoples within their state structures. TWAIL scholars are, however, alive to how
international law came to exist and have undertaken to historicising the blind spots
of international law beyond the colonial experience. In this regard, TWAIL
scholars profess a particular fidelity to ‘a historical perspective’ as central ‘to
understanding the current features of and debates about the international system.’
29

This fidelity to ‘a historical perspective’ reminded me of the necessity to examine

the historical account of refugee encampment as key aspect in the process of
searching for answers to my main research question.
Second, is the imperialism and hegemony theory. TWAIL scholars theorise that
international law is imperialistic and hegemonic despite apparent transformations
since the second European war ended in 1945. In other words, international law
still fosters imperialistic and hegemonic interests which are pathological forces
that perpetuated the domination and subjugation of the peoples of the Third
World. For TWAIL scholars, international law is the instrument of continued
imperialism and hegemony of western states in the Third World and have
committed their intellectual energies to expose the structures and practices of
contemporary

imperialism,

hegemony

of

states

and

international

intergovernmental institutions, and how they perpetuate injustice against the poor
peoples of the Third World.30
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2.2.3.2

Socio-Legal Studies

Socio-legal studies is a school of thought whose world view about legal scholarship
is interdisciplinary. It challenges legal positivism’s world view of law as a selfcontained system of rules devoid of law’s moral predicates. Socio-legal scholars
take an ‘interdisciplinary approach to analysing law, legal phenomena, and
relationship between these and wider society.’ 31 This approach embodies a broad
group of ‘disciplines that applies a social scientific perspective to the study of law,
including the sociology of law, legal anthropology, legal history, psychology and
law, political science studies of courts, and science-oriented comparativists.’32
These disparate groups of intellectuals are unified in at least one respect: they share
‘a left-to-far-left critical orientation to law.’33
The basic tenet of Socio-Legal Studies is that ‘analysis of law is directly linked
with analysis of the social situation in which law applies’. 34 This implies that
context and empiricism are critical to socio-legal inquiry and theorising. In other
words, a social-legal approach requires that any study, whether of law and
institutional design or legal processes or law and legal decision, should be
grounded in its social, economic, political, and legal context. 35 In addition, legal
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analysis of a particular problem should be informed by data collected from the
field.
A socio-legal approach professes a fidelity to empiricism and a radical reorientation in analytic approaches from highlighting questions of the validity of
law to questions of the function of law in society. 36
The methods of Socio-Legal Studies largely derive from sociology and the
social sciences. In other words, Socio-Legal Studies adapted the traditional
research methods employed in the social sciences and sociology for purposes of
analysing law and legal studies.
I benefit from one of the tenets of Socio-Legal Studies in two fundamental
ways. First, it inspires me to take an interdisciplinary approach to the whole
dissertation, thereby reviewing both legal and non-legal documents and methods
of data collection and seeing theoretical paradigms beyond the discipline of law.
Second, its tenet, namely, that data from the field and not just reliance on the
‘analysis of the distinctive vocabulary of the law’37 should inform legal analysis of
a particular problem, influences me to undertake a case study and fieldwork. And
thus, my analyses in Chapter 3 and 5 heavily benefits from data collected from the
field.
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2.2.3.3

Policy-oriented Jurisprudence (New Haven School)

The policy-oriented jurisprudence, often referred to as the New Haven School,
initiated by McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, 38 is a school of thought about law
that is grounded in social fact and decision-making processes. It offers a ‘coherent
and systematic approach to the study of law’39 and a ‘framework of inquiry’ which
takes account of the ‘many variables which affect the process of decision-making
other than “legal norms.”’40 I attempted to summarise in the paragraphs that
follow the core theoretical commitment of this school of thought, hopefully,
without doing injustice to them.
First, the the New Haven School, theorises that law is a process of
authoritative decision and control aimed at achieving common community
goals.41 As such, law must be linked to the social processes ‘of shaping and sharing
values in a world community.’42 Thus, the ‘focus of inquiry must be directed to a
social process in which people influence one another consciously or otherwise.’ 43
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Second, law serves social values and ends for the community and so when
lawyers are dealing with problems, they should inquire beyond the black letter of
the law because ‘[w]hen ‘inquiry is focused only upon rules of law – verbalizations
– to the exclusion of actual choices or practices – decisions – there can be no
assurance that it will have any relevance to what is actually happening in a
community.’44
The New Haven School has had its critiques.45 In the first place, it has been
claimed that the New Haven School conflates law and politics. Indeed, Schachter
argues that it subordinates ‘law to policy…it virtually dissolves the restraints of
rules and opens the way for partisan or subjective policies disguised as law.’46
Simma and Paulus charge that the New Haven School’s theory about law
‘conflat[es] law, political science and politics plain and simple.’ 47
The New Haven School’s approach to law as a process of authoritative
decision-making, despite criticism, provided me a useful way to grasp how to
frame international obligations for the protection of the environment that
transcend the statist approaches, to capture the obligations of IOs as well. Seeing
law as a process of authoritative decision-making involving the members of the
international community allowed me to argue in Chapter 5 that the Stockholm
and Rio processes and resultant declaration provide good examples of social and
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political processes of decision-making that produced authoritative decisions on
how to protect and preserve the environment, which decisions must bind all
actors, whether States, IOs, or individuals.
2.2.3.4

Political Economy

The British, or rather Scottish, economist, Adam Smith, is said to have ‘founded
the study of political economy in its modern sense as the ‘application of scientific
methods of analysis to human society.’’48 But since Smith’s time, the theoretical
project of political economy, to paraphrase Mosco, has moved from the scientific
study of the relationship between the economy and politics to include four distinct
ideas, namely history, social totality, moral philosophy, and practice or praxis. 49
These ideas give political economy its character as a distinctive approach to
learning, thinking, and producing knowledge.
Several scholars have observed that there are various schools of thought of
political economy. Mosco devotes a whole chapter to discuss the various schools
of thought in political economy.50 Clement and Williams too observe that within
political economy there are divergent schools of thought and theorising, which
they broadly characterise as liberal and Marxist.51 Bartholomew and Boyd,
however, observed more than three decades ago that a ‘political economy of law
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remains relatively unelaborated and untheorized in Canada.’52 Ghai, Luckham,
and Francis, in contrast, produced a valuable work that deals with the political
economy of law from a Third World perspective.53 They provide, as one reviewer
put it, ‘an excellent overview of the role of law in the expansion of capitalism, the
creation of the colonial State, and the nature of the judiciary and legal profession
in post-colonial States.’54
A detailed discussion of each school of thought and its theoretical
commitments is beyond the scope of my dissertation. But I was looking for ideas
from theories of political economy that would help me to grasp how decisions that
produce refugee encampment are made. I realised that a black-letter law analysis
of legal texts, while important, would not provide insights into how decisions to
encamp refugee are made and who makes them.
Mosco’s political economy of communication, and his theoretical grounding
for the political economy of communication, in particular,55 appeared to provide
me with the theoretical approaches I was looking for. Mosco’s theory rests on
basic epistemological and ontological principles that provide a ‘framework for
understanding how we know things’ and a ‘foundation for understanding the
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nature of being.’56 Mosco points out that ontology ‘distinguishes seeing things as
either structures or as processes.’ Using these, he develops a political economy
approach that ‘places social processes and social relations and structures at the
foreground’ and uses concepts and ideas as entry points to understanding the
internal dynamics of a given problem or phenomenon. This approach allows him
to study social relations, and particularly power relations that mutually constitute
the production, distribution, and consumption of communication services and
commodities.57
Thus, Mosco’s thesis that we can understand the foundation of the nature of
things and social relations through a careful examination and grasping the
processes and structures provided me with the theoretical route I was looking for
to unlock how refugee encampment decisions are made. I deploy this in Chapter
3 to understand UNHCR’s international process and structures that produce
refugee encampment decisions.

2.2.4 Method or Methodology?

The term “method,” just as the term “theory,” I explained in the preceding section,
means different things in different disciplines and contexts. Some leading scholars
in international law use the term “method” interchangeably with “theory.” 58
Moreover, another term used quite frequently is “methodology” whose meaning
is left to the reader to decipher. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “method”
in several ways, but one definition means, ‘[a] special form of procedure adopted
in any branch of mental activity, whether for the purpose of teaching and

56
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exposition, or for that of investigation and inquiry.’59 Another definition of
method, in a wider sense,

refers to, ‘[a] way of doing anything especially

according to a defined and regular plan; a mode of procedure in any activity,
business, etc.’60 Adapting these definitions to legal research or scholarship, method
could simply mean a procedure of investigating any legal problem.
The procedures for inquiry or investigation may consist of several steps and
tools depending on the nature of the problem or question to be addressed. For a
typical legal problem, a starting step may be to examine the facts of the problem,
extract the material or most relevant facts and, then, frame or ask the relevant legal
questions and and where and how to find the law to resolve the problem. The
next step may involve identifying remedies, legal or otherwise; if legal remedies
are identified, this may be located in the texts of legislation or treaties or
agreements or in the doctrines enunciated in case law, domestic or international
or by leading publicists. In addition, a search will be necessary to find the relevant
volumes of the treaty series or the law reports. The problem, in some contexts,
may concern issues of governance and accountability of key actors either at the
national or international levels. Similar procedures may be identified and applied,
but the nature of the problem may require further empirical facts from practical
engagements with the key actors involved on the ground. In other words, to
address the legal problem identified may require empirical observations.
The data gathered is then analysed through a process of conceptual analysis
and the development of argumentation in which the pros and cons of each issue
are weighed and thoroughly examined in the light of the theoretical commitments
most relevant to the exposition being undertaken or the precedent and legislation
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that most suitably disposes off the issue at hand; these are either sustained,
modified, or rejected and, conclusions drawn, and prescriptions made.
Thus, I use the term “method” in this dissertation to mean the procedures for
data collection and conceptual analysis. Method, as I understand it, is also
conceptually distinct from “methodology.” In some of the literature, “method”
and “methodology” are used interchangeably.61 The term “methodology”
originally meant ‘[t]he science of methods.’62 But it also meant ‘the study of the
direction and implications of empirical research, or of the suitability of the
techniques employed in it.’63 In other words, methodology could simply mean the
study of the suitability (my emphasis) of methods employed in empirical research;
it is a science, not a procedure, of studying or scrutinising of methods of
conducting research. But in most of contexts in which the term is deployed, it has
been ‘weakened to mean little more than ‘method.’’ 64 Therefore, in this
dissertation, methodology is understood as a science of studying or scrutinising
methods of conducting research. In other words, methodology is the entire frame
of reference or theoretical assumptions undergirding a given study.
2.2.5

Conclusion

Method, theory, and school of thought, as understood in this dissertation are
distinct, albeit, interconnected concepts. Method is understood as the procedures
and techniques used to frame issues, collect data, and interpret and undertake legal
analysis. Theory refers to the statement of the core ideas developed for explaining
and confirming or refuting known or observed facts about a given phenomenon,
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say, encampment of refugees or law, domestic or international law. And a school
of thought is the world view of a group of people united by a shared world view,
theoretical commitment, and methods of understanding and explaining social
phenomena. The one aspect that unites all different schools of thought in law,
national or international law, is that all lawyers share the same basic procedures
of conceptual analysing and discussing legal issues. This method of conceptual
analysis is often referred to as the doctrinal method.
2.3 Methods of Data Collection
I had the dilemma of choosing between quantitative and qualitative methods and
which particular tools of each method to use. I wondered whether to use a survey
or to interview purposively selected participants, either as individuals or as a focus
group.
I envisaged two main challenges if I were to use a survey method. In the first
place, I would need to conduct the survey in more countries in the global south to
generate statistically significant data. This was not feasible both in the light of my
initial time frame and financial resources, although I had a generous Vanier
Graduate Scholarship and CIGI graduate scholarship. In the second place, and
crucially, if I used a survey to collect data from UNHCR and government officials
participants, how do I address the problem of participant bias. I was certain, from
my previous research and work experiences with refugee issues that certain issues
or questions, such as refugee encampment, were sensitive to both UNHCR and
government officials and neither have wanted the public to know the truth about
whose idea refugee encampment really was.
Therefore, UNHCR and government officials have the incentives to conceal
their true preferences for refugee encampment because they know that I am
studying questions about how to hold them accountable under international law
for the injurious consequences of refugees camps on the environment and refugees
86

in camps which one of them created, funds, and manages. Third, the problem with
using a survey was my own bias in framing the survey questions although
proponents of quantitative methods often suggest that closed-end questions are
allegedly bias-free; I argue that closed-end question have inherent elements of bias.
The alternative of interviewing purposively selected participants, either in a
one-on-one interview or a focus group, also presented its own type of challenges.
First, how to identify participants and from which country; second, the difficulty
of having to organise a focus group of government or UNHCR officials, or
refugees; third, bias both from participants since I would still be asking some direct
questions, including the primary question about whose idea refugee encampment
was; and fourth, my own bias because of my previous research and work
experiences with refugees and interactions with UNHCR and refugee-hosting state
government officials in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.
I chose, ultimately, qualitative methods of data collection, both doctrinal and
interviews of purposively selected participants, on one-on-one basis or focus
group, depending on the circumstances on the ground, to gather the relevant
information for writing my dissertation. The doctrinal method allowed me to
undertake a document survey, i.e., search databases for primary and secondary
sources of data. The interview or empirical approached allowed me to interview
participants purposively selected in one country in the global south. I planned for
both one-on-one interviews and focus group interviews because of past research
experience, especially with regard to interviewing refugees. Officials in charge of
refugee affairs, whether UNHCR or refugee-host state government, can change
positions about who can stay in the refugee camps, especially for researchers and
other persons. If this happened during my fieldwork, then I may not conduct oneon-one interviews. So, while one-on-one interviews with refugees was my
preferred tool, I incorporated into my fieldwork plan, alternative B, focus group
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interviews. The best way to optimise one’s time in such a scenario would be to
identify a focus group and conduct interviews with them.
I chose Kenya for my fieldwork because it never used to have refugee camps
until 1990. The interviews and participant observations provided me with ways to
overcome the likely bias of UNHCR and Government of Kenya (GoK) official
participants in responding to my interview questions or in their policy documents.
I could look for what Epstein and King describe as ‘revealed preferences,’65 of
participants and the activities of UNHCR in the camps generally to draw
inferences about the UNHCR’s preference for refugee camps and why Kenya
abandoned its laissez faire refugee policy and chose refugee encampment and
whose idea and decision refugee encampment was.
I chose qualitative over quantitative methods for another reason: the nature
of my main research question – framed as a how-question, not a what-question –
albeit both qualitative and quantitative methods are procedures of gathering
empirical data. Quantitative methods, while often touted as being scientifically
less biased in contradistinction to qualitative methods, focus on proving a ‘causal
model, or hypothesis’66 or ‘what works.’67 My dissertation’s main research
question is not necessarily seeking answers for understanding causal links or what
works, albeit I do interrogate certain aspects of causal links between the decisions
that produce refugee encampment and refugee camps and the injurious
consequences of refugee camps on the environment and refugees. Nor is my main

65

Lee Epstein and Gary King, “The Rules of Inference” (2002) 69:1 University of Chicago Law Review 1 at
93 – 94.

66

Gail M. Sullivan and Joan Sargeant, “Qualities of Qualitative Research: Part I” (2011) Journal of Graduate
Medical Education 449 at 449.

67

Ibid.

88

research question seeking to hypothesize qua hypothesize UNHCR accountability
under international law, although I do theorise based on the date collected how
the decisions that produce refugee encampment are made and identify observable
implications that are relevant to the questions of the accountability of the
UNHCR, under international law, for its actions or omissions in relation to
refugee encampment that cause harm to the environment and refugees in camps it
helps create, fund, and administer.
Rather, I am interested in understanding how this can be done or achieved in
the context of current rules of international law and international politics. This
required, among other things, my grasping of how the decisions of refugee
encampment are constructed and the role of the main actors in the provision of
international protection to refugees in the encampment of refugees to be able to
allocate and attribute responsibility for the injurious consequences resulting from
refugee encampment on the environment and the conditions of refugees in the
camps. Understanding the decision-making processes that produce refugee
encampment necessitated performing two tasks: first, reviewing policy documents
and reports that the main actors in refugee protection, such as the UNHCR,
refugee-host

state

governments,

and

international

non-governmental

organisations produce; and second, interacting with some of key UNHCR and
government personnel and refugees in the field in ways that would allow me to
probe further how encampment decisions are made and make necessary follow
ups and observations.
Therefore, the tools of quantitative methods, such as surveys, would have
been inadequate because they rely on closed-end questions that pigeonhole
responses or biases. In addition, quantitative methods, generally, rein in or restrict
related variables, are extremely controlled, and are mainly driven by synthetic
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logic or inductive reasoning.68 Fieldwork-based qualitative methods of data
collection, by contrast, allow for the framing of open-ended questions, which are
easily adaptable or flexible to draw or produce more answers or responses in a
specific context. The qualitative method focuses on the why and how about a
phenomenon and this necessitates a context specific interaction in natural setting
where the phenomenon or questions of interest can be intensely observed. That is
why it was necessary for me to undertake fieldwork in Kenya and visit a refugee
camp and interview individual participants and focus groups and observe intensely
the camp processes and structures to be able to grasp how refugee encampment
happens and why. In addition, some of the questions I had to ask participants
required some explanation not a straightforward ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers. In this
context, qualitative methods allow a participant room for explaining processes,
structures, decision, and experiences and make it, as I stated already, possible to
look for revealed preferences and minimise bias.
Some objections, however, may be raised to my using qualitative methods
of data collection, which are associated with social sciences and humanities
research methods, for a dissertation that seeks to understand questions about how
UNHCR can be held accountable under international law. Critiques may argue
that ‘[l]egal research, or much of it’69 is ‘different in character from research in
other fields because of the peculiarities of law and legal systems’70 and, therefore,
that a more appropriate method of data collection for a main research question

68
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steeped in law, and especially questions of international law, should have been the
traditional method of legal research and analysis: the doctrinal method.
The doctrinal method is regarded as the ‘most accepted methodology in the
discipline of law.’71 In conventional doctrinal research, the researcher takes one
or a series of legal questions or propositions as a starting point and defines the
research objective and, then, in a library or at home, locates authoritative
decisions, applicable legislation, and secondary analyses and discussions of these.
The legal researcher, having gathered relevant data, then ‘provides a systematic
exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, analyses the
relationship between the rules, explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps, predicts
future development’72 in the particular area of law whence the research question
was identified and framed. Indeed, doctrinal research methods or what other
scholars refer to as ‘‘black-letter-law’ approach,’73 it is claimed, ‘relies extensively
on using court judgements and statutes to explain the law.’74 It ‘aims to systematise
and rectify the law on any particular topic by a distinctive mode of analysis of
authoritative texts that consists of primary and secondary sources.’ 75
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These features of doctrinal research, I would suggest, demonstrate that it is a
qualitative method of doing legal research. Indeed, McConville and Chui assert
that ‘doctrinal research is qualitative research’ because ‘such research is a process
of selecting and weighing materials taking into account hierarchy and authority as
well as understanding social context and interpretation.’76 McConville and Chui
further claim that the methods of doctrinal research, ‘such as the identification of
relevant legislation, cases, and secondary materials in law can be seen as
analogous to a social sciences literature review.’ 77 If that is the case, it may be
argued that it was unnecessary for me to ‘borrow’ qualitative methods of data
collection from social sciences and humanities to collect data to answer a research
question that is legal in character. Indeed, Pendleton has advocated that legal
scholars should reject the dominance of empiricism – social science style – in legal
scholarship.78
Empiricism, I submit, if understood beyond the narrow confines of
quantitative data and statistical techniques and modelling, is relevant to legal
scholarship because legal analyses and synthesis is enriched when conducted on
evidence based on observation or experience. I argue with Epstein and King that:
‘[w]hat makes research empirical is that it is based on
observations of the world – in other words, data, which is just a
term for facts about the world. These fact may be historical or
contemporary, or based on legislation or case law, the results of
interviews or surveys, or the outcome of secondary archival
research or primary data collection…’79
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Therefore, incorporating empiricism in legal research might lead to a better
understanding of the efficacy or limitation(s) of existing rules of law on a particular
issue or subject, such as the accountability of IOs under international law, or the
regulation of the Internet and criminal activity online.

2.3.1 Data from Documents

I started the process of data collection for answering my research question with a
document survey, namely a list of things to do that helped me to get to what I
wanted to know about my main research question and how to get them. In other
words, I undertook a process of identifying a list of things to do that allowed me
to grasp the relationship between my main research question and the data required
to answer it.80
I identified and reviewed documents, including policy documents and reports
on refugee protection that the League of Nations, and the United Nations (UN)
organs, such as the General Assembly and the Security Council, subsidiary organs
such as the UNHCR, refugee hosting states, and NGOs produce.

2.3.1.1 Documents from the League of Nations

I started with the work of the League of Nations since it laid the foundation of
contemporary international protection of refugees. The work of the League of
Nations for refugees started in 1921 and ended in 1946. So, there is a vast body
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of materials that the League produced on refugee protection during its tenure,
which I could not complete reviewing within the time frame of my research
project.
Therefore, I decided to focus on reports produced during the first two years
of the League’s inaugural work on refugees, from April 1921 to December 1923. I
chose this time period because I anticipated that it was the League’s moment of
responding to a “refugee emergency” and therefore issues of refugee
accommodation, including encampment might have been high on the agenda. I
had to limit further the scope of documents I could review during this time frame.
I selected four key sets of documents. The first document is Dr Fridtjof Nansen,
the first League High Commissioner for Refugees, first report since taking office
in August 1921, on the work accomplished up to March 1922. 81 This report gives
a general overview of the assignments that the High Commissioner and his
officials had undertaken during the reporting period. It is important because it
provides a window into the policies of the first League High Commissioner for
Russian Refugees designed to address the Russian refugee crisis in Europe after
the first European War or World War I.
The second document is Dr Nansen’s report to the Fifth Committee of the
Assembly of the League of Nations.82 This report covers the work ‘carried out on
behalf of the League of Nations for Russian refugees since the last meeting of the
Assembly.’ The report ‘explains how the League came to take up the question,
how we have endeavoured to deal with our task, and the results which we have
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achieved.’83 One of the key issues the report covers is the best way to help refugees.
If this is the case, then it should provide insights into how the League High
Commissioner

for

Russian

Refugees

addressed

the

question

of

the

accommodation of Russian refugees, especially whether refugee camps were used
in the emergencies. It provides a useful contrast with contemporary approaches to
refugee protection, whereby refugee encampment is often defended on the basis of
the best way to help refugees.
A third document from the League of Nations comprises information
supplied by ten countries hosting Russian refugees about ‘the number and
condition of the Russian refugees in their respective territories.’ 84 Each of these
sets of documents provide valuable information on what each country has done
and plans to do for Russian refugees in their territories. In addition, they also
address the challenges that refugee-hosting states and refugees faced. The
information I gleaned from these reports by Member States of the League of
Nations provided, to some extent, a context within which to situate contemporary
refugee encampment. An intriguing question for me has been whether right from
the outset of the Russian refugee crisis European states adopted encampment
policies and if so why and if no, why not. Reviewing the information in these
document indicate that European governments of the early twentieth century
expressed more solidarity with the Russian refugees and did not emphasize
refugee camps as a technology of choice for helping them in their territories.
The fourth group of documents from the League of Nations that I reviewed
related to the work of the Greek Refugees Settlement Scheme (GRSS)
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implemented through an independent settlement Commission.85 I shall return to
the GRSS in detail in Chapter 3 and 5, but suffice to point out here that the GRSS
were a solution devised by the League of Nations in collaboration with the Greek
government of the time to the problem of over one million Greeks who were forced
from Turkey following the war in which the Turkish army captured ‘the whole of
Asia Minor’ and Smyrna.86 The work of the Commission is gleaned from its
reports87 and statements made by its chair before the Council of the League
Nations.88 The reports of the work of the GRSS provide useful contrast to
contemporary encampment of refugees under the auspices of the UNHCR.
In addition to these four broad sources information under the auspices of the
League of Nations on refugees, I also decided to review the League’s hard-law and
soft law documents on refugee protection. Specifically, I identified four soft-law
documents, called arrangements of 1922, 1924, 1926, and 1936 and two
conventions, the 1933 Convention on the International Status of Refugees and the
1938 Convention on Refugees coming from Germany.
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2.3.1.2

Documents from the United Nations

The United Nations also produces huge volumes of documentation of various
kinds, including on refugee protection since its inception in 1945. I am, however,
only interested in documents that will provide me information about issues
concerning the accountability of the UNHCR under international law for the
injurious consequences of refugee camps on the environment and refugees that it
helps create, fund, and administer. Even under these broad them, I chose to focus
on four types of documents. The first set of documents is are contained in the UN
Juridical Yearbook, which contain documentary material of a legal character
concerning the United Nations and related inter-governmental organisations.’89
Key legal questions concerning the United Nations and its organs are addressed
in the volumes of this document.
The second set of documents relevant to my research question relate to the
work of the UN on codification of international law, especially the work of the
International Law Commission (ILC) on the law of international responsibility
and liability for the injurious consequences arising out of acts that international
law does not prohibit. These information are produced yearly both in the ILC’s
annual reports to the General Assembly of the United Nations and its flagship
publication, the Yearbook of the International Law Commission and available online.
The third set of documentation relate to the reports of major UN sponsored
international conferences on the environment. The earliest of these reports is the
UN report on the conference on human environment.90 This report covers the
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proceedings of the UN conference on the human environment held in Stockholm,
Sweden, in 1972. The second report covers the proceedings of the Rio Conference
of 1992, which is in three volumes.91 The first volume covers the resolutions
adopted by the Conference and in particular the declarations and principles; the
second volume covers the proceedings of the Conference; and the third volume
contains the statements made by states that attended the conference. This report,
like the previous report from the 1972 conference have all the good ideas about
how best to conserve the environment and who has responsibility for what, when
and how. Thus, it will be useful for my analysis of how refugee encampment
relates to the principles and standards enunciated in the report and who bears
responsibility for the consequences of encampment on the environment. There are
other reports, e.g., the World Summit report92 and the UN conference on
sustainable development.93
The fourth set of documents relate to legal materials on the environment,
such as the UN Convention on climate change94 and the Convention on
biodiversity.95
In addition to broader UN documentation, the UNHCR also produces a
variety of documentation on its work for providing international protection to
refugees. Some of these include, the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, now in its

91

See, Report

of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN Doc

A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1) (1992).
92

See, Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc A/CONF.199/20 (2002).

93

See, Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, UN Doc A/CONF.216/16 (2012).

94

UN, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107.

95

UN, Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79.

98

fourth edition,

UNHCR’s Refugee Operations and Environmental Management,

UNHCR Global Trends, UNHCR, Global Reports, UNHCR Statistical Yearbook,
and the High Commissioner’s annual reports to the UN General Assembly. 96
2.3.2 Data from Case Law

I located at least two case-law documents of national and international courts. The
international case, the Sufi case, that the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) decided in 2010 concerns two Somali refugees whom the United
Kingdom had wanted to return to Somalia or the Dadaab Refugee Camp
Complex, in Kenya. The domestic case concerns challenges to Kenya government
directive in 2012 that all refugees living in Nairobi and other urban centres must
go and live in the Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps.
How to find the most relevant documents from which to ‘mine’ data for
answering my research question was a real challenge; it was like finding my way
through a thick forest. I, however, surmounted this challenge with the help of
modern technology in three possible ways. First, I used ‘Boolean search logic’ to
find documents.97 A Boolean search allows one to combine key words with

96

See, e.g., Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNGAOR, 68th Sess, Supp No 12,
UN Doc A/68/12 (Part I) (2013); Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNGAOR,
68th Sess, Supp No 12, UN Doc A/68/12 (Part II) (2013); Report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, UNGAOR, 67th Sess, Supp No 12, UN Doc A/67/12 (2012); Report of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, UNGAOR, 66th Sess, Supp No 12, UN Doc A/66/12 (2011); Report of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNGAOR, 65th Sess, Supp No 12, UN Doc A/65/12
(2010).

97

On this aspect, see, e.g., Ian Dobinson & Francis Johns, “Legal Research as Qualitative Research,” in
Mike McConville & Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
Ltd, 2nd Edition, 2017) 18; Jim Alderman, ‘Boolean Logic/Boolean Searching’ (2014), online:
https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=
1&article=1009&context=bliss>.

99

modifiers, such as “AND”, “OR,” and “NOT,” to produce the most relevant
results one is looking for. Web search engines, such as Google, as well as several
databases, actually use Boolean search logic.98 To look for text books, monograms,
and articles on refugee camps and their impact on the environment, I used
“keywords” from my research topic and modifiers, e.g., ‘“refugees” AND
“environment”’; ‘“refugees” AND ‘“Environmental Degradation,”’ ‘“refugees
AND “camps,”’ and “refugee camps” AND ‘“impact on environment.”’ Boolean
searching has its limitations, however, because the search terms used are often
subject or author oriented and may not produce the results sought.
Second, I browsed online data bases and educational, but commercialised,
data bases such as Hein Online, Lexis Advance Quicklaw, and WestlawNext
Canada. Browsing involves ‘relying on the structure of a database, where
navigation is done by an alphabetical list, a table of contents, a data range, or an
index, simply using mouse clicks to find a particular document.’ 99 Fortunately,
both Osgoode Library and York Libraries hold subscriptions to some of these
online data bases and I searched for documents using the structure of the databases
such as Hein Online using an alphabetical order, table of contents, or data range
or an index. In the event of difficulty, help was always available from the librarians
of the Osgoode Hall Law School Library; they were often handy proved to be so
valuable.
A third method that I used for identifying relevant documents was scanning
through newspapers’ “books section” and events or activities on refugee issues. I
focused on newspapers in East Africa because that is where I chose to do my
fieldwork and that is also where refugee encampment has been endemic. The
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problem with this approach is that newspaper book reviews are declining 100 and
one might be searching on barren land.
Finally, from our monthly meetings with my Supervisor, I learnt of a fourth
method of searching for documents in the library: physically scan the shelves,
whenever picking a particular book within the same row of shelves or when one
has sat for long, a break to stretch up tired muscles along the rows of shelves
looking for materials, the old-fashioned way also bore some surprising
information.

2.3.3

Data from Interviews

When I reviewed the select documents and reports, some gaps existed and the only
way to fill the gaps was to interview some of the key actors involved in the
provision of international protection to refugees and the refugees themselves. I had
to design an interview strategy and determine the questions to ask each group of
participants.
2.3.3.1

Preparation for Interviews

Before I left for fieldwork in Kenya to conduct interviews, I ensured that I was
properly prepared. First, I had to think and decide what kind of data or facts I
wanted to know that I could not obtain from my review of the documents I
identified; second who do I want to interview and what ethical issues needs to be
addressed; third what resources and how much of each will I need to be able to
conduct the interviews, from transport, accommodation, stationery, ethics
clearance, and research permits; fourth, what likely challenges will I encounter
once in the field for interviews, e.g., the problem of unforeseen interruptions that
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result in the postponement of interviews for several days or even weeks or camp
officials refusing me permission to stay in the camps; and finally, what type of
questions I will ask the participants and where will the interview sites be and how
long will each interview session take.
While all these aspects were important if I were to conduct successful
interviews, I realised that four of these, ethics clearance with the Human
Participants Review Sub-Committee of the Ethics Review Board, York
University, obtaining research permit from the Kenya Commission for Science,
Technology and Innovation, identifying who to interview, and the sites for
interviews were critical. So, I will explained each, a little bit more in the
subsections that follow.

2.3.3.2

Ethics Review and Approval

It is mandatory for all York University graduate students undertaking research
that involves human subjects to apply for ethics review and approval before they
can embark on fieldwork.101 Thus, I undertook an ethics review process before
going for fieldwork in Kenya to conduct interviews with participants I had
purposively identified. The Graduate Program, Osgoode Hall Law School, and
the Human Participants Review Sub-Committee of the Ethics Review Board,
York University, both supervise or oversee the ethics review process to ensure that
my project conforms to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council Research Ethics
Guidelines. The Sub-Committee, however, approves the project.
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Before embarking on the ethics review process, however, I had to complete
the ‘Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct of Research Involving
Humans Course on Research Ethics (TCPS 2: CORE).’ After completing the
TCPS 2: CORE course and receiving a certificate, I submitted my research project,
Refugee Camps, Environmental Degradation and Accountability of Actors in Refugee
Protection in February 2017 for ethics review and approval and it was approved on
12 May 2017. I attach to the dissertation the certificate of completion of the
Canadian Tri-Council on Research Ethics course as Appendix 1 and the Human
Participants Review Sub-Committee’s Ethics Approval as Appendix 2.
2.3.3.3

Research Permits and Permission to Visit Dadaab Refugee
Camp

Obtaining a research permit is a mandatory requirement for anyone intending to
conduct research in Kenya.102 Therefore, the first thing, after having secured a
place to live in Nairobi, on my first fieldwork trip to Kenya in June 2017, was to
follow up my application for research permit with the Kenya National
Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI). I had started
the application process online while still in Toronto, Canada, having established
that I need research permit to conduct research in Kenya.
I went to the NACOSTI offices located at Utali House, Uhuru Highway,
Nairobi on 16 June 2017 to deliver a reference letter, one of the supporting
documents required for completing the application for research permit, from my
Graduate Program and to meet officials there and find out how long for I would
have to wait before my application for research permit is approved. I had already
paid the fee and uploaded some of the key documents required on the NACOSTI
website. The official I met told me that, at a minimum, it would take up to 2 weeks;
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but the normal duration for processing a permit is 3 months. I requested that the
Commission use its discretion to expedite the process so that I could receive the
permit at least in a week’s time since I had uploaded the documents three months
earlier before my coming to Kenya. Secondly, I told the officer that I had limited
time in Kenya, and I did not want the Kenyan elections scheduled for August 2017
to have minimum impact on my research plans. The officer told me to call her
after one week. On 19 June 2017, however, my permit was approved. The permit
and letter are attached as Appendix 3 and 4; certain parts of the letter nd permit
are redacted to conform to the Faculty of Graduate Studies requirements.
In addition, I also needed permission to conduct research in the refugee
camps from both the government and UNHCR. I had selected, the Dadaab
Refugee Camp Complex because it was the first to be established and one time the
largest refugee camp in the world. The Secretary of Security in the Ministry of
Interior and Coordination of National Government, however, informed me,
during my first fieldwork trip in 2017, that I cannot go to Dadaab Refugee Camp
Complex (DRCC). He gave two reasons for denying me permission to go to
DRCC. First, allegedly, because of the threat of Al-Shabab terrorist group, who
were said to have members in the camp. Second, that as a Ugandan I may likely
become a target for the terrorist because Uganda was one of the countries that had
sent troops to fight them in Somalia. I was, however, allowed to go to DRCC
during my second trip in 2018 and the permit (parts redacted) to conduct research
there is attached as Appendix 5.
2.3.3.4

Who to Interview and How to Select them?

I decided that interviewing the key actors, i.e., UNHCR, government of Kenya
officials, NGOs, both national and international, involved in refugee protection,
and refugees themselves, would provide me with valuable data for answering part
of my main research question. I chose purposeful sampling, a non-probability
sampling technique, to select participants based on their knowledge and
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experiences. From a review of the relevant literature, I discovered that UNHCR
officials, such as the Country Representative and operational staff, the permanent
secretaries and refugee commissioners or directors under the relevant Government
of Kenya (GoK) ministry, refugees, non-governmental organisations, and leaders
of local communities where a refugee camp is located have unique positions that
make them likely possess knowledge and experience that can help me understand
how the decision-making processes that produce refugee camps are arrived at and
who are the key players in this.
My initial plan to conduct all one-on-one interviews with refugees and one
or two focus group discussions in the DRCC did not work out for reasons that I
had not anticipated. I had planned that for interviews in the refugee camps, I
would move into the camps and find accommodation there. I was aware, from my
first fieldtrip in 2017, that there were security issues associated with the terrorist
group Al Shabab, but I believed that the overall security provided was sufficient to
allow me stay in the refugee camps and conduct interviews with individual
refugees as much as possible and one or two focus group interviews. But on arrival
at DRCC, UNHCR officials told me that I cannot stay in the camp for security
reasons. I can hitch a ride to and from the camps with its staff, but I cannot stay
in any of the camps. In the circumstances, I could not conduct one-on-one
interviews with refugees in the camps. I switched to plan B: adopted focus groups
discussions as the main tool for data collection.
2.3.3.4.1

The UNHCR

From the preliminary review of relevant literature, the UNHCR representative
(often referred to simply as the UNHCR Rep) in a given country was shown to be
the head of Contingency Planning in refugee emergencies, which provided some
hints about UNHCR’s critical role in the creation, funding, and management of
refugee camps. This, I believed suggest that the Country Rep had knowledge and
experience on refugee policy and encampment that other officers may not possess.
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Therefore, I decided that I would interview at least the UNHCR Rep in Nairobi,
Kenya, the Deputy Rep, and at least one retired UNHCR staff and, where feasible,
two officers. I planned also to interview UNHCR officers in the field offices in
DRCC. I would interview these officials based on their knowledge and experience.

2.3.3.4.2 Government of Kenya (GoK) and County Authorities

States bear the primary responsibility of providing international protection to
refugees under international law. Therefore, I surmised that people working in
specific government ministries under which refugee issues fall have special
knowledge about the refugee policies and practices that other government
departments not engaged in refugee issues may not have.
I planned, initially, to interview four types of government officials: the
minister responsible for refugee affairs; second, the permanent secretaries of the
ministry responsible for refugees; third, the commissioners or directors of refugee
affairs in the relevant ministry or departments of refugees; and a fourth category,
technically not a government official, are the retired government official who
worked with refugees, whether minister, permanent secretary, or commissioner or
director.
My initial plan was to interview government participants in Kenya,
Uganda, and Tanzania because of their vast experience of hosting refugees in
camps and settlements, but time and financial constraints compelled me to focus
on Kenya. I chose Kenya, as I already stated, because of the three countries I had
selected, Kenya was the only one which had no refugee encampment policy until
June 1990. So, I was curious why Kenya eventually embraced the refugee
encampment mentality and decided that it would provide a better case study to
understand how the decisions on refugee encampment are hatched or broached
and by whom.
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In addition to interviewing central government officials, I planned to
interview County government officials, especially officials at the Sub-county level,
where the refugee camps are located. I interviewed two officials of the Dadaab
Sub-county. It was logistically impossible for me to travel to Garissa to interview
the County government officials.
2.3.3.4.3 Refugees

Refugees are the primary reason the international refugee protection regime was
created and encampment policies that purport to implement that protection
regime. It was imperative that I interviewed some of them, both those who live in
refugee camps and those that live outside the camps, such as in Nairobi. I had
planned to interview 20 refugees, purposively selected, 10 women and 10 men.
But it was not possible to have one-on-one interviews with refugees in the
refugee camps. To be able to have one-on-one interviewed required me to stay in
the refugee camp. UNHCR and RAS told me that I cannot live in the camps and
conduct interviews. I had to live at the UNHCR Camp Base and then hitch a ride
everyday with UNHCR staff going to work in the camps. We arrived at the camps
by around 9.00 am and then returned by 1.00 pm or sometimes 2.00 pm. I had,
fortunately, envisaged such as scenario and incorporated focus group interviews
with purposively selected groups of refugees, such as refugee youth, teachers, and
refugee elders.

2.3.3.4.4 Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs)

The non-governmental Organisations are the blood-life of refugee encampment;
without them, the social services provided for refugees and governance structures
and systems used to deliver these services would grind to a halt. Given their
importance in the refugee encampment equation, it was crucial that I obtained
their views on refugee encampment and its consequences on the environment and
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refugees. I had anticipated to interview the directors or executive directors of five
international NGOs and three local NGOs that have refugee programmes in
Kenya.
The international NGOs were generally uncooperative. I had requested
interviews with seven of them: Care International, Save the Children,
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Rescue
Committee (IRC), Lutheran World Federation, Medicines Sans Frontier (MSF),
Switzerland (MSFCH) Kenya Mission (MSFCH-Kenya Mission), and Jesuit
Refugee Services (JRS). LWF accepted to be interviewed; MSFCH-Kenya
declined stating that, ‘…unfortunately we cannot participate in the interview due
to its background of LAW nature rather than a medical nature as we are a
humanitarian medical organisation.’103
2.3.3.5

Interview Sites

I had two main sites for the interviews: Dadaab Refugee Camp Complex (DRCC)
and non-camp sites, in Nairobi, Kitale, and Thika. In Dadaab I held focus group
discussions or interviews with secondary school students, members of the parents
and teachers association (PTA) and the school board, and teachers at Ifo I, Ifo II,
Hagadera, and Dagahaley refugee camps. I also interviewed participants from
UNHCR, GoK, the LWF, and two refugees participants – a woman and a man.
In Nairobi, I interviewed one participant from UNHCR, GoK participants,
refugees, and two Kenyan NGOs. I also interviewed two participants outside
Nairobi, in Thika and Kitale.
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2.3.3.6

The Interviews

I wrote to each participant a letter seeking their consent to be interviewed. In the
letter, I introduced what my research is about, the ethics approval by York
University and research permit from the Kenya National Commission for Science,
Technology, and Innovation, and clearance from GoK to do research in the
camps. I also indicated to participant their right and freedom to quit the interview
any time of their choosing, how I will guarantee and protect their anonymity and
confidentiality issues, and how long for interviews will take place.
Furthermore, I stated the period I will store the data and when to destroy it.
At the end of the letter, the participant had to sign if they consent to the interview.
I also included a sample of the questions the participant will expect me to ask
during the interview. The sample questions were submitted to the Ethics
Committee, York University, as part of the ethics review process.
It was not possible, however, to give the consent letter to participants of focus
group discussions in advance because of logistical issues and the time within
which to identify groups and have preliminary meetings with them. Instead, I read
to the group the points and ethical issues in the letter and allowed them to ask
questions or withdraw their consent and not participate if they believe, for
whatever reasons, they are not interested in participating in the discussions or
interviews. The one-on-one interviews took between an hour and one and half
hours. And the focus group discussions often took at least an hour, especially for
the secondary school students’ focus groups because of their day’s class time-table.
Discussions with PTA and School Board members focus groups took at least an
hour and half.
I interviewed 4 participants, from GoK, 3 in Nairobi and 1 in DRCC; 2
former government officials, one of whom was also a former UNHCR official; 2
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sub-county officials in Dadaab; 6 UNHCR officials; 1 former UNHCR official
who worked in Kenya; 2 representatives of local NGOs; 1 representatives of an
international NGO; 2 refugee focus groups in Nairobi; 10 refugee focus groups in
Dadaab; 2 individual refugees in Nairobi; and 2 individual refugees in Dadaab.
Thus, I interviewed 21 individual participants from GoK, UNHCR, NGO, and
refugees on a one-on-one basis and 89 participants in 12 refugee focus groups in
both Dadaab refugee camp complex and in Nairobi. A summary of participants
interviewed is presented in Appendix 6.
In addition to the data I collected from fieldwork in Kenya in 2017 and 2018,
I also drew from my previous research experiences in Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania on refugee rights and refugee policy, law, and practice in these countries.
I further drew from the work of leading scholars in refugee studies whose works
are based on data collected both from documents and fieldwork.

2.3.4

Limitations of the Study

It is pertinent I address some of the limitations of my study. Since I used qualitative
methods to collect data on which I base my theorising and analysis, some
limitations are unavoidable. First, the number of participants interviewed is small
and therefore not statistically representative and any generalisations can only be
made in context. Second, it is difficult to replicate the results of qualitative research
because it is based on individual perspectives and data may be difficulty to verify.
Third, the bias of the researcher, whether conscious or subconscious may affect
the data and this may influence the conclusions. Fourth, the quality of data
depends on my research skills. Fifth, some critics may argue that not all refugee
camps are the same and that the findings from one camp cannot represent
conditions in other refugee camps. Therefore, conclusions drawn from the data
are limited to similarly situated camps.
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I believe, however, that my detailed explanation of the methods I used to
collect the data and the advantages of qualitative methods I explained earlier may
offset some of these limitations. My detailed explanation of the methods of data
collection may facilitate replication of the results of my study. To minimise my
own bias and the biases of participants, for example, I used multiple procedures to
collect data – fieldwork in Kenya, participant observation, interviews, both one-onone and focus groups, and data from secondary sources – published works and
electronic databases or sources.
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CHAPTER 3: REFUGEE CAMPS: LOCATING THEIR FRAMEWORK
GOVERNANCE AND THE LOCUS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

3.1

Introduction

In this chapter, I attempt to locate the site where the decisions that produce refugee
encampment are made. One of the key aspects inherent in framing the research
problem and question in Chapter 1, is how and by whom the decisions that produce
refugee encampment in many refugee-hosting states in the global south are made.
The answer to this question is directly relevant to answering my main research
question, namely, how the UNHCR can be held accountable, and to what extent,
under international law, for its contribution to harm to the environment and
refugees that results from the refugee camps it helps to create, fund, and administer.
If the UNHCR has no role and part at all in the decision-making processes that
produce refugee encampment, then my main research question is moot.
Proponents of refugee camps have justified and defended refugee encampment
on several grounds. Crisp and Jacobsen, for example, in their robust defence of
refugee camps, make four claims about how the decisions that produce refugee
encampment are made and by whom.1 First, Crisp and Jacobsen claim that refugee
camps are unavoidable;2 second, that it is not UNHCR policy to encamp refugees
if alternatives are available;3 third, and crucially, that in most cases it is host
governments that insist on the creation of refugee camps;4 and finally, that in some
situations refugees themselves congregate in large groups and form large-scale

1

Jeff Crisp & Karen Jacobsen, “Refugee camps reconsidered” (1998) 3 Forced Migration Review 27 at 27 – 29.

2

Ibid., at 27.

3

Ibid., at 28.

4

Ibid.
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settlements that are eventually institutionalised.5 In their view, critics of camps are
naïve at best and simplistic at worst.6
I argue, however, that the UNHCR is the chief architect of refugee
encampment policies and practices in many refugee hosting states in the global
south, despite its rhetorical position on camps in the public domain. In other words,
I theorise that the UNHCR is the author of the framework governance of refugee
encampment in some refugee-hosting states in the global south. If this is correct,
what, then, are the possible practical or, to borrow from Epstein and King,
‘observable implications’ that flow from it? Epstein and King define ‘observable
implications’ to ‘mean things that we would expect to detect in the real world if our
theory is right.’7 Thus, in this sense, if my theory is right, what would one expect to
detect in the real world if the UNHCR is the architect or author of the framework
governance of refugee encampment? In this connection, the real world could be
refugee-hosting state’s territory or the international international plane.
I offer this discussion of the possible practical implications of this theory at
this point in the chapter, so that the available evidence (including those I gathered
during my field work) can be assessed in the light of such possible implications as
well.
I envisage at least seven possible practical or observable implications in
situations in which the UNHCR is the architect of refugee encampment.
The first observable implication is that if UNHCR is the architect of refugee
encampment, its logical to see in practice that the decision-making processes and

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid at 29.

7

Lee Epstein & Gary King, “The Rules of Inference” (2002) 69 University of Chicago Law Review 1 at 62.
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structures that produce refugee camps or refugee encampment in refugee-hosting
states in the global south reside or are located within UNHCR’s internal processes
and structures. I call this possible practical implication the framework governance
implication. I borrowed the concept of ‘framework governance’ from Okafor’s
theory of the ‘relative appropriation of the “third world” framework governance by
entities external to the third world’8 or simply, “third world” framework governance
analysis, which I explain in section 1.2. of this chapter.
The second implication, related to the first, is that the UNHCR will then be
de facto in charge of refugee policy and practice in the relevant context and will
therefore also hold significant de facto control over almost all aspects of refugee
protection policy and practice in the refugee-hosting states, including in relation to
refugee camps, but with the exception of the physical security of such places. In
other words, refugee-hosting states in the global south would have simply
surrendered their protection functions to UNHCR. I call this practical implication
the effective control implication.
The third implication flowing from the theory that the UNHCR is the architect
of refugee encampment in refugee-hosting states in the global south is that the
UNHCR is no longer an impartial guarantor (as between the state and the refugee)
of refugee rights and freedoms, such as the right to freedom of movement and
choice of residence that article 26 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention) protects. The right to freedom of movement
and choice of residence, I argue, is the most important right for refugees because it
is the avenue to various solutions for their situation. I label this practical implication
the refugee rights detractor implication.

8

Obiora C. Okafor, “Reconceiving “Third World” Legitimate Governance Struggles in Our Time:
Emergent Imperatives for Rights Activism” (2000) 6 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 1 – 38, hereinafter,
Okafor, ‘Reconceiving “Third World” Legitimate Governance Struggles.’
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The fourth practical implication is that the UNHCR in private or behind-thescenes, defends refugee encampment and will incentivise and socialise refugeehosting states in the global south to embrace refugee camps as the most appropriate
technology for providing international protection to refugees. I refer to this
implication as the institutional vested interest implication.
The fifth observable implication is that the UNHCR does in fact exercise some
power and influence over state actors in refugee-hosting states in the global south.
I call this practical or observable implication the power and authority implication.
The sceptic might wonder how the UNHCR’s exercise of power over state actors
in refugee-hosting states in the global south can be an observable implication that
flows from the theory that the UNHCR is the architect or author of refugee
encampment in some of these states. My response is that without some influence
over state actors in refugee-hosting states, many of whom are poorly remunerated,
and with limited resources and facilities to perform their functions, it would not be
possible for the UNHCR to appropriate the framework governance of refugee
policy and practice in these states and author the framework decisions that produce
refugee encampment.
The sixth practical implication flowing from the theory that UNHCR is the
architect of refugee encampment is that there must be some legal or normative
basis, real or apparent, upon which UNHCR derives the authority to use camps as
a technology for implementing its mandate. I describe this implication as the legal
or normative basis implication.
The seventh observable implication identifiable from the theory that UNHCR
is the architect of refugee encampment in refugee-hosting states in the global south
is that it must be possible, under international law, to hold the UNHCR
accountable, wholly or in part, for the injurious consequences of refugee
encampment on the environment and the condition of refugees in the camps that it
helps create, fund, and administer. This will be the accountability implication.
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Before I discuss further the evidence that supports these observable
implications of my theory that that UNHCR is the architect of refugee encampment
in the global south, it is imperative to draw attention to a competing or counter
theory, especially from proponents of refugee camps, some of which I have already
referred to.9
The counter theory posits that refugee camps and refugee encampment are the
sole decision of the refugee-hosting states in the global south, as sovereign states.
Proponents of this theory would argue that the UNHCR, which is a creation of
states, has no power or influence, whatsoever, to resist a refugee-hosting
government’s refugee encampment policies and practices, even if the UNHCR
knows that refugee camps are bad for refugees. Indeed, proponents of this theory
may argue that even if the UNHCR, as a matter of principle, does not want refugee
camps, operational necessity compels it to use them away. Moreover, proponents
of this theory may further argue that historically, it is states which invented the idea
of concentrating civilians in camps,10 long before intergovernmental institutions
were created in the twentieth century. It follows, logically, that states would be most
interested in camps as an aspect of statecraft. If this counter theory is correct, what
observable implications can be identified?
If the counter theory that refugee-hosting states are the architects or authors
of refugee encampment is correct, then in practice it must be possible to identify
observable implications. First, the decision-making processes and structures that
produce refugee camps or refugee encampment would be solely or are entirely
located within governmental processes and structures of the state. In other words,
the framework governance of refugee policy would be located within governance

9

See, e.g., Crisp and Jacobsen, supra note 1.

10

A discussion of the historical origins of camps is beyond the scope of my dissertation, but it is a theme that
I will pursue under future areas of research.
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processes and structures of the state. I will describe this observable implication as a
framework governance implication; it is the same as the observable implication of the
theory that the UNHCR is the architect or author of refugee encampment.
The second implication is that refugee-hosting governments would be in
charge of the refugee camps in their countries and the UNHCR would simply
exercise the supervisory function or role that Article 35 of the 1951 Refugee
Convention assigns to it. I call this implication the effective control implication.
The third one would be that refugee-hosting states are wholly accountable for
the injurious consequences resulting from refugee encampment on the environment
and the condition of refugees in the camps the state creates and manages. I refer to
this as the accountability implication.
One other observable implication may be identifiable in contexts where the
refugee-hosting state has ‘invited’ the UNHCR

to be involved in providing

protection to refugees in its territory. If the refugee-hosting state is the architect or
author of refugee encampment, one observable implication would be that the
UNHCR will try as much as possible to use its resource leverage and influence to
socialise or incentivise refugee-hosting states to upholding the gamut of rights and
freedoms due to refugees and to abandon refugee encampment. In other words, the
UNHCR would be performing properly its supervisory function under Article 35 of
the 1951 Refugee Convention; it would especially encourage refuge-hosting states
in the global south to embrace the idea of guaranteeing the refugee’s right to
freedom of movement and choice of residence in the refugee-hosting state’s
territory.
Article 26 of the 1951 Refugee Convention guarantees and protects the
refugee’s right to freedom of movement and choice of residence. I would argue that
the right to freedom of movement and choice of residence for refugees is one of
most important rights because freedom of movement allows refugees access to
opportunities unavailable or inaccessible under conditions of encampment and this
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increases their economic prospects in having to fend for themselves. Indeed, Dr
Fridtjof Nansen, the first League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
understood the importance of freedom of movement for refugees as means to
securing their independence than his successors and promoted it during his tenure.11
I will return to freedom of movement in Chapter 5; but suffice to point out that if
a refugee-host state is the architect of refugee encampment and restricts the right to
freedom of movement for refugees because it has entered reservations to Article 26
of the 1951 Convention, an observable implication is that the UNHCR would work
hard to persuade the particular state to revoke the reservations. Evidence of such
pro-refugee rights activities of the UNHCR would be discernible from its policy
documents and public statements of its officers and praxis in the field. I describe
this implication as the refugee rights guarantor implication.
Although it is possible to draw out more practical or observable implications
from both theories than I have done here, I limit myself to these in the dissertation.
Even then, I will, in this chapter, focus only on a more detailed discussion of
the framework governance practical implication flowing from both theories, namely,
the theory that the UNHCR is the architect of refugee encampment and the counter
theory that refugee-hosting states in the global south are the architects of refugee
encampment. I do so in order to systematically locate the framework governance
and the locus of accountability, i.e., identify the sites where the framework
governance on refugee policy is located and determine who should be held
accountable for the injurious consequences of refugee encampment both on the
environment and refugees.

11

See, e.g., League of Nations, Report by Dr Fridtjof Nansen, High Commissioner for Refugees, Presented to the
Council on June 12th, 1924, Annex 637:Armenian Refugees, C.243.1924 (1924) League of Nations Official
Journal 933 at 967.
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I take up the other practical implications in Chapter 5.
3.2 The UNHCR and the Framework Governance of Refugee Policy and
Encampment Praxis
In this section, I provide the evidence that confirms my theory that the UNHCR is
the architect of refugee encampment in refugee-hosting states in the global south.
One of the things that one would detect in the real world of refugee encampment is
that the location of the framework governance of refugee policy and practice in
refugee-hosting states in the global south has shifted to the UNHCR’s internal
processes and structures. In this connection, I borrow ideas from theories from
TWAIL, Political Economy, and Socio-Legal Studies to explain this shift. From
TWAIL, I drew from Okafor’s theory on the relative shift to external bodies of
‘‘third world’ framework governance’12; and from Political Economy, Mosco’s
political economy theory of communication that focuses on how processes and
structures produce social relationships to demonstrate how the framework
governance of refugee policy and praxis resides within the UNHCR’s internal
processes and structures. I will then buttress this with data from the fieldwork.
Okafor’s framework governance theory (OFGT) posits that the ‘location(s) and
site(s) of major “third world” policy-making’ ‘has been acquired by enti[ties]
external to “third world” states.13 These entities include supranational institutions,
such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),
which is popularly referred to as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO); transnational corporations
(TNC), or certain powerful states.14 In such cases, ‘the relative location of the

12

Okafor, ‘Reconceiving “Third World” Legitimate Governance Struggles,’ supra note 8.

13

Ibid at 2.

14

Ibid at 3.
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governance and decision-making relevant to that state shift[s],’ ‘in favour of the
external entity that authors the framework decisions that constitute the bulk of the governance
pie’ (my emphasis).15 And crucially, if the ‘relative framework governance relocates’ to an external entity, then the strategies that activist movements in the
“third world” adopt ‘to resist effectively the scourge of illegitimate governance in
the relevant state, must invariably alter in ways that reflect the changing face(s) and
location(s) of governance regarding that “third world” state.’16
The central idea in OFGT that is relevant to my dissertation is that once the
framework governance of a “third world” State shifts to an external entity, it is the
external entity that ‘authors the framework decisions that constitute the bulk of the
governance pie’(my emphasis). In sections that follow, I deploy Okafor’s theory to
demonstrate empirically, based on UNHCR documentation and data from
fieldwork in Kenya, how UNHCR’s internal processes and structures ‘author the
framework decisions that constitute the bulk,’ to borrow from Okafor’s
terminology, of the governance of refugee encampment policies and practice of
refugee-hosting states in the global south. In other words, I demonstrate how
UNHCR acquires the framework governance of refugee policy and practice of
refugee-hosting states in global souths and ‘authors’ the framework decisions
constituting the bulk of these States’ refugee policies and practices, or to paraphrase
Okafor’s terminology, ‘the refugee governance pie.’
In addition to OFGT, I have also drawn insights from other TWAIL work,
especially its fidelity to delving deep into historical accounts to exposing the
undercurrents of imperialism and hegemony. It was necessary to trace, historically,
albeit briefly, the UNHCR’s interest refugee encampment to understand its current

15

Ibid.

16

Ibid.
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position on this matter. Also, I received inspiration to think critically about the
UNHCR’s internal processes and structures and how they play a role in refugee
encampment praxis from Political Economy, especially Mosco’s theory of
processes and structures and how they shape social relations. The Socio-Legal
Studies’ commitment to empirical data from the field to illuminate the blind spots
of the black-letter of the law with real world experience guided me toward, and in
preparation for, fieldwork (including the framing of the interview questions and the
making of critical observations).
3.2.1 The UNHCR’s Structures and Processes for Refugee Emergency
Management [including Refugee Encampment]

UNHCR has several structures and processes for implementing its mandate,17 and
these have been re-organised or restructured from time to time as the situations arise
or demand. As of 30 June 2019, for example, UNHCR was structured as follows:18
broadly, Executive Direction and Management (EDM); Division of External
Relations (DER); Division of Human Resource; Division Resilience and Solutions
(DRS); Division of International Protection (DIP); Division of Emergency,
Security, and Supply (DESS); Division of Financial and Administrative
Management (DFAM); Division of Human Resources Management (DHRM);
Division of Information Systems and Telecommunication (DIST); and Division of
Programme Support and Management (DPSM).19
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See, e.g., UNHCR, “Operational Support and Management” (2013), online (pdf): UNHCR Global Report

2013 <https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/53980a01b.pdf>.
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See, e.g. Biennial programme budget 2020 – 2021 of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees:

Report by the High Commissioner, EXCOM, Annex V (a), 70th Sess, Agenda Item 6, UN Doc A/AC.96/1191
(2019) 24 at 58, online (pdf)< https://www.unhcr.org/5d723c477.pdf>.
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In addition to these main structures and processes, there are field-based
process and structures, such as the regional bureaus and branch offices in refugeehosting states in the global south. There are, for example, regional bureau in Africa,
Asia, and the Middle East – the Africa bureau, bureau for Asia and the Pacific, and
the Middle East and North Africa bureau. There are branch offices in both refugeehosting and non-refugee-hosting states in the global south under the leadership of
the UNHCR Country Representative or UNHCR Rep. Each of these discrete
structures have clearly defined roles and functions, but they work in collaboration,
one with the other; they are the spokes of the wheel that make it work as single unit.
I will return to these structures and process in Chapter 5 when discussing the
accountability of UNHCR under international law and the question of the
attribution of wrongful acts to UNHCR.
The names of some of the structures and processes have changed over the
years. In 2019, for example, a new division was created, the Division of Resilience
and Solutions (DRS), but the goal remains the same: to provide quality protection
to refugees, whether in emergency situations or not. In the 1980s, for example, the
structure responsible for developing policies and procedures for responding to
refugee emergencies was called, ‘The Emergency Unit.’20 And in the 1990s it was
changed to the Emergency Preparedness and Response Section (EPRS).21 But the
Division of Emergency, Security, and Supply (DESS) currently performs this
function.22
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UNHCR, Handbook for Emergencies Part One: Field Operations (Geneva: Emergency Unit UNHCR, 1982);
hereinafter, Emergency Handbook, 1st end (1982).

21

See, e.g., UNHCR, The Global Report 1999, 2nd edn (Bron: Imperimerie, Sezanne, 1999) at 42.
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122

The DESS ‘is the central support mechanism for emergency preparedness and
response within UNHCR.’23 It has four substructures: the Emergency Capacity
Management Service (ECMS); the Field Safety Section (FSS); the Supply
Management Logistics Service (SMLS); and the Procurement Management and
Contracting Service (PMCS). The ECMS ‘provides support to emergency
operations through the development of policies, guidance and tools, and emergency
missions’ (my emphasis),24

and therefore, is the most relevant of the four

substructures of the DESS to questions concerning decision-making processes that
produce refugee encampment.
Indeed, the ECMS, with input from the various offices, especially field offices
where operations take place, is the structure responsible for framing the normative,
substantive, and procedural guidelines for refugee emergency response, such as the
Emergency Handbook.25 In other words, one of the UNHCR’s structures identifies
and defines the phases and processes of refugee emergency preparedness and
response. The processes are the preparedness and management steps and actions
that UNHCR field staff in the areas of operation must take and implement, such as
the contingency planning, to respond to a refugee emergency.26
How the refugee emergency structures and the processes function, can be
gleaned from the UNHCR’s flagship publication on refugee emergencies, Handbook
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See, e.g. UNHCR, Preparedness Package for Refugee Emergencies: A Reference Guide to Risk Analysis,
Preparedness, and Contingency Planning (Geneva, DESS/ECMS, UNHCR, First edition, 2014), available
online (pdf): UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency <http://www.coordinationtoolkit.org/wpcontent/uploads/UNHCR-Interactive-Preparedness-Package-for-Refugee-Emergencies.pdf>
(Hereinafter, PPRE, 1st edn, 2014).
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for Emergencies, first released in 1982 and revised in 1998, 2007, and 2015.27 The
2015 edition, which ‘replaces all previous print editions’28 is the fourth edition and
is digital and the latest edition. The title of the Handbook has changed a bit in this
fourth edition, from Handbook for Emergencies, as it was styled in the previous three
editions, to a longer title, Emergency Handbook: A UNHCR guide for agile, effective and
community based humanitarian response (hereinafter Emergency Handbook).29And while
the latest digital edition ‘replaces all’ the older editions, I will draw substantially
from the older editions as well for two reasons.
First, because the earlier editions provide insights into how the decisions
making processes that produced most of the refugee encampments in the global
south, and especially in countries such as Kenya, which had no refugee
encampment policy until the refugee influx of the early 1990s, were made. Second,
the fourth edition, has attempted, subtly to respond to criticism of refugee
encampment and presents perspectives about refugee encampment that were not
held by UNHCR in the past. In a way, it allowed me to grasp how UNHCR
responds to criticism of some of its bad policies. 30
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UNHCR, ‘About’ in UNHCR, Emergency Handbook: A UNHCR guide to agile, effective community based
humanitarian emergency responses, 4th edn (Geneva, Division of Emergency Support Services (DESS, 2015),
online:< https://emergency.unhcr.org/about>.
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The Emergency handbooks provide valuable evidence that confirms my theory
that the UNHCR is the architect or author of refugee encampment in refugeehosting states in the global south. One participant who played a key role in the
establishment of two refugee camps in Kenya, the Dadaab Refugee Camp Complex
(DRCC) and Kakuma Refugee Camp (KRC), in 1990, stated that, ‘We relied on
the handbook for emergencies for everything we did ’(my emphasis).31 In other words, in
responding to Kenya’s request to so-called donor countries for help with dealing
with the influx of refugees in the 1990s, UNHCR in Kenya followed the Emergency
Handbook.
What is more, a critical review of the first and second editions of the Emergency
Handbook for example, reveal that not only are refugee camps an integral
component of UNHCR’s refugee emergency response strategy, they are also its
preferred device or technology for implementing its competence to provide
international protection to refugees, especially for refugees in the global south, its
caveats in public that camps are not good for refugees notwithstanding. If this is the
case, then refugee-hosting states in the global south, such as Kenya, which had in
the past a laissez fair refugee protection system had not all that much room for
manoeuvre; it was take it or leave it. In other words, if refugee camps are already
an integral component of the UNHCR’s refugee emergency response, refugeehosting states had little room, if any, to present alternative non-encampment-based
policy frameworks that best served their interests and the interests of the refugees
they hosted. Some critics may argue that it is possible that Kenya, or other refugee-

interview with one of the Assistant High Commissioners. One of the key questions I asked participants
was whose idea is refugee encampment in Kenya, since Kenya never had refugee camps till 1990. The
second edition of the PPRE, however, has redacted all references to refugee camps or camps, i.e., all
references to camps been removed. Moreover, the second edition of the PPRE now has a subheading on
‘Accountability to Affected Populations’, at 9, which the first edition of 2014 did not have.
31
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hosting states, acquiesced in the UNHCR’s appropriation of its framework governance
of refugee policy and praxis and creating refugee camps because of converging or
joint interests, namely, that Kenya realised that refugee encampment might
promote its interests, such as security and economics. My brief response here is that
there is evidence to suggest, at least in the case of Kenya, that Kenya initially did
not see refugees as security and economics threat. It refused to give the UNHCR
land for refugee camps and at some point, there was a fall out between the UNHCR
Representative in Kenya and one of the senior Kenyan government officials on
refugee issues in Kenya. I will return to this aspect in section 3.3.
Furthermore, from the various editions of the Emergency Handbook, one can
grasp the UNHCR’s interest in camps. In the first edition published in 1982, for
example, the UNHCR starts with a statement that can easily mislead one to think
that it is not interested in refugee camps. It claims that ‘refugees are often most able
to help themselves, and thus be least reliant on outside assistance if they are not
grouped together in highly organised camps.’32 It then calls on ‘[p]rogramme
planners to overcome their instinct to endorse camps because they are convenient
for delivery of outside emergency assistance.’33 Then it acknowledges the drawback
of camps:
That early convenience too often becomes a long-term burden for
refugees, host governments and donors alike. Small, less formal
groupings of refugees, provided their protection, access to land
and related economic rights are assured, often enjoy much better
prospects of self-sufficiency than large highly planned but
artificial settlements.34

Yet, the UNHCR ends up endorsing the use of camps when it argues that:
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Nonetheless, refugee settlements of the camp type seem to be
here to stay. The various pressures of mass influx on
countries of asylum and the occasional need to group
refugees together for their own protection make it probable
that these unsatisfactory and artificial institutions will
survive.35

Ultimately, the UNHCR’s point is that the refugee camp is a necessary evil
that it seeks to sanitise and normalise:
This handbook seeks to make even these institutions as “uncamplike” as possible and ensure that with active refugee
participation they achieve an appropriateness in terms of service
and infrastructure that neither sets them too far apart from local
communities around them nor puts them in so close a
dependence on international assistance that they can never
escape it.36

This is a case of history repeating itself. A similar mindset of sanitising the
British concentration camps for Boers and Africans during the second Anglo-Boer
of 1899 – 1903, known for their deplorable conditions,37 is attributed to British
camp officials and the colonial office. British colonial camp officials or ‘camp
experts’, as Forth would put it, in South Africa during the second Anglo-Boer war
also believed that camps could be made ‘un-camp-like’ or normalised with ‘proper
siting, sanitary provisions, and disciplinary arrangements.’38 The British also ran
concentration camps for the Mau Mau in Kenya, but I did not come across
evidence that points to similar view of making these camps ‘un-camp-like.’39 Forth
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California Press, 2017) at 212.
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A discussion of the British Concentration camps in Kenya during it repression of the uprising against
colonial rule is beyond the scope of my dissertation. On works that attempt to discuss the concentration
127

notes that British ‘‘camp experts’ played a pivotal role propagating and to a certain
extent exonerating civilian concentration camps as legitimate instrument of liberal
empire.’40 And the colonial office agreed with the ‘camp experts’ prognosis that
the South African Anglo-Boer war concentration camps, in their improved
manifestation ‘were ‘deserving of imitation.’’41
The evidence suggests, however, that it is never possible to sanitise the
refugee camp and make it “un-camplike” as UNHCR wishes to portray or as their
progenitors, the British imperial camp officials wished.42 The British camp
officials’ prediction that their camps were ‘deserving of imitation’ as technologies
of statecraft, have, however, indeed come to pass.
3.2.2 The Phases of the UNHCR’s Refugee Emergency Preparedness Response
and Refugee Encampment

Decisions, explicit and implicit, about refugee camps or refugee encampment, can
be gleaned or read from themes or topics covered in the Emergency Handbooks,
especially the phases or stages through which UNHCR accomplishes refugee
emergency preparedness and response. These themes or topics and phases have
been described in different terminology or phraseology in the various editions of
the Emergency Handbooks, but their goals remain the same: to respond effectively to

camps during the Mau Mau war for independence, see, e.g., David Anderson, History of the Hanged:
Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (London: Orion Publishing Group, 2005); Caroline Elkin,
Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry Hold & Co/Macmillan
Publishers, 2005)
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Humanitarianism (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005).
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any refugee emergency anywhere in the world. In the first edition of the Emergency
Handbook, for example, themes or key topic areas relevant to refugee encampment
include,

‘needs

assessment

and

immediate

response,’43

‘implementing

arrangements and personnel,’44 and ‘site selection, planning, and shelter.’45
These themes are expanded and revised in the second, third, and fourth
editions of the Emergency Handbook. In the second edition, for example, the needs
assessment and immediate response is now described as ‘initial assessment,
immediate response’46; the implementing arrangements and personnel, is now
‘implementing arrangements’47; and site selection, planning, and shelter, remain the
same,48 but new themes are added, such as ‘contingency planning’49 and ‘operations
planning.’50 In the fourth and latest digital edition of the Emergency Handbook, the
themes are further developed to reflect lessons learnt and the changes that have
occurred since the third edition was published in 2007, especially in the light of the
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expansions in the UNHCR’s mandate and increasing civil society criticism of
refugee encampment policy.51
Emergency preparedness themes have been radically reorganised and
redefined in the digital edition in seven broad topic areas: ‘getting ready,’ ‘protect
and empowering,’ ‘developing the response,’ ‘leading and coordinating,’ ‘staff wellbeing,’ ‘security,’ and ‘media.’52 Under these topics, stand-alone, yet integrated,
refugee emergency preparedness and response themes are developed.
I identified the Preparedness Package for Refugee Emergencies (PPRE), a key standalone component of the digital edition of the Emergency Handbook, as one of the
chief approaches and process where refugee encampment decisions and policies are
developed and implemented. I, however, tried, as much as possible, in my analysis
and discussions to juxtapose the processes in the PPRE with those in earlier edition
of the Emergency Handbooks. Doing so allowed me to figure out whose idea refugee
encampment really is and whether there was any serious consideration of
alternatives to refugee encampment. In addition, I also buttressed some of the
observations and inferences with data from fieldwork.
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The PPRE is, according to its first edition,53 which I use here, ‘a graduated
system of preparedness activities that increases as the risk of refugee emergency
increases.’54 The UNHCR Rep ‘in each country is accountable for initiating and
leading timely preparedness for refugee emergencies.’ 55 The PPRE consists four
main processes: minimum preparedness,56 analysing refugee emergency risk,57
advanced preparedness,58 and scenario-based contingency planning.59 These four
process, I believe constitute the decision-making processes that produce refugee
camps or refugee encampment, among other solutions for responding to refugee
emergencies. The decisions of encampment to be found in these process are not
radically different from those found in the earlier editions of the Emergency
Handbooks. The same ideas, however, have simply been recast in sophisticated
vocabulary under the PPRE approach and process, itself elegantly prepared and
presented. I will focus on minimum preparedness (MP), which I renamed as
minimum preparedness process (MPP); advanced preparedness (AP), which I call
advanced prepared process (APP); and scenario-based contingency planning
(SBCP), which I describe as scenario-based contingency planning process (SBCPP).
I focus on these to demonstrate how refugee encampment is an integral aspect of
the UNHCR’s refugee protection strategy. Where feasible, and as already stated, I
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will also make references to the older editions of the Emergency Handbook to
illustrate how these same processes were described and defined.
3.2.2.1

The Minimum Preparedness Process and Refugee Encampment

The MPP is the first phase or stage of the PPRE approach and process. The MPP
defines the actions to be taken during a refugee emergency. UNHCR describes
these as the minimum preparedness actions (MPAs). These are actions ‘that all
UNHCR offices world-wide must accomplish to maintain responsible minimum
level of preparedness for refugee emergencies.’60 The MPAs are developed at the
country and regional office or Headquarter (HQ) regional bureau levels. The PPRE
provides templates for these. UNHCR develops the MPAs ‘in support of
government preparedness, but the UNHCR Rep in each refugee-hosting state is
responsible for ensuring that the MPAs are actually developed and maintained. 61
There are five MPAs under the country-level MP: ‘management, coordination
and external relations’62 (MCER); ‘protection’63; ‘basic needs and services’64 (BNS);
‘supply’65; and administration.’66 The decisions on refugee encampment are
imbedded in the BNS and Supply MPAs . The BNS covers aspects such as food
security; water, sanitation, and health (WASH); camp management; education;
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nutrition; health; non-food items (NFIs); and livelihoods and it has five MPAs. 67
Two of MPAs (B3 and S2) give direction to UNHCR staff on decisions and actions
that have refugee encampment implications.68 Under the third MPA, for example,
UNHCR staff in country offices world-wide are directed to ‘[i]dentify emergency
refugee shelter and settlement solutions in potential refugee receiving areas’
(emphasis in original).69 Moreover, the staff are to ‘[i]nclude specific consideration
for settlement in rural areas and urban settings, as applicable.’ The specific
considerations include ‘the identification of possible camp sites’ in rural areas, and
the ‘determination of the average rent for a family apartment’ in urban settings.70 A
critic may argue that this does not necessarily imply that the UNHCR is wedded
into the idea of establishing camps but are considering both options for sheltering
refugees when a refugee emergency does occur. My response is simple: if
encampment is not the preferred technology, the UNHCR planners could have also
included alternative to camps in rural areas, such as refugees settling amongst the
local communities. Moreover, under the fourth MPA, staff are directed to
‘[d]evelop the possible composition of standard shelter solutions’71 with suggested
examples in parenthesis of ‘use of local materials?’72
Refugee encampment is not embedded, explicitly, within the Supply MPAs.
One can draw, however, inferences of the UNHCR’s preference for refugee
encampment from one of the MPAs that give direction to UNHCR staff to conduct
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market survey of resources and equipment. Under the third Supply MPA, UNHCR
staff are required to ‘[u]ndertake a market survey on the availability of heavy
machinery (earth removing equipment for site construction) and transport services
(trucks)’ (emphasis in original removed). 73
I drew the logical (and even obvious) inference, from these references and
supported by the data, that shelter materials and heavy machinery, usually bulldozers or earth removing equipment for site construction, are strong indications of
preparations for refugee camps or refugee encampment. One participant who
played a key role in the creation of the DRCC in Kenya in 1990 had this to say:
In a short time, we realised that more camps were needed and
had to be made. But by the time we developed Ifo I, we realised
that we made grave mistakes. The Germany organisation, I
believe it was GTZ, were hired to prepare the site for the
establishment of Ifo I, but they simply brought bull-dozers and
razed everything to the ground – it cleared all the vegetation and
creating some of the serious problems of environmental
concern.74

This participant acknowledged mistakes were made when heavy machinery
was used to clear sites for camps. Thirty or so years since the establishment of the
DRCC, it is doubtful that UNHCR learnt any lessons from it mistakes of using
refugee camps as a technology to implement its mandate for providing international
protection to refugees. If anything, ‘earth moving equipment for site clearing’
remains the standard operation tools for site clearance, as the direction to UNHCR
country offices developing MPAs show.
At the regional office or regional HQ bureau levels, the MPAs do not make
any explicit or implicit references to actions or decisions on refugee encampment
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in refugee emergencies but they do not rule them out either. Refugee encampment
is already embedded in the PPRE process at the country level and at the regional
level offices. Moreover, in the process of deciding what needs to be included in the
PPRE, regional offices and regional HQ bureaus, and indeed, ‘many UNHCR staff
worldwide’ were consulted and provided their input in the PPRE process. 75 In
addition, the regional offices also provide oversight to ensure the decisions and
policies for refugee emergency, including decisions on refugee shelter and
settlement, are fully adhered to. In their oversight responsibilities, the regional
office or HQ regional bureau, UNHCR staff are to, for example, ‘[s]upport country
operations with their undertaking of timely and effective Minimum Preparedness
Actions.’76
Basic needs and resources also featured in the first, second, and third editions
of the Emergency Handbook, as one of the key thematic areas upon which the
decisions on refugee encampment were also made.77 But some editions, such as the
first edition, provide a glimpse of likely decisions on refugee camps and refugee
encampment right at the introductory remarks. These opening remarks were often
framed in benign or more accurately, rhetorical statements such as, ‘[t]he efugees
are often most able to help themselves, and thus least reliant on outside assistance,
if they are not grouped together in highly organised camps’ (my emphasis).78 Or remarks
which attempt to call on ‘[p]rogramme planners to overcome their instinct to

75

See, supra note 25 at iv [Acknowledgements].

76

Ibid., at 1.20, HQ3.

77

See, supra note 20, at 16 – 19, ‘Chapter 3: Needs Assessment and Immediate Response’ ; Emergency
Handbook 2nd edn, note 46, at 40 – 47, Chapter 5, ‘Initial Assessment, Immediate Response’, and
Emergency Handbook, 3rd edn (Geneva, UNHCR Emergency Preparedness and Response Section, 2007),
Section 12, Site Selection, Planning and Shelter,’ at 204 – 224.

78

See, Emergency Handbook, 2nd edn, supra note 46, at vi.

135

endorse camps because they are convenient…’79 Readers are, however, reminded
that ‘[n]evertheless, refugee settlements of the camp type seem to be here to stay’80 (again,
my emphasis). After the caveats have been made, decisions on refugee encampment
begin to appear under the main themes or chapters that deal with ‘needs assessment
and immediate response’81 and ‘site selection, planning, and shelter.’82 Under the
needs assessment and immediate response, for example, are sub themes, such as
‘the location of refugees,’ the ‘characteristics of location’ and the ‘criteria for site
selection.’83
The difference, for example, between ‘needs assessment and immediate
response’ in the earlier editions of the Emergency Handbook and ‘basic needs and
services’ (BNS) under the digital edition is that the same ideas of refugee
encampments are now embedded in some technical jargon, PPRE, Minimum
Preparedness (MP) and Minimum Preparedness Actions (MPAs) and Advanced
Preparedness (AP) and Advance Preparedness Actions (APAs). The similarity
between the decisions-making process that produce refugee encampment developed
in the older and newer digital editions of the Emergency Handbook is that refugee
encampment decision are made in the process of determining the basic needs and
services for refugees during a refugee emergency response through a UNHCR-led
refugee emergency response.
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3.2.2.2

Advanced Preparedness Process and Refugee Encampment

The advanced preparedness process (APP) for refugee emergency is a decisionmaking process that guides UNHCR country and regional offices to take
specifically defined actions, the advanced preparedness actions (APAs), beyond
MP once a minimum or high risk refugee emergency scenario has been detected
through the analysis of refugee emergency risk process.84 In other words, the APP
provides an ‘additional preparedness measure’ after a ‘risk analysis indicates a
“medium risk” of a refugee emergency occurring.’85 The APA under the APP are
said to ‘constitute a set of actions which lead towards setting up an emergency
response operation’86 and ‘include the partner based and scenario-based
contingency planning process.’87 The APAs provide ‘a step by step guideline for
UNHCR and partners.’88
The APP has five APAs: management, coordination and external relations
(MCER)89; protection90; basic needs and services (BNS)91; supply; and scenariobased contingency planning (SBCP).92 The APA checklist of action is not
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‘exhaustive,’93 but ‘includes the essential preparedness actions that will facilitate the
emergency response during the initial phase’94 of a refugee emergency.
Refugee encampment policies are explicitly embedded in the protection and
BNS APAs. Under the seventh protection APA, UNHCR staff are directed to
‘[e]stablish a protection monitoring system for refugees that can be activated
immediately when an influx takes place.’95 This protection monitoring system is for
both ‘camp and non-camp’96 refugees. The issue of protection monitoring is not
explicitly addressed as such in the earlier edition of the Emergency Handbook.
Protection was handled as a separate chapter; there is no discussion of monitoring
protection.97 Decisions on monitoring covered questions or issues arising from
distribution of commodities to refugees98 or monitoring water quality and
availability in the earlier editions of the Emergency Handbook.99 Critics may,
however, argue that including protection monitoring for both camp and non-camp
refugees in the APA integrates flexibility and discretion into the emergency
response system so that the UNHCR staff can deal with inevitabilities during and
emergency; it does not imply that the UNHCR staff are wedded to camps. My
response, however, is that the evidence shows the opposite. From the focus group
interviews and even one-on-one interviews with refugees during the fieldwork in
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Kenya, almost all participant said they had no choice in the decision to live in
camps; the UNHCR told them that if they wanted to receive material assistance, it
can only be in a refugee camp. This shows that refugee encampment is ‘wedded’
into the emergency and protections system; it is the preferred technology. Similarly,
from my work with refugees in Uganda, the UNHCR made material assistance
contingent on refugees accepting to live in the camps.
The BNS has three APAs relevant to refugee encampment. The second BNS
APA requires UNHCR country offices staff to ‘decide on the refugee shelter and
settlement strategy’,100 albeit they should do this with their senior management and
in ‘consultations with the government authorities’ (my emphasis).101 The suggested
refugee shelter and settlement strategy should at least include ‘non-camp, camp,
rural, dispersed etc...?’102 Critics, once again, may, however, argue that merely
including camps in the refugee emergency shelter strategy does not necessarily
imply that the UNHCR is wedded to refugee encampment. Again, the evidence
demonstrates that the rhetoric and practice do not match; material assistance to
refugees in most refugee-hosting states in the global south is contingent upon the
refugee accepting encampment, unless the refugee passes the UNHCR’s
vulnerability criteria. And crucially, the directive in the second BNS categorically
states the the UNHCR country staff have to ‘decide on the refugee shelter and settlement
strategy’ (my emphasis). In other words, it is the UNHCR officer who first has to
decide the strategy for refugee shelter and settlement, and it is usually the UNHCR
Representative in the given country who leads the emergency response. A critic
may, however, still argue that the UNHCR staff or office has to agree on sites with
host government. I would argue, however, that in practice, most of these
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governments have limited room to manoeuvre once they have been approached
with a decision on refugee shelter that the UNHCR Representative in the host
country has already taken, but which is then presented to the host government as a
‘suggestion’ for discussion.
The fifth APA of the BNS APAs explicitly provides the UNHCR country staff
some direction on refugee encampment. If the UNHCR staff decide that refugee
camps are the shelter option, then they have to do four things. In the first place,
they are to ‘[i]dentify potential camp locations together with government
authorities, conduct site assessments, and agree on sites(s).’103 Second, if they agree
on site(s), then they should ‘[a]ssess the maximum hosting capacity of each site and
develop a master site plan for each site.’104 Third, the UNHCR staff should ‘[a]gree
on actors to implement camp assistance sectors, starting with the construction of
the camp infrastructure (shelters, WASH facilities, health clinics, etc…), and
including camp management.’105 And fourth, the UNHCR staff should ‘[i]dentify
and contract suppliers(s) for rental of heavy earth moving equipment for ground
and access preparations at the site, as required.’106 A critic may, however, ask, what
is the point here? There is nothing in this fifth APA to suggest that refugee
encampment is the UNHCR’s preferred technology for providing international
protection to refugees in the global south. I argue, however, that including the
refugee camp in the emergency response strategy is indicative of the UNHCR’s
interest in camps. Indeed, the third edition of the UNHCR’s Emergency handbook,
made it explicit that one of the advantages of ‘good site selection, planning, and
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shelter’ is that it will ‘uphold UNHCR’s protection mandate.’107 This, however, has
been removed in the digital edition, I argue, precisely because of mounting criticism
over the years of refugee encampment, which activists labelled as refugee
warehousing.108 Thus, the UNHCR’s refugee emergency planners are mindful of
critics of refugee encampment and careful how they present refugee encampment
in its emergency policy document. One can, however, read between the lines and,
buttressed by empirical evidence, discern the UNHCR’s interests in refugee
encampment.
One can also infer the UNHCR’s interest in refugee encampment from the
ninth APA of the BNS APAs. Under this APA, UNHCR country offices staff are
instructed to ‘[i]dentify and implement priority projects/activities or the benefit of
the refugee hosting community, to strengthen their coping mechanisms and
enhance absorption capacity outside of camps where this is a viable strategy.’ The
UNHCR staff are to ‘[c]onsult with local government authorities via appropriate
channels on their priority needs.’109
3.2.2.3

The Scenario-Based Contingency Planning Process and Refugee
Encampment

UNHCRS’s scenario-based contingency planning process (SBCP) explains to its
staff how to develop contingency plans for regional and country levels refugee
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emergence preparedness.110 A contingency planning toolbox is included or annexed
to the SBCP process, which provides further guidance on the content and
formatting of a contingency plan (CP) or ‘[p]rovides planners with pre-made tools,
templates, and formats to assist in quickly drafting a refugee emergency
contingency plan.’111 The SBCP is a decision-making process whereby UNHCR
country and regional offices staff decide on the key strategic issues, such as the
nature and type of shelter or settlement for refugees, that must be addressed in a
refugee emergency to be included any refugee emergency contingency planning
(CP).112
The SBCP addresses a multiplicity of issues on how to prepare for a refugee
emergency in a given country or region under four broad topics: focus on
emergency response,113 good practice standard for contingency planners,114
regional-level contingency planning,115 and country-level contingency planning.116
I focus here on two broad areas that I believe demonstrate how the decision-making
processes that produce refugee encampment work: the key strategic issues relating
to refugee protection to be included in a refugee emergency and the response
strategy. The former are discussed under the topic of ‘focus on emergency
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response’117 while the latter are explained under ‘regional-level contingency
planning’118 and ‘country-level contingency planning’ respectively.119
There are strategic issues that UNHCR believes should be included in any
refugee emergency contingency planning. These are refugee protection, 120
assuaging the concerns of national authorities with respect to refugees entering their
territories,121 adjusting existing refugee assistance systems to accommodate a new
refugee emergency,122 a clear vision,123 refugee shelter and settlement,124 assistance
to refugees,125 and the operational necessity of refugee camps.126 Three of these are
directly relevant for my purpose: refugee shelter and settlement strategy, assistance
strategy, and the operational necessity of camps.
The UNHCR’s relevant statements appear benign on their face. Under the
strategic issue of refugee shelter and settlement, for example, UNHCR planners of
country and regional refugee emergency contingency planning are informed that
refugee shelter and settlement is ‘another important element of the protection
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response strategy’127 and that ‘[d]ecisions in this regard are particularly hard to reverse
once taken’128 (my emphasis). Therefore, ‘[c]amps are to be considered as a last resort
option’129 (again, my emphasis). Instead, ‘[t]he default strategy should first look into
how refugees can be accommodated in the host community.’ 130 In addition, under
the operational necessity of camp, UNHCR country and regional planners of
refugee emergency contingency plans are informed that, ‘camps may be the only
feasible operational option immediately available,’131 but this largely depends on
‘the existing capacity of host country and rate of the influx,’132 i.e., refugee influx.
In this context, therefore, ‘appropriate specific camp locations need to be identified
with the host government as part of the response strategy.’ 133 And crucially, the
refugee emergency ‘response strategy should be based on field assessments of
locations for camps’134 (emphasis in original removed).
Thus, in addition to the key strategic issues that UNHCR planners must
include in a refugee emergency contingency plan, the response strategies to be
included in both regional and country level contingency planning also provide a
window into grasping how decisions on refugee encampment are made within
UNHCR’s internal structures and processes. I will focus, however, on the country-
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level response strategies because ‘operational details are to be included in the
country-level CPs’135 and not regional contingent plans (CPs), albeit refugee
encampment decisions are also embedded in regional level CP. 136 Another reason
to focus on country level response strategy for refugee emergency is that ‘[c]ountrylevel contingency planning is one of the required Advanced Preparedness Actions
(APAs).’137 In the second edition of the PPRE, however, SBCP is said to be ‘an
APA that is context-specific and non-mandatory.’138
At the country-level refugee emergency contingency planning, either the
UNHCR Rep, concerned regional office, or the UNHCR HQ bureau initiates the
contingency planning process. Whether the UNHCR Rep or regional office, for
example, initiates the contingency planning process, however, the partners from
the concerned response agencies must be involved in the refugee emergency
contingency planning.139 The response strategy that the UNHCR Rep or regional
office or HQ bureau adopts is ‘the practical strategy that they envision for
responding to the potential refugee emergency in the country of asylum.’ 140 And
crucially, the response strategy is ‘the basic premise of the CP and reflects what
partners agree will be the best way to respond to the planning scenario.’ 141
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The UNHCR country offices or UNHCR Rep or regional offices are directed
to ‘[d]evelop a macro-level scenario and context specific response strategy
narrative,’142 which ‘should outline the best achievable approach to be followed to
ensure the protection of the arriving refugees.’ 143 The UNHCR country office staff
are to address basic strategy questions and five types of questions have been
suggested, but the list is not exhaustive and show that camps are an integral
component of the UNHCR’s refugee emergency strategy:
Where will the population be settled (upon arrival/medium term
– specify locations). Urban locations, rural, scattered, camps?
What services need to be provided at the various stages (entry
points, way stations, transit locations, settlement) and to whom
(refugees, host communities, authorities)?144 (my emphasis).

Critics may, however, argue that merely including camps in a set of questions
to guide the UNHCR’s emergency response planners in contingency planning does
not in itself show that camps are the UNHCR’s technology of choice for providing
international protection to refugees. My response, however, is twofold: first, and as
I stated already in subsection 3.2.2.2, the third edition of the UNHCR’s Emergency
Handbook does state that managed camps and their location will help uphold
UNHCR’s protection mandate145; second, the UNHCR does not have to explicitly
state in its refugee emergency response strategy documents that refugee
encampment is its preferred device for providing protection to refugees. Where,
however, it does not only include refugee camps as part of its response to refugee
emergency but also has practically created, funded, and managed camps in refugeehosting states in the global south for decades, it is legitimate to draw inferences
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regarding its interest in refugee encampment from its processes and structures that
plan and execute refugee emergency responses.
In addition to these questions, the UNHCR’s country office planners of a
refugee emergency contingency plans are directed to consider in their response
strategy the issue of the essential services for non-camp and camp based refugees (my
emphasis). The question of essential services for non-camp refugees ‘should only
be included in the CP if some or all refugees will be settled in the community.’ 146
Similarly, the question of essential services for camp refugees should be included in
the CP only if ‘some or all the refugees will be settled in camps.’ 147
Refugee encampment appears in several other parts or sections of the
contingency planning guide with templates, but the most important point about a
contingent plan the UNHCR country offices produce at the end of contingency
planning activities or exercise is that it ‘is a record of the decisions taken during the
planning process’148 and ‘reflects serious policy decisions and commitments,’149 which, I
submit, produce, among other things, refugee encampment (my emphasis).
In earlier editions of the Handbook for Emergencies, the UNHCR’s interest and
preference for refugee encampment may be inferred from its guide for field staff on
questions of site selection, planning, and shelter. According to the third edition of
the Emergency Handbook, ‘[t]he layout, infrastructure and shelter of a camp will have
a major influence on the safety and well-being of refugees.’150 Moreover, a ‘good
site selection, planning and shelter’ will, among other things, ‘uphold UNHCR’s
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protection mandate’151 (my emphasis). In other words, a good camp, will uphold the
UNHCR mandate to provide international protection to refugees in the refugeehosting states in the global south.

3.2.3 The UNHCR’s Revealed Preference for Refugee Camps

Epstein and King observe that people generally:
‘do not know or cannot articulate, why the act as they do, in other
situations, they refuse to tell, in others they are strategic both in acting
and answering scholars questions’ (my emphasis).152
While Epstein and King made this observation in the context of quantitative
research, it was at the back of my mind as I reviewed the UNHCR’s internal
documents and when I was conducting interviews with participants during
fieldwork in Kenya. The UNHCR is strategic both in its public articulation of its
position on refugee encampment and in the rendition of refugee encampment in the
phases of its refugee emergency preparedness response: it casts refugee
encampment as an operational necessity, a last resort option, not its deliberate
preferred default approach to providing international protection to refugees.
Indeed, it claims throughout the different editions of its Emergency Handbook,
including the most recent PPRE approach and process, that ‘[c]amps are to be
considered as a last resort option. The default strategy should first look into how
refugees can be accommodated in the host community.’153 This has been a standard
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caveat, right from when the first edition of the Emergency Handbook was published
in n 1982 to the present.
So, how do I surmount the UNHCR’s strategic rendition of encampment in
its internal processes and structures on refugee emergency response in ways that
does not explicitly expose its interest in or preference for refugee encampment?
Epstein and King suggest that in situations such as this, a creative way around this
problem is to look for what they described as the revealed preferences of the
participant, which can be directly observable in real behaviour.154 This was one
reason I had to incorporate fieldwork into my project. Indeed, observing the
UNHCR’s behaviour in practice in Kenya, Uganda,155 and Tanzania,156 for
example, reveals its interest and preference for camps to self-settlement for refugees
despite its rhetoric that refugee encampment should considered a last resort option.
In Uganda, the UNHCR was the first to complain that the activities of the Jesuit
Refugee Service (JRS) for urban refugees in Kampala, were undermining the
encampment policy because many more refugees, especially those with urbanite
background were resisting being sent to the refugee settlements that the UNHCR
funded.
In Kenya, for example, the UNHCR staff participants I interviewed spoke
approvingly of refugee camps when I asked them other questions, such as what
were the considerations for choosing refugee camps over other alternatives and
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what were the criteria for selecting sites for refugee camps. 157 The participants’
responses to these questions are revealing. One participant, who had said that
refugee encampment was the decision of the GoK, for example, had this to say on
the considerations for refugee camps:
Three considerations. The first is security. It is easier for us to
manage refugees when in a camp than if they were scattered all over.
Second, availability of land which is sparsely populated or land
unclaimed by anyone. Thirdly, restriction on movement. Most
of Kenya’s refugee camps were created with refugee repatriation
in mind (my emphasis).158

Another participant gave other reasons for considering refuge encampment:
Two main considerations. First, accessing refugees; it is easier for us
to access refugees and monitor violations of refugee rights when they are
in one place. It also makes it easier for refugees to access UNHCR.
Second, logistics. Coordinating humanitarian aid for refugees –
supplies such as food and non-food items and facilities – in a
camp setting is much easier and less costly (my emphasis).159

It is ironical that refugee encampment is justified based on monitoring the
violation of the rights of refugees, yet the act of encampment itself denies refugees
the right to freedom of movement and choice of residence, which Article 26 of the
1951 Refugee Convention protects.
Another way I used to find out whose idea and decision to encamp refugees
was to interview refugees both in Nairobi and in DRCC. I asked refugees questions
such as, ‘How did you come to live here?’ and ‘How were the decision to come and
live here arrived at?’ Some of the responses were revealing. In a focus group
discussion comprising seven participants, when I asked the group how did you
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come to live here, one participant stated that, ‘We came here because were were
told it is here that we shall find help.’160 And when I probed further, ‘Who told you
to come here?’, the answer came almost in a chorus, ‘UNHCR.’161 But one
participant added, ‘And also the government of Kenya.’162 For refugees living in
urban areas, one participant stated:
It was not the will of UNHCR that we stay here in urban areas.
If one is sick with chronic illness, one is allowed to live as an
urban refugee. UNHCR, however, tells us that they do not have
a budget for urban refugees, and we have to take care of
ourselves.163

I also interviewed at least two participants from the local government in
Dadaab sub-county about their role in the creation of the camps. I asked what led
Kenya to move away from its policy of freedom of movement and choice of
residence for refugees to their encampment and isolation. One participant had this
to say:
The local authorities were not involved in the decisions to use
refugee camps to protect refugees. It was the government of
Kenya (GoK); it was a decision taken by the central government
and imposed on the local communities here.164

I also asked the same participant what role UNHCR played in the GoK’s
decision to move refugees to camps, the participant stated that:
UNHCR had influence on the decision to house refugees in camps in
Kenya. UNHCR convinced the government of Kenya to give the land
for creating the refugee camps and I would say that that in itself is a
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decision by UNHCR to use camps for helping refugees. After they, I
mean UNHCR, had acquired Ifo I & II, they used the GoK to get more
land for the camps. Then the people by 2007 became sensitised and
demanded to be consulted.165

The interviews with participants from the GoK were also as revealing about
whose idea and decision refugee encampment was and what led Kenya to adopt
refugee encampment. Some participants said the decision of refugee encampment
was a joint one between UNHCR and the GoK. Others said it was government of
GoK but on further probing, also said it was a joint decision. Others suggested it
was UNHCR but framed their responses carefully as if afraid of letting the cat out
of the bag. One participant whom I asked what led Kenya to adopt refugee camps
since it never had them up to 1990, had this to say:
At the height of the influx of Somali refugees, the Department of
Refugee Affairs (DRA) was created and it operated within
UNHCR offices. Government literally seconded staff to the
DRA which was within UNHCR. The Somali refugees were
initially kept in camps in Mombasa (does not remember the
name of the camp). Then they were moved to Dadaab. I think
because those behind their move there wanted them to be close
to Somalia but other (sic) Somali refugee were moved to Kakuma
refugee camp.166

I asked this same participant a follow up question, whether refugee
encampment was the sole decision of the GoK, or donors and other organisations
influenced the decision to adopt refugee camps as a condition for providing aid to
Kenya so that Kenya could handle the refugee influx, especially after the fall of the
Said Barre regime in Somalia. This participant, a senior official, stated that, ‘[i]t
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was most likely a collaboration between UNHCR and the government of Kenya.’167
And on further probing:
When you look at the way the designated refugee areas are
managed, you can see that UNHCR had influence on the
decision to move the refugees to designated areas. The decision
to move refugees to designated areas was mainly influenced by
the need to mobilize humanitarian aid for the refugees. UNHCR
and the other humanitarian organisations needed to mobilize aid
for refugees, and it was necessary to have a designated place for
the refugees to handle the aid, especially distribution.168

So, refugee encampment can serve as an instrumentality of raising funding and
resources because it guarantees visibility of both the refugees and work of the
UNHCR and other international NGOs. It relieves the refugee-hosting government
of worries about resources to meet the needs of refugees.
In addition, one can further glean the UNHCR’s interest in and preference to
refugee encampment from some of its policy positions on, for example, refugees
living in urban centres. The UNHCR stated, in its 1997 Urban Refugee Policy, for
example, that urban refugees, ‘while constituting less than 2% of UNHCR’s refugee
caseload (and less than 1% of the total caseload of concern to the High
Commissioner), demand a disproportionate amount (estimated at 10 – 15%) of the
organizations’ human and financial resources.’169 Donor countries have become
allegedly selective and not interested in refugees living in urban centres and is the
main factor driving this policy.170 Indeed, critics would argue that my focus on the
UNHCR’s role in refugee encampment is misplaced because western donor
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countries do exert some significant influence on the UNHCR’s refugee protection
work, including its encampment policies. The evidence, however, points to the
contrary. In the first place, UNHCR’s own preferences and priorities in refugee
protection also do inform donors’ decision on whether to fund urban refugees.
UNHCR had already created the impression that urban refugees are expensive and
that the camp offers a cheap alternative. Donors states are going to consider that in
their funding decisions for the UNHCR. In the second place, the UNHCR is not a
passive actor when it comes to refugee policy and practice, especially in the global
south; the UNHCR influences, significantly, many donor countries about refugee
encampment and refugee policy and practice in the global south. Indeed, many
donor states sometimes take whatever the UNHCR tells them about refugees in
some refugee-hosting states in the global south as truth.171 In the third place, the
relationship between the UNHCR and donor states in far more nuanced and
requires separate treatment and beyond the scope of my dissertation.
The long-term support for refugees in urban centres, it is alleged, might not
only create a dependency syndrome among refugees, but also ‘favours unjustly the
individual treatment of urban cases compared to those in rural settlements or
camps.’172 With this mindset, it should not be surprising that the UNHCR is
interested in refugee camps.
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3.2.4 Some Inferences from the Data about the UNHCR’s authorship of
Refugee Encampment

One inference from the preceding review of the UNHCR’s internal process and
structures for refugee emergency response is that refugee encampment is an integral
part of the emergency response strategy. It is possible to infer, from both its
rendition of camps as devices of operational necessity in emergency situations and
its revealed preferences, that in practice, the decisions that produce refugee
encampment are ‘authored,’ to paraphrase Okafor, within the UNHCR’s internal
processes and structures, such as the PPRE and earlier versions of its Emergency
Handbook. In other words, the UNHCR is the architect of the majority of the
framework decisions on refugee encampment. That UNHCR is in fact an architect
of refugee encampment is a key finding, which challenges the conventional wisdom
that often projects the UNHCR as simply a passive actor and subservient to the
dictates and whims of refugee-hosting states in the global south who actually decide
on refugee encampment.173
Second, the significance of the UNHCR’s authorship of the framework
decisions on refugee encampment in the global south escapes scrutiny in virtually
all the relevant literature on the subject – even in the entries that come to the closest
to meeting this mark. Janmyr’s excellent work, for example, neither explains how
encampment happens nor UNHCR’s role in creating refugee camps. This was not
her focus, however. Wilde’s pioneering and helpful inquiry into the UNHCR’s
accountability also does not engage with the question of the decision-making
processes that produce refugee encampment. Loescher is the one scholar that gives
some hint about UNHCR’s interest in refugee encampment, but his work largely
focuses on the political and international relations dimension of the issues. He does
not therefore provide a discussion of UNHCR’s internal processes and structures
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for refugee emergency preparedness response and how refugee encampment is an
integral aspect. Verdirame and Harrell-Bond’s groudbreaking work on refugee
policy and practice in Kenya and Uganda attempts to address how the framework
governance of refugee policy and practice in Kenya shifted to UNHCR, but they
do not locate the sites within the UNHCR that made that shift possible.
3.3

Refugee-hosting states in the Global South and the Framework
Governance of Refugee Policy and Encampment

I now turn to consider the counter theory, namely that refugee encampment is the
sole decision of the refugee-hosting states in the global south, as sovereign states,
and not UNHCR. In short, refugee-hosting states in the global south are the
architects of refugee encampment. If this is right, then one of the things that can be
observed is that the framework governance of refugee policy is located within the
processes and structures of governance of the refugee-hosting state in the global
south.174 In other words, the refugee-hosting states in the global south are the
authors of the majority framework decisions that constitute the policies and praxis
of refugee protection, including refugee encampment.
I used Kenya as a case study to observe whether the framework governance
of refugee policy is located within the internal processes and structures of
governance of refugee-hosting states in the global south, as the sceptics would
argue. I chose Kenya because earlier research indicated that Kenya never used to
have refugee encampment policy and practice until the early 1990s.175 If that is the
case, why did Kenya abandon its laissez-faire refugee policy and embrace refugee
encampment. As I stated in Chapter 2, I also drew from my earlier research
experiences on refugee issues in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania and from some of
the most relevant literature, such as Verdirame and Harrell-Bond on Sudan and
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Loescher on the Algerian refugee crisis and the UNHCR’s role in refugee
encampment in these countries.
I briefly review Kenya’s refugee policy and practice before and after 1990 in
the light of empirical evidence to help confirm or refute the counter theory that
refugee-hosting states in the global south are the sole architects of refugee
encampment.
3.3.1 Kenya’s Framework Governance of Refugees Before October 1990

Kenya’s refugee policy and practice prior to the opening of refugee camps in 1990
allowed refugees in Kenya to work, move, and settle anywhere, especially in towns
and cities, in Kenya. Verdirame and Harrell-Bond in their groundbreaking work on
refugee policy and practice in Kenya and Uganda noted that, ‘Kenya operated a
policy of benign neglect, allowing refugees to settle freely in towns and cities to
secure their own means of livelihood as best as they could.’ 176 Indeed, all
participants from GoK and some from UNHCR confirmed that before 1990, there
were no refugee camps, save for a reception or transit centre at Thika, that the
Immigration Department, in collaboration with the National Refugee Secretariat
(NRS), under the Ministry of Home Affairs, ran for screening refugee applications
for refugee status. One participant, a GoK official, said,
[b]efore the period you are talking about, i.e., before the
establishment of camps in 1990, refugees were handled by the
immigration department and the refugees were given Alien ID
Cards. The Class M visas was given to those who had Alien ID
card and when they found work, it allowed them to work. The
refugees were mainly from Uganda and some of my teachers
were Ugandan refugee teachers. Then, refugees could move
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freely around in Kenya. There were no formal programmes as
we have them today.177

Verdirame and Harrell-bond further note that, ‘[u]p to 1991, the Kenyan
government conducted refugee status determination’ 178 and the National Refugee
Secretariat (NRS) ‘administered a small, open reception centre at Thika where
destitute asylum-seekers could reside during the process.’179 And crucially, refugees
at the Thika reception centre who were ‘granted status were expected to move out
of [the] reception centre and settle outside,’180 i.e., anywhere in Kenya.
Thus, before 1991, the evidence shows that Kenya was the author of the
framework decisions that constituted its governance of refugee affairs on its
territory. In other words, the framework governance of refugee policy and practice
was located within Kenya’s processes and structures of governance; an external
entity had not yet appropriated or acquired it. The evidence further shows that
Kenya, despite having control of its framework governance of refugee policy, did
not encamp refugees. In other words, refugee camps were not considered an
integral aspect of the framework decisions that constituted governance of refugee
affairs in Kenya.
The evidence of Kenya’s refugee policy and practice before 1990, therefore,
contradicts the counter theory that refugee-hosting states are the sole architects of
refugee encampment and invalidates the observable implication that the refugee
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hosting state’s internal processes and structures will produce refugee encampment.
This demands an explanation. It implies two possible things. First, that a refugeehosting state in the global south can, under certain conditions or for certain reasons,
be in full control of its framework governance and yet not consider refugee
encampment as a technology of governing refugee affairs. Second, it suggests that
refugee encampment is not always or not necessarily the idea of a refugee-hosting state
in the global south. Other external forces or interests may be involved. It certainly
was not the path Kenya took Kenya before 1990s (although this does not mean that
it could not have changed course after that year).
3.3.2 Kenya’s Framework Governance Shifts after 1990

Kenya’s open-door refugee policy and practice ended in 1991. Beginning in late
1990, Kenya received an influx of refugees from some of its neighbouring countries,
i.e., Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and from other East and Central African
countries, such as Rwanda Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC). The arrival of many refugees in Kenya raised several issues for the GoK.
One participant, a former senior Kenyan government official, who was among the
first officers given the responsibility for addressing the problem at early stages of
the refugee influxes into Kenya, recollects:
Before 1991 we had Thika Reception Centre which was used to handle
refugees in Kenya. Then most of the refugees were from Uganda and
other countries in the region. In general, there were less than twenty
thousand refugees. The refugee problem was minimal, and it was easy
to handle and integrate them into Kenyan society because most were
employable and therefore easy to employ or relocate to the US and
Canada. In 1991, the refugee population, however, increased. I came
into the refugee issues in February 1991 and I was made in charge of the
Thika Reception Centre. I saw the explosion of the refugee problem.
That is when Somalia collapsed following the overthrow of Siad Barre.
During that same period, the Ethiopian refugees arrived, following the
fall of Mengistu’s government. But the Ethiopian refugees brought with
them the Sudanese refugees who had fled the civil war in Sudan and
sought refuge in Ethiopia and had been in refugee camps there…Then
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the refugee numbers exploded from handling just about one thousand
at the Reception Centre to handling over twenty thousand.181

The increase in refugee numbers definitely put Kenya’s open-door refugee
policy and praxis to the test. How Kenya responded to the influx and the
implications of that response are subject to competing interpretations from different
perspectives, but one of the most important aspects is that – in the end and no matter
who authored the policy – Kenya embraced refugee camps as the technology with
which to respond to the early 1990s refugee crisis it confronted.
The official version from GoK is that the shift in policy was authored from
within normal government processes and structures. One participant, another
former senior official, remembered that:
The events in Somalia, namely the civil war there, led the move
away from the policy of freedom of movement and residence to
encampment. Thika, before 1991, was a transit centre with a
manageable number of refugees, especially the class and profile
of the refugees were, I would say, the typical or normal
refugee…And the numbers of refugees were overwhelming. In a
week, 20,000 were arriving in Kenya – they were coming from
all over – through the coast and the north-eastern Kenya. This
raised several issues in terms of management: issues of
sanitation, resources, and law and order. The camp arrangement
became immediately the most feasible or imperative approach to
dealing with issues of physical safety, receiving humanitarian
assistance, and the security of the people, i.e., security of the
people entering into Kenya and the security of those in host
communities.182

The official version of how Kenya made the shift from open-door, laissez-fare,
refugee policy and practice to refugee encampment, however, cannot hold in the
face of the totality of the available evidence and masks how the ‘balance of power,’
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to borrow the phraseology from Verdirame and Harrell-Bond, on refugee policy
and practice in Kenya shifted from GoK to an external entity. In other words, the
official version of how Kenya made a shift to refugee encampment masks how
external entities acquired or appropriated the framework governance of refugee policy
and practice in Kenya. Critics may, however, argue that the UNHCR seed met
fertile GoK soil. In other words, even if UNHCR broached the idea of refugee
encampment, it must have found some interest within the GoK. First, it is possible
the critics are right. Second, a more nuanced analysis in the context in which the
GoK found itself, especially when it was in dire need of financial and other
resources to handle the refugee influx, shows that it had limited options but to
embrace encampment. In the paragraphs that follow, I endeavour to set out that
context and the time when the balance of power shifted or when GoK lost its
framework governance on refugee policy and practice to an eternal entity.
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond sketch out both the possible time when the
‘balance of power’ on refugee policy in Kenya started shifting away from the GoK
to some external entity and when it actually shifted. In 1991, Verdirame and
Harrell-Bond point out, Kenya attempted to raise funds on its own, without going
through entities such as the UNHCR, to deal with the refugee crisis that was
unfolding and, in fact, succeeded in ‘raising some funds from the EU through the
Lomé IV Convention.’183 But a ‘serious conflict developed between the permanent
secretary, home affair, and the UNHCR representative’184 after Kenya’s initial
success in raising funds without UNHCR involvement. In the end, Kenya
surrendered funding-raising to UNHCR and ‘acquiesced in the encampment of
refugees’ after it resisted refugee encampment for many years, and agreed ‘to
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provide land, albeit for the most part in inhospitable areas.’ 185 Thus, it was the
UNHCR, not the GoK, actually set up the refugee camps and administered them,
unlike the Thika reception centre which the GoK administered. Crucially, the GoK
had no effective control over the camps and its officials’ visits to the camps ‘had to
be negotiated with UNHCR.’186 Against this background, Verdirame and HarrellBond addressed aspects of the dynamics that produced refugee encampment in
Kenya. This section of Chapter 3 builds on this part, but in a more direct and
general way because it delves deeper into the UNHCR’s internal processes and
structures that make such shifts in balance of power vis-a-vis the framework
governance of refugee policy and practice in some refugee-hosting states in the global
south.
Despite this account from two leading scholars in the field, the UNHCR
participants I interviewed in Kenya for my study either feigned ignorance about
how refugee encampment decisions were made in Kenya or stated that it was the
decision of the GoK. Others, upon further probing, said it was a joint decision.
There was one exception: one participant, a senior official was candid and
forthright about refugee encampment in Kenya. He said,
‘It was not the idea of Kenya to have camps. They did not
want camps, especially in locations such as Dadaab because
Kenya had issues with its eastern region…’187
I further probed that if it was not Kenya’s idea to encamp refugees, how, then,
did it come to have refugee camps and what was the role of external entities, such
as the UNHCR in the encampment decisions? The senior official stated:
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The role of UNHCR, indeed it was the whole international
community that supported the idea of creating the camps, was to
facilitate the creation of the camps. It was assumed then that the
camps would be temporary.188

In contrast to the senior official, however, one former senior official involved
with the setting up of DRCC and Kakuma refugee camp initially stated, albeit
implicitly, that refugee encampment was the decision of the GoK, arguing that ‘The
decision on who lives where in Kenya is made by the Government of Kenya.’ 189
On further probing, however, the same official stated:
To some extent the GoK did not want camps. I witnessed Kenya
government officials forcibly returning refugees to Somalia. But
the refugees continued coming and GoK allowed UNHCR to
locate proper places where refugee camps were to be
established.190

Crucially, however, this same participant said something in a July 2011
communication with a retired professor in Oxford which reveals how the GoK
initially resisted to give land for refugee encampment and how UNHCR overcame
that resistance.191 I quote extensively from this e-mail communication, given the
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more about how the camps were created and the role of UNHCR since in the book they say Kenya was
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participant. Upon returning to Uganda, however, I forgot all about it till when I started my doctoral studies
at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada, in the fall of 2014. Even then, I had
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revealing nature of the behind-the-scenes dealings, which are rare to come across
because, as he pointed out in the e-mail, nothing was put in writing, and even when
put in writing, might be classified not for public consumption. Because of the
significance of this piece of evidence, I have decided to quote at length to illustrate
how the decision-making processes that produce refugee encampment operate in
practice:
The GoK represented by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), was
extremely reluctant to grant land for sheltering refugees, often referring to
Kenya as “the island of tranquillity” within the region. They made
no secret of their roundups of refugees – including Somali women
and children in the far northeast of the country – onto GoK lorries
and forcibly returning them from where they came. I witnessed such
occurrences myself, as did other relief workers those months of 1991
(my emphasis)….
During the course of negotiations for the use of Kenyan land,
UNHCR recognized the obvious limitations of the GoK. UNHCR
readily offered to provide equipment and materials to strengthen the
capacity of both the security forces as well as the civilian authorities.
Vehicles, radios and communication equipment, and even shelter
and food were provided as incentives in order to secure the firm
decision and ultimate approval of the GoK in acquiring the
relatively large Dadaab Refugee Camp Complex. Suffice to say that
subsequent land negotiations between HCR and GoK for additional
refugee camps transpired far more easily, with the Kakuma site
negotiations passively relatively smoothly and without controversy.
By that stage, UNHCR had earned the GoK’s respect and, needless
to say, the GoK had recognised the many benefits (hundreds if not
thousands of jobs; financial support; the goodwill of the
international community, etc) that befell the country and the GoK
in offering asylum to refugees.192

The Kenyan Minister of Home Affairs and National Heritage confirmed in
Parliament in October 1995 that UNHCR did provide material support to the GoK
during a question time session in Parliament that focused on ‘Hosting Somali

forgotten about the e-mail until I found this participant and it was during the interviews with the
participant that I remembered the email Barbara had forwarded to me.
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Refugees.’193 The Minister was asked how much compensation UNHCR had paid
to the GoK for hosting the Somali refugees. He responded that UNHCR paid
nothing to the GoK, but hastened to add that ‘UNHCR builds police posts,
administrative police posts and also buys some vehicles for those security personnel
to ensure that there is enough security.’194 Members of Parliament may not have
known the context in which the UNHCR was building police and administrative
police posts and providing vehicles, but we do now know, thanks to this
participant’s communication with the Oxford professor to whom he had addressed
the email.
Similarly, in Uganda, the UNHCR ‘‘top[ed] up’ the salaries of government
officials dealing with refugees,’195 ‘provided equipment – vehicles and computers,’
196

fuel, and paid customs duty for imported vehicles as incentives that allowed it to

appropriate the framework governance of refugee policy and practice in Uganda,
especially refugee encampment.197
And crucially, in 2014 a new refugee camp was created at Kalobeyei, officially
referred to as the ‘Kalobeyei Integrated Settlement,’ to decongest the Kakuma
refugee camp in north western Kenya. It is said to be modelled on the Ugandan
refugee settlements.198 But the UNHCR, and not the GoK applied for
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environmental impact assessment (EIA).199 If refugee-hosting states are the
architects of refugee encampment, why would it be the UNHCR to apply for
environmental impact assessment? Would it not have been the relevant government
entities communicating between each other to sort out the EIA requirement? Why
would a government that controls refugee policy in its territory negotiate land with
the UNHCR for encamping refugees? Why would an external entity take
responsibility for environmental impact assessment of a site for a refugee camp if it
has no interest in refugee encampment? The UNHCR and GoK participants were
reticent about these questions but one can read between the lines and together with
observations on the ground, decipher the revealed preferences of each and conclude
who actually authors the framework decisions that produce refugee encampment
in Kenya.
UNHCR’s appropriation of the framework governance of refugee-hosting
states is not only limited to the experiences of Kenya and Uganda. Karadawi 200 and
Harrell-Bond,201 each in separate works on refugee policy and practice in the Sudan,
details how the UNHCR appropriated the framework governance of refugee policy
from the Sudanese Government (GoS) between 1980 and 1983, when Sudan faced
a similar refugee crisis, as Kenya, with hundreds of thousands of refugees from
neighbouring countries, including Ugandan refugees.
Kenya and the Sudan are, by no means, not the only countries, faced with a
refugee crisis, whose framework governance shifted to UNHCR. UNHCR has a
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historical interest in refugee encampment that can be traced to its early years as it
struggled to survive in an emerging post-second European war cold war world
order.202 The refugee crises during the early phase of the cold war in the 1950s
provided the UNHCR with the golden opportunity to demonstrate its relevance to
states. The Algerian war of independence from France and the resulting refugee
crisis of 1954 - 1962, is one classic example. Indeed, Loescher and Ruthstrom-Ruin
are two scholars, in separate works, that claim that the Algerian refugee crisis
provided the UNHCR the platform to launch itself as a global United Nations
refugee agency.203
A detailed historical account of the refugee crises during the early phase of the
cold war, including the Algerian refugee crisis are beyond the scope of my
dissertation, but suffice to point out two important points about the Algerian
refugee crises relevant to my discussions here. First, that when Tunisia, in 1957,
and later Morocco, requested the UNHCR for material assistance for the Algerian
refugees they were hosting, there were no refugee camps. The refugees were already
in Tunisia for three years since the outbreak of the war of independence from
France in 1954 and the UNHCR official, Arnold Rorholt, who was sent to
investigate the situation reported in December 1958 that ‘Tunisian authorities were
against the setting up of camps and that I had agreed with them.’204 Moreover,
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‘there were no camps in these areas and the refugees are spread over many districts
in much the same way and in the same kinds of dwellings as in Morocco.’ 205
Similarly, in Morocco, Rorholt had noted in his 1958 report that, ‘the authorities,
do not at present, seem to favour the establishment of camps in Morocco.’206 And
yet, at the time the UNHCR got involved with Algerian refugees in their countries,
Morocco and Tunisia were not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention given its
temporal limitation to events in Europe. And crucially, that Morocco and Tunisia
were not in favour of refugee encampment for over three years further buttresses
my point that a refugee-hosting state in the global south can, under certain
conditions or for certain reasons, be in full control of its framework governance and
yet not consider refugee encampment as a technology of governing refugee affairs.
The second important point to note is that the idea of refugee encampment in
both Tunisia and Morocco remained one of the options the UNHCR did not rule
out, even when it was clear that these two states were not initially in of favour
refugee encampment. Indeed, Rorholt noted in his 1958 report that ‘it may be that
later on the setting up of camps may be necessary’ and that, ‘I am inclined to agree
that a proportion of the refugees should be established in organised camps,’ 207 but
with the caveat that ‘this should not be a general measure.’208
But when Felix Schnyder became High Commissioner, that changed. Refugee
encampment became the modus operandus for UNHCR’s operations in Tunisia and
Morocco. Loescher observes that when Felix Schnyder became High
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Commissioner in 1960, he envisaged repatriation as the most feasible solution to
the Algerian refugee crisis:
Algeria was by far the most important issue confronting
Schnyder when he took office. From the beginning of its aid
operation for Algerian refugees, the UNHCR believed that
repatriation, not resettlement, was the only feasible approach to
the problem. Refugees were held in camps in anticipation of a
successful, organized repatriation at the end of the war (my
emphasis).209

Loescher notes that the Algerian refugee repatriation ‘was successfully
completed within three months’210 and that Schnyder believed that repatriation of
the refugee could only succeed if the UNHCR launched activities of ‘actual
integration of these refugees in the economy of their country.’ 211Thus, the UNHCR
launched reconstruction activities in Algeria to integrate the returning refugees.
Loescher concludes that UNHCR’s ‘operating procedures’

212

for the Algerian

repatriation and reconstruction ‘became a blue-print for the UNHCR actions and
policies in practically all subsequent repatriations.’213 Indeed, almost all participants
from UNHCR gave repatriation as an important consideration for refugee
encampment.
Therefore, the evidence shows that refugee-hosting states in the global south
are not necessarily the architects of refugee encampment, even in cases where the
framework governance of refugee policy is located or sited within their internal
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governance processes and structures, as the cases of Kenya before 1990 or Sudan
or Tunisia and Morocco illustrates. Rather, a pattern emerges that demonstrates
that before the intervention of external entities, such as the UNHCR and
international NGOs, refugee-hosting states in the global south, with their meagre
resources, do not respond to the unfolding emergency with refugee encampment as
their preferred technology of choice. Instead, refugee-hosing states often allow
refugees to settle amongst the population and generally leave them to fend for
themselves, of course, with the support of the local host communities.
In this context, the theory that refugee-hosting states in the global south are
the architects of refugee encampment is patently flawed and its proponents, such as
Crisp and Jacobsen214 and Kibreab,215 for example, ignore UNHCR’s role in tilting
the balance of power between itself and refugee-hosting states in its favour, often
taking advantage of certain weaknesses within these refugee-hosting states and
stereotyped assumptions held in the global north about refugee-hosting states in the
global south.216 In fact, none of the proponents of refugee encampment, such as
Crisp and Jacobsen, make any reference to the behind-the-scenes negotiations and
methods that UNHCR uses to induce refugee-hosting states to surrender their
framework governance to UNHCR and embracing refugee encampment as the case
of Kenya illustrates.217
Proponents of the theory that refugee-hosting states in the global south are the
architects of refugee encampment might still remind readers of how these states
ruthlessly enforce refugee encampment policies in their countries. Kenya, in
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December 2012, for example, ‘decided to stop reception, registration and close
down all registration centres in urban areas with immediate effect. All
asylum/seekers will be hosted at the refugee camps.’ 218 There are two possible
responses to this type of contention. First, once the refugee-hosting State has lost
the balance of power to UNHCR and its framework governance to UNHCR and
other external entities, the only semblance of its authority and sovereignty is it is
ability to enforce refugee encampment, often in the name of security, even without
a scintilla of evidence linking refugees to increase in crime. Of course, critics may
argue that enforcement of refugee encampment also suits the interests of the
government in the specific time and context. If that is correct, and if context
matters, one is hard put to explain how a country, such as Kenya, that had seen the
benefits of it laissez-faire refugee policies of the past, and that had attempted to
resist refugee encampment, had better interests in enforcing refugee encampment.
Second, and crucially, a refugee-hosting state’s enforcement of refugee
encampment must be understood in the broader context of the same state’s
enforcement of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy aid conditionality that the agents
of capitalism, such as the World Bank and IMF impose on these states. It is often
the case that these hapless states claim that they are the authors of the economic
reforms that they were undertaking and have fiercely enforced the reforms, such as
the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and early 1990s with disastrous
consequences on the people. And yet, many of these same states later come out to
disown the programmes as not their own or blame these institutions for
undermining their programmes.219 As Okafor demonstrates, external entities, such
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as the World Bank and IMF, or even some powerful states, have acquired the sites
or locations of the framework governance on key economic and other governance
issues of many “third world” states. It is the external entities that ‘authors the frame
decisions that constitute the bulk of the governance pie’220 in these states.
Given the orientation of all the evidence available, I argue that refugee
encampment, for most refugee-hosting states in the global south, and certainly in
Kenya, has tended to be an external conditionality that external entities, such as
UNHCR and its implementing partners, mostly international non-governmental
organisations, introduce to refugee-hosting states for a variety of reasons, including
institutional interests. In the case of the UNHCR’s praxis of refugee encampment,
as I have demonstrated in section 3.2 of this chapter, refugee camps are an integral
component of its refugee emergency response strategy. It is presented to states as a
necessary technology, albeit for temporary period, and often the security concerns
and fears of states are exploited to drive the message home.221 And where there is
some resistance, as the case of Kenya demonstrated, key government officials are
incentivised and socialised into embracing and owning refugee encampment.222
In this context, it should not come as a surprise to the keen observer that
refugee encampment in Kenya, for example, coincided with an influx of a refugee
emergency in which the UNHCR was involved. My thesis is that the UNHCR
‘proposes’ refugee encampment to a refugee-hosting state facing a refugee crisis, as
the most feasible solution to the emerging crisis, giving the state the security
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implications of refugees and how encampment is the technology to minimise those
risks.223
Even critical refugee law, policy, and praxis scholars such as Verdirame and
Harrell-Bond missed this subtle manoeuvring that UNHCR adopts to assert itself
and appropriate the framework governance of refugee policy in a refugee-hosting state,
such as Kenya, that never had a refugee encampment policy. Indeed, Verdirame
and Harrell-Bond instead noted that ‘rather than challenge the camp policy’ of
refugee-hosting states,
UNHCR and even NGOs supported it for the perceived
advantages that this concentration and isolation of the refugee
population provided: administrative efficiency, the ability to
control refugees, and the facilitation of the ‘voluntary’
repatriation of refugees.224

The UNHCR cannot challenge refugee encampment policies in refugeehosting states in the global south because it is the chief architect of encampment.
How can the UNHCR challenge itself about a technology it is interested in? The
UNHCR succeeded, however, in normalising the camp as its standard technology
for implementing its mandate in the global south, using rhetorical assertions that
portray it as against refugee encampment in general. Some High Commissioners,
such as Sadako Ogata225 and Ruud Lubbers226 publicly claimed that refugee camps
are not good for anybody and that UNHCR’s goal is to make refugee encampment
unnecessary. Yet, in practice, the organisation these former High Commissioners
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headed continues to put high premium on refugee camps in their refugee emergency
response strategy. And I noted in subsection 3.2.1, this rhetoric, that camps are not
good for refugees, was articulated in the first edition of the Emergency Handbook, but
quickly qualified with statements that the camp can be sanitised anyway. Indeed,
the UNHCR’s praxis over the decades does not support its rhetorical claims that
refugee camps are bad for refugees. It is possible that things might change in the
near future, especially in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis whereby the
majority of the Syrian refugees live in urban centres; in this context, the UNHCR
will start to adapt to this increasing reality. Indeed, in 2014 the UNHCR released
its policy on alternatives to refugee camps.227 A discussion of this new policy is
beyond the scope of my dissertation.
3.4

Conclusion

In the first place, the evidence confirms my theory is correct, namely, that the
UNHCR is the architect of refugee encampment in many refugee-hosting states in
the global south. Also, the observable implication of this theory is correct; the
framework governance of refugee policy is located within UNHCR’s internal
processes and structures. The counter theory, namely, that refugee-hosting states in
the global south are the architects refugee encampment, however, did not hold true
because states that retained their framework governance of refugee policy and practice
did not automatically use refugee camps for providing protection. In other words,
the observable implication that if states are the architects of refugee encampment,
then the framework governance of refugee policy would be located within the
governance processes and structures of the refugee-hosting states contradicted the
counter theory. Using Kenya, Sudan, Tunisia, and Morocco refugee emergencies,
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it was shown that these states did not automatically adopt refugee encampment as
the preferred device for responding to the refugee influxes in their territories. In fact,
all of them never at first considered refugee encampment, until UNHCR became
involved with the refugee influxes in their territories.
In the second place, UNHCR uses refugee encampment as a form of aid
conditionality in much the same way that the two leading neo-liberal financial
institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, demand of “third world” states
conditions for financial and other forms of loans for growing their economies.
These conditionalities take various forms, including surrendering the framework
governance of key policy decisions on how to grow the economy, institutional
reform, and governance issues.
In the third place, if refugee encampment is an integral component of the
UNHCR’s refugee emergency response strategy and it appropriates the framework
governance of refugee-hosting states and tilts the balance of power in its favour, then
accountability for the injurious consequences of refugee encampment on the
environment and refugees must follow the locus of the framework of governance that
authors the decisions to encamp refugees. I develop this aspect in more detail in
Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 4: THE REGIME OF ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW

4.1

Introduction

In Chapter 1, I conceptualised accountability as answerability and argued that
accountability is the underlying theme of the law of state responsibility and
international liability for the injurious consequences arising from acts that
international law does not prohibit. If that is the case, then it is logical to foreground
accountability as a legal term for describing and prescribing the rules and principles
governing the the wrongful acts or injurious consequences arising from activities that
international law does not prohibit of both state and non-state actors as subjects of
international law. In this context, the content and scope of the rules and principles of
a regime of accountability under international law would comprise the existing rules
and principles of responsibility for internationally wrongful acts and liability for
injurious consequences arising out of activities international law does not prohibit,
despite the existing gaps in these rules and principles.
In this chapter I analyse the content and scope of the rules and principles
governing the regime of accountability under international law. I argue that
international law provides a legal route, or a legal regime, for engaging the
accountability of states and other actors who violate its precepts. If this is correct, at
least some five practical or observable implications may be detected. First, it means,
in practice, that international law has well-developed legal rules and principles that
constitute a regime of accountability. Second, it implies that international law has
well-developed institutions and processes for ensuring accountability. Third, it
suggests that international law’s regime of accountability is accessible to any injured
party or person seeking redress for injury or harm suffered as a result of either the
wrongful acts or the injurious consequences arising from activities of an actor on the
international plane that international law does not prohibit. Fourth, it implies that it
should be possible to hold any actor, such as UNHCR, accountable for their
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wrongful acts or the injurious consequences of their acts that international law does
not prohibit. Fifth, it is possible that the regime of accountability under international,
just like any other structures and processes that human beings have created, suffers
from inherent deficiencies and flaws that allows some actors to evade scrutiny and
accountability.
There is nevertheless a competing or counter theory to the theory that
international law provides a regime for engaging the accountability of actors who
violate its precepts. A possible competing theory, from a TWAIL perspective, for
example, could be that international law is hegemonic and imperialistic, or otherwise
facilitates the domination of certain actors in other parts of the world, especially in
the global south. Therefore, international law is ill-equipped to provide an equitable
legal route for engaging the accountability of actors who violate its precepts. If this
theory is right, it will also have some identifiable practical or observable implications.
The first observable practical consequence from this theory is that the rules and
principles that constitute the current regime of accountability in international law are
skewed in favour of protecting the hegemonic and imperialistic interests of powerful
actors, states or otherwise. The second implication, which is related to the first, is that
weaker actors (e.g., weaker states or IOs), will disproportionately be subjected to
higher standards of accountability than powerful states or IOs. The third observable
implication is that the existing rules and principles may not provide the legal route
for engaging the accountability of international intergovernmental actors, principal
or subsidiary, such as UNHCR, for the consequences of their activities that
international law does not prohibit.
The fourth practical implication is that, even assuming that within the
hegemonic and imperialistic structure and bias of international law there are some
legal routes to engaging the accountability of international intergovernmental actors
such as UNHCR, these legal routes or avenues may not be accessible to many weaker
people, especially refugees in refugee camps in the global south. The fifth, which is

177

somehow related to the fourth, is that there are barriers, such as the privileges and
immunities of IOs, to any attempts at engaging their accountability.
In this chapter, I focus on my theory and counter-theory about international
law providing some legal route for holding actors on the international plane
accountable and one observable implication for each to analyse the rules and
principles constituting the regime of accountability under international law. As such,
I structure the discussion in this chapter under four main sections. Section 4.1 is this
introduction. In section 4.2, I focus on the rules and principles constituting the regime
of accountability under international law. Here, I briefly trace the origins and sources
of the rules and principles constituting the regime of accountability under
international law, first, in state practice and, second, in the codification work of the
United Nations International Law Commission (ILC). Then I proceed to discuss the
rules and principles governing the accountability of states (subsection 4.2.1); and IOs
(subsection 4.2.2). A discussion of the rules and principles governing the
accountability of individuals, multinational corporations, and international nongovernmental organisations is beyond the scope of my dissertation, which is focused
on the accountability of an international intergovernmental organisation. In
addition, a discussion of the institutions and process of the regime of accountability
under international law is beyond the scope of my dissertation. I take up the first
observable implication of the counter theory, namely, that the rules and principles
that constitute the current regime of accountability in international law are skewed
in favour of protecting the hegemonic and imperialistic interests of powerful actors,
states or otherwise in section 4.3. I conclude the discussions in this chapter in section
4.4.
4.2

The Regime of Accountability Under International Law
I start the analysis of the rules principles of a regime of accountability under

international law with the theory that international law provides a legal route, or a
legal regime, for engaging the accountability of states and other actors who violate
its precepts. If this is correct, then, international law has well-developed legal rules
178

and principles that constitute a regime of accountability that can be observed in real
life situations. In the sections that follow, I will identify and explicate these rules and
principles.
In the first place, the rules and principles constituting the existing regime of
accountability under international law comprise those governing the accountability
of states and the accountability of international organisations (IOs) for: (a)
internationally wrongful acts; and (b) the injurious consequences arising out of acts
or activities that international law does not prohibit.
In the second place, the existing rules and principles of accountability under
international law for both IOs and state actors initially evolved from inter-state
relations. In other words, the rules and principles governing the regime of
accountability under international law first concerned the wrongful conduct of states
and are said to be more developed than those governing the accountability of other
actors.1
In the third place, when the dictates of international life compelled states to
create international organisations (IOs) for harmonising their competing interests, it
became apparent, as years passed by, that IOs were also capable of committing
internationally wrongful acts. The imperative necessity to regulate their conduct and
hold them accountable required the development of rules and principles with which
to engage their accountability.
Therefore, there are rules and principles governing the accountability of states
and IOs for their internationally wrongful acts. The rules for state accountability
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evolved from custom and are now codified, albeit states have not ratified them. The
International Law Commission (ILC) completed its study and codification of the
rules and principles governing the accountability of states for their internationally
wrongful acts in 2001 and adopted draft articles and commentary thereto.2 The ILC
submitted the draft articles on state accountability for internationally wrongful acts
and commentary to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) recommending
the General Assembly (GA) to ‘take note of the draft articles on State responsibility
for internationally wrongful acts in a resolution and that it annex the draft articles to
the resolution.’3 The ILC further recommended that the GA consider:
‘convening an international conference of plenipotentiaries to
examine the draft articles on the responsibility of State for
internationally wrongful acts with a view to concluding a
convention on the topic.’4
Similarly, the ILC undertook to study the topic of the accountability of IOs for
their internationally wrongful acts and the codification of the rules and principles of
international law governing their accountability and completed this task in 2011. It
adopted ‘draft articles on the responsibility of international organisations for
internationally wrongful acts’ and with commentary thereto.5 The ILC submitted the
draft articles and commentary thereto to the UNGA, recommending that the UNGA
‘take[s] not of the draft articles on the responsibility of international organisations in
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a resolution, and to Appendix them to the resolution.’6 Furthermore, the ILC
recommended that the UNGA ‘consider…the elaboration of a convention on the
basis of the draft articles.’7 So far states have not concluded a convention pursuant to
the ILC’s recommendation.
In the fourth place, there is a distinct set of rules and principles governing the
accountability of states and IOs for acts that are not characterised as internationally
wrongful. The ILC studied these under the topic of international liability for the
injurious consequences of acts that international law does not prohibit. It completed
studying and codifying part one of the topic on ‘international liability for injurious
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law (Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities)’ in August 2001 and submitted to
the UNGA draft articles and commentary thereto.8 Furthermore, the ILC completed
work in 2006 on the second part of the topic, and adopted ‘draft principles on the
allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous
activities.’9 In completing the second part of the topic, the ILC effectively completed
its work on the topic, ‘international liability for injurious consequences arising out of
acts not prohibited by international law’ and submitted the draft principles to the
UNGA recommending that it ‘endorse[s] the principles by a resolution and urge
States to take national and international action to implement them.’10
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4.2.1 Rules and Principles of International Law Governing the
Accountability of States

In this section I review and explain the rules and principles governing the
accountability of states under customary international law and the the ILC’s draft
articles on the accountability of states.
4.2.1.1 Rules and Principles of Customary International Law

Since the existing regime of accountability under international law emerged from
inter-state relations,11 it is imperative to commence a brief discussion of the regime
with the the rules and principles of international law that emerged from state
practice.12 A detailed discussion of the various expressions of state practice and
customary international law in general is beyond the scope of this chapter.13 It
suffices, however, to point out that the rules and principles governing the
accountability of states under international law have been conventionally referred to
as the law of state responsibility or simply state responsibility.
I will here summarise at least five main rules and principles from customary
law that govern the accountability of states: protection of aliens, their property and
reparation; basis of accountability; when is a wrongful act an act of state; attribution
acts of officers to state; and the point in time when the accountability of the state is
triggered. Some of these principles such as those concerning the basis of
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accountability and when an act of an officer is considered an act of the state are
critical to a regime of accountability under international law and can be, in specific
contexts, extrapolated to other actors, such as the UNHCR. That is precisely what
the ILC did when it was codifying the rules and principles for a regime of the
accountability of IOs. I return to this aspect under subsection 4.2.1.2 of this chapter.
In the first place, the rules and principles concerning the duties a state owed
foreign nationals on its territory was settled both in practice and theory and formed
an important aspect of the international regime of accountability of the state for
injury an alien suffers on its territory. Two most pronounced principles concerns the
duties of a state to respect and protect the property rights of aliens and to make
reparation for injury an alien suffers, whether with respect to property or other
interests.14
In the second place, the issue of what constituted the basis of a state’s
accountability for injury to aliens on its territory under international law was settled
amongst states in their bilateral relations with each other. Among state practitioners,
the prevailing rule and principle was that ‘some wrongful invasion of the rights of an
alien by an agent of the State'15 was required. In other words, the ‘“wrongful acts or
omissions” by the State or its agents’16 was the basis for the accountability of the state
for injury to aliens.
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There was also the issue concerning the acts of an officer of government. And
the question was when is an act of an officer considered an act of the state under
international law? Does a state incur international accountability immediately when
an official of the state wrongfully injures an alien? Borchard argues that the practice
amongst states does not support this position. In practice, the international
accountability of a state is not engaged ‘immediately when an official of the state
wrongfully injures an alien, but only when it is evident that the local remedy is
unavailable or ineffective.’ It is only when the alien has no access to effective local
remedies that ‘international responsibility commences, for it is an indication that the
State is unwilling or unable to make good the wrong of its officer… and hence must
assume international responsibility.’17
The point in time when the accountability of a state is triggered was a
fundamental and controversial question. The prevailing principle on when the
accountability of the state commences posited that the accountability of the state for
the wrongful act of its officer is triggered or commences ‘after local remedies have
failed.’18 The PCIJ later ‘overruled’ the principle that the accountability of the state
is not immediately engaged when it breaches an international obligation in its
decision in the Phosphates in Morocco case.19 In this case, the Italian Government
instituted proceedings against the French Government before the PCIJ concerning
phosphates in Morocco. The Italian government alleged that certain decisions of the
Moroccan and French authorities with respects to phosphates prospecting in
Morocco constituted a monopolisation of Moroccan phosphates contrary to certain
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provisions of the Franco-German Convention of 7 April 1911 concerning Morocco,
to which Italy had acceded. In the alternative, the Italian government further alleged
that the Moroccan Mines Department’s decision to reject the application of its
national, one Mr. Constantino Tassara, as transferee of phosphates prospecting
licenses he had acquired from French citizens, ‘to be recognised as the discoverer of
the deposits covered by the said licenses,’ amounted to an expropriation without
compensation of a vested right. This was an unlawful international act.
The PCIJ held that it had ‘no jurisdiction to adjudicate on this dispute’,20 i.e., it
had no jurisdiction to entertain the Italian claim against France, because the facts
constituting the dispute ‘did not arise with regard to situations or facts subsequent to
the ratification by France of the compulsory jurisdiction’ of the Court.21 The most
relevant part of the PCIJ’s judgment to the point under discussion here, namely,
whether a state’s accountability for internationally wrongful act is engaged
immediately after its organ commits the unlawful act or after the injured alien’s
exhaustion of local remedies, relates to the Court’s observations on the alternative
claim of the Italian government, namely, that the decision of the Moroccan Mines
Department to expropriate its national’s vested rights, without compensation, was
an internationally wrongful act and engaged the accountability of France
immediately. The Court said:
In its application, the Italian Government has represented the
decision by the Department of Mines as an unlawful international
act, because that decision was inspired by the will to get rid of the
foreign holding and because it therefore constituted a violation of
the vested rights placed under the protection of international
conventions. That being so, it is in this decision we should look for
the violation of international law – a definitive act which would,
by itself, directly involved international responsibility. This act
being attributable to the State and described as contrary to the

20

Ibid at 29.

21

Ibid.

185

treaty rights of another State, international responsibility would be
established immediately between the two State’ (my emphasis).22

The Court, in summary, affirms the theory that the wrongful act of an officer of
State immediately engages the accountability of State. The PCIJ’s successor, the ICJ,
has applied this principle, for example, it the Corfu Channel case and the Military and
Paramilitary activities against Nicaragua cases. The ILC has incorporated this rule in its
draft articles on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts, to which
I now turn in subsection 4.2.1.2.

4.2.1.2

Rules and Principles of International Law Governing the
Accountability of States Emanating from the ILC’s Codification
Work

The rules and principles governing the accountability of states as the ILC has codified
them now consist of two broad aspects: accountability for internationally wrongful
acts and accountability for the injurious consequences arising out of acts that
international law does not prohibit.23 The rules and principles governing the
accountability of states for injurious consequences arising out of acts that
international law does not prohibit are, in contrast, contained in two draft
documents: the ‘draft articles on the prevention of transboundary harm from
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hazardous activities’24 and the ‘draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of
transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities.’25
The ILC’s draft articles on accountability of states for internationally wrongful
acts, unlike the regime governing the accountability of states under customary
international law, no longer focus on bilateral relations between states and the rights
and economic interests of alien nationals on their territories. The issue of the
protection of the rights and economic interests of alien nationals, whether natural or
juridical persons, is now addressed under a separate regime of rules and principles
governing diplomatic protection.26
4.2.1.2.1

Accountability for Internationally Wrongful Acts

The organising principle of the scheme of the draft articles on the accountability of
states is the idea of the internationally wrongful act of the state as the basis of accountability
under international law. The scope of issues addressed under this organising concept
are broad.27 Thus, the draft articles contain rules and principles governing what
constitutes a wrongful act; attribution of a wrongful act to a state; the breach of
international obligation; the accountability of a state for the wrongful act of another
state; the circumstances precluding wrongfulness; reparation for injury; serious
breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law; the
invocation of the accountability of a State; and countermeasures.28
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I focus here on the general rules and principles governing an internationally
wrongful act, rules and principles governing attribution of wrongful acts to a state,
and rules and principles governing the breach of an international obligation because
I believe these aspects are foundational steps in any attempts at investigating whether
a state’s accountability is engaged. In other words, the rules and principles governing
an internationally wrongful act, attribution of wrongful act to a state, and breaches
of an international obligation help in determining whether a State has complied with
an international obligation.
4.2.1.2.2 General Rules and Principles governing what Constitutes an
Internationally Wrongful Act

The general rules and principles undergirding what constitutes an internationally
wrongful act of a state are set out in Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the draft articles on
responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts. The basic principle
underlying the draft articles, i.e., articles 1 – 59, is articulated in Article 1, which
stipulates that, ‘[e]very internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international
responsibility of that State.’29 In other words, when a state breaches international
law, its accountability is engaged. A wrongful act therefore is a breach of any
international obligation. It implies that the accountability of the state is engaged
immediately it commits an internationally wrongful act. In framing the concept of a
wrongful act in this way, the ILC followed international judicial opinions or
precedent that had already ‘overruled’ the dominant principle in the early twentieth
century that enunciated that the accountability of the state for the wrongful act of its
officers is only engaged after the injured alien had exhausted local remedies. Under
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the authority of the Phosphates in Morocco case, the accountability of the state is
immediately engaged when it commits an ‘unlawful international act.’30
Similarly, under the authority of the Corfu Channel case, a state’s accountability
for an internationally wrongful act is engaged immediately.31 In that case, two British
destroyers, the Saumarez and Volage, struck mines in Albanian territorial waters and
sustained serious damage. Albania denied knowledge of the mining of its territorial
waters, claiming that it has no naval capacity and no knowledge who might have
done it. The Court concluded, based on evidence and several assumptions, that
Albania had knowledge of the minelaying of the Corfu Channel, because ‘there was
a close Albanian surveillance over the straight’32 around the period the two British
warships were struck by the mines. Based on this conclusion, the Court held that
‘Albania is responsible under international law for the explosion which occurred on
October 22nd, 1946 in Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of human life
which resulted from them…’33 Several other judicial and arbitral authorities affirm
the principle that the international wrongful act of a state engages its accountability.34
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The principles laying out the integral components of a wrongful act are
stipulated in Article 2 of the draft articles.35 Article 2 stipulates that a state is said to
have committed an internationally wrongful act when two things have occurred: an
act or omission ‘is attributable to the state under international law’ and the act or
omission ‘constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the state.’ In other
words, there are two components to what constitutes an internationally wrongful act
under the principles enunciated in Article 2. The first component is that the wrongful
act must be attributable to the state under international law, not national law. The
second component requires that the wrongful act must constitute a breach of an
existing international legal obligation of the state. These principles, as explained in
subsection 4.2.1.1, were enunciated through state practice or customary international
law and the ILC simply codified and clarified them. Under the authority of the
Dickson Car Wheel case, for example, the Commission stated that for a national of the
claimant Government’s claim to succeed, it ‘is indispensable’ that ‘that two elements
co-exist: an unlawful international act and a loss of injury suffered by a national of
the claimant Government.’36 The claim must fail if any of these two components are
lacking.37
The last general principle governing what constitutes an internationally
wrongful act relates to the issue under what legal regime an act may be characterised
as an internationally wrongful act. Article 3 of the draft article enunciate the principle
that international law is the legal regime under which a state’s act is to be
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characterised as internationally wrongful even if that same act is considered lawful
under national law.38
The commentary to Article 3 explains its import, indicating that Article 3
embodies ‘two elements.’39 An act of a state is characterised as internationally
wrongful only if that act ‘constitutes a breach of an international obligation.’40 It is
irrelevant that the state’s act ‘violates a provision’ of its ‘own law.’ In addition, a state
cannot escape international law’s characterisation of its act as wrongful even if that
act conforms to its national law.41
4.2.1.2.3

Rules and Principles Governing Attribution of Internationally
Wrongful Act to a State

The rules and principles governing the attribution of internationally wrongful acts to
a state are covered under articles 4 – 11 of the ILC’s draft articles on the
accountability of states for internationally wrongful acts.42 They define or specify the
conditions under which an act of the state is attributable to that state for purpose of
determining its accountability under international law.43 The ILC identified eight key
issues that are critical to attributing a wrongful act to a state, which form the basis
of the rules and principles.
The first issue, which Article 4 addresses, concerns organs of a state whose
wrongful act or omission is considered the act of that state. Under national law, the
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state comprises various organs, e.g., the executive, parliament or legislature, the
judiciary, ministries, departments, authorities, public corporations with separate
legal personality, territorial units, entities with other functions, etc. The rules
enunciated in Article 4 stipulates that international law holds the state accountable
for all the acts of these different organs acting in their various capacities while
exercising governmental functions of the state. It is immaterial what position these
entities hold in the organisation of the state, including having a separate legal
personality under national law.
The second issue concern a person or entity, technically not organs of the state,
but is vested with power to exercise elements of governmental authority on behalf of
the state. Article 5 covers this aspect and stipulates that the act or omission of such a
person or entity in exercise of powers vested in them are considered, under
international law, acts of the state, as long as they are acting in that capacity and in
that specific instance or occasion.
The third issue relates to a situation where a state places one of its organs at the
disposal of another state. The rules for attributing the wrongful act of such an organ
placed at the disposal of another state are provided in Article 6. The act of such a
person or entity placed at the disposal of another state, when acting in exercise of
elements of governmental authority of the state at whose disposal it was placed, are
considered, under international law, the act of the state that placed the person or
entity at the disposal of another state.
In addition, there is the situation or case where an organ of state or a person or
entity vested with the power to exercise elements of governmental authority exceeds
their authority or contravenes the instruction given. The rule enunciated to address
this scenario is laid out in Article 7. The act of an organ of state or person or entity
clothed with power to exercise governmental authority are considered act of the state
even if the organ, person, or entity, exceeds the authority vested in them or simply
violates or flouts the instruction it was given.
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Another issue critical to questions of attributing wrongful acts to the state under
international law concerns the act of a person or group of persons acting on the
instructions of or under the influence of or control of a state. The rules of attributing
the act to the state are stipulated in Article 8. The rule is that the act of a person or
group of persons acting on the instruction or direction or control of the state are
considered an act of that State.
The ILC also considered the issue of what when happens a person or group
persons exercising governmental authority in the absence or default of the official
authorities commits a wrongful act under international law. This scenario is
addressed in Article 9. The rule articulated in Article 9 considers the act of a person
or group of persons acting in exercise of elements of governmental authority to be an
act of the State in such circumstances.
The acts of insurrections or movements also raise questions regarding
attributing such acts to a state under international law. Are the acts of groups seeking
self-determination or revolutions that take over the state from previous groups
attributable to the state? Article 10 of the draft articles is devoted to defining the rules
for attributing acts of insurrections and movements to the state under two possible
occurrences. In the first place, the act or acts of an insurrection or movement are
considered the act of the state if it becomes the new Government of the state (Article
10 (1)). In the second place, the act or acts of an insurrection or movement are
considered acts of the state under international law if it succeeds in establishing a
new state in a part of a territory of pre-existing state or territory under its
administration (Article 10 (2)). Some examples of insurrection or movements that
eventually become new states, include the newest state of the world, South Sudan,
created in 2011, or Croatia or Bosnia Herzegovina, established after the
disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
The operation of the rule enunciated in Article 10 (1) and (2), i.e., the attribution
of acts of insurrections or movements to a state, is without prejudice to the attribution
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to a state any act, however related to that of the movement, which is already
considered an act of the state under articles 4 to 9 (Article 10 (3)).
The draft articles also address the issue of how to deal with a situation, under
international law, where a state acknowledges an act and adopts it as its own. Article
11 defines the rule for dealing with this type of situation and provides that acts which
are not attributable to the state under the preceding articles, namely, articles 4 to 10,
shall be considered acts of that sate under international law.
4.2.1.2.4

Accountability for Injurious Consequences of Acts
International Law does not Prohibit

In the preceding sections I explicated the rules and principles governing what
constitutes an internationally wrongful act of a state and how to attribute an
internationally wrongful act to a states under various circumstances or scenarios
when dealing with the issue of the accountability of the state under international law.
I now turn, in this subsection to elucidate the rules and principles governing the
accountability of states and IOs for the injurious consequences arising out of acts not
prohibited by international law.
The ILC’s work of developing and codifying international rules and principles
governing states and IOs accountability for injurious consequences of their activities
that international law does not prohibit is a welcome addition to the corpus of
existing rules and principles of accountability that focus on the internationally
wrongful acts of states and IOs. As I stated in Chapter 1, certain activities or conduct
may not be unlawful or ‘wrongful’ per se, but nonetheless may produce injurious
consequences on people and the environment, for example. The injurious
consequences of refugee encampment on the environment and condition of
refugees in camps that the UNHCR helps create, fund, and administer to provide
international protection to refugees, is a good example of this aspect. In addition,
in Chapter 3 I demonstrated how the UNHCR is the architect of refugee
encampment; and the UNHCR concedes that the encampment of refugees in its
Dadaab Refugee Camp Complex (DRCC) ‘has resulted in significant environmental
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degradation.’44 In Chapter 5, I will attempt to develop the case for the UNHCR’s
accountability based on the concept of accountability for the injurious consequences
of activities that international law does not prohibit.
As we have seen, the ILC decided to split the topic of international liability for
injurious consequences arising out of activities that international law does not
prohibit into two sub-topics: prevention of transboundary harm and loss from
transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities.45 On the prevention sub-topic,
it adopted, in 2001, the draft articles on the prevention of transboundary harm from
hazardous activities. And on the loss sub-topic it adopted the draft principles on the
allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities were
adopted in 2006. These two documents codify the existing rules and principles
governing the accountability or the consequences of any legal obligation arising out
of activities international law does not prohibit.
4.2.1.2.5 Rules and Principles Emanating from the Draft Articles on
Prevention of Transboundary Harm

Prevention is the organising principle of accountability under the regime of the draft
articles on the prevention of transboundary harm comprising 19 articles. The ILC
states that prevention connotes both a procedural and obligatory sense.46 This
contrasts sharply with the regime of accountability under the draft articles on
accountability of states whose organising principle is the concept of the internationally
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wrongful act. Under this concept, the ILC developed a broad array of rules and
principles that govern issues from the constitutive element of the concept itself to, for
example, reparations, and countermeasures.
The prevention regime of accountability, unlike the internationally wrongful
act regime, that seeks to compensate, and remedy injury already suffered, however,
seeks to prevent injury or harm before it occurs, as much as feasible. In this context,
the concept of prevention produces rules and principles of accountability, which
places ‘emphasis upon the duty to prevent as opposed to the obligation to repair,
remedy, or compensate.’47
The scope of the 19 articles on prevention of transboundary harm, while not as
broad as that of the draft article on the accountability of states for internationally
wrongful acts, envisage scenarios that facilitate the state of origin and the state likely
to be affected and other states of concern in ensuring that preventive measures are
put in place before an activity that has potential transboundary harm can be
authorised.
I review a few articles of the Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary
Harm to give an idea of what the rules and principles governing issues of preventing
transboundary harm and consequences, if any for failure to take preventive
measures. The focus or scope of the 19 articles are articulated in Article 1, which
provides that the articles ‘apply to activities not prohibited by international law which
involve a risk of causing significant transboundary harm through their physical
consequences.’48 The activities covered under the articles are limited to those that
international law does not prohibit. The scope of the articles are further limited under
Article 2(d) of the draft articles, which defines the meaning of “State of origin,” as
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‘the State in the territory or otherwise under the jurisdiction or control of which the
activities referred to article 1 are carried out.’ Thus, subparagraph (d) of Article 2
further limits the scope of the draft articles to activities carried out in the territory of
the State or other territory under the State’s jurisdiction or control.
The rules and principles in the draft article also depend on a set of concepts that
are laid out in Article 2 of the draft articles. Key among them are ‘risk of causing
significant transboundary harm’ and ‘harm.’ The concept of ‘risk of causing
significant transboundary harm,’ is defined in subparagraph (a) of Article 2 to
include, ‘risks taking the form of a high probability of causing significant
transboundary harm and low probability of causing disastrous transboundary
harm.’49
The ILC states in its commentary to Article 2 that the ‘concept of ‘risk of
causing significant transboundary harm’ refers to combined effects of the probability
of occurrence of an accident and the magnitude of its injurious impact.’50 In other
words, the threshold of what constitutes a transboundary harm from hazardous
activity is ‘the combined effect of “risk” and “harm.”51 The ILC concludes that, ‘[a]
definition based on the combined effect of “risk” and “harm” is more appropriate for
these articles, and the combined effect should reach a level that is significant’ (emphasis in
original).52 Under this conceptual scheme, the ILC claims, ‘[t]he obligations of

49

Ibid.

50

Ibid at 152.

51

Ibid.

52

Ibid.

197

prevention imposed on States are thus not only reasonable but also sufficiently
limited so as not to impose such obligations in respect of virtually any activity.’53
The ILC’s draft articles on the prevention of transboundary harm focus on
hazardous material that cause harm across and beyond borders. The issue is whether
the injurious consequences of refugee camps on the environment and refugees can
be characterised as activities that cause transboundary harm. Some critics may argue
that while refugee camps are capable of causing irreparable damage to the
environment and refugees who have lived under conditions of encampment, some
for over 25 years, they may not cause transboundary harm. Moreover, the critics
may further take issue with the idea of using laws or rules created to govern the
accountability of actors whose legitimate activities cause transboundary harm to
holding accountable entities such as the UNHCR whose encampment activities may
not necessarily cause transboundary harm.
My response is twofold. First, that any damage to the environment is likely to
have transboundary effects either in the short or the long run regardless of whether
the source of harm is from, for example, activities that are explicitly hazardous, such
as smelting metal from its ores or activities that are implicitly hazardous, such as
refugee encampment. One of the most visible consequences of the refugee camp on
the environment is deforestation and soil erosion, which can have both localised and
regional impacts. The UNHCR concedes that the DRCC has had a negative impact
on the environment: ‘[t]wenty years ago, shelter construction materials were readily
available within a radius of 0-5 km from the refugee camp. Presently refugees travel
between 40 to 70 km for the same items.’54 Moreover, this ‘has resulted in destruction
of over 3,000 hectares of land in and around the Dadaab refugee camp complex.’55
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Widespread deforestation, whether of tropical rainforests or other form forest for
small or large scale economic activities or encampment ‘could disrupt the movement
of water in the atmosphere causing major shifts in precipitation that could lead to
drought’ across countries.56 This in turn could affect agricultural productivity and
create food shortages.
Second, since harm done to the environment in one state’s territory has
potential transboundary impacts, it is legitimate to extrapolate or extend the rules
and principles developed to govern accountability for the injurious consequences of
hazardous activities to those that are not characterised explicitly as hazardous.
4.2.1.2.6 Rules and Principles on Allocation of Loss in Case of
Transboundary Harm

The draft principles on the allocation of loss in case of transboundary harm define a
set of rules and principles governing the accountability for states for loss in case of
transboundary harm, without prejudice to the regime of accountability of states for
internationally wrongful acts. The draft principles on allocation of loss attempt to
embody the spirit of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.57
The Draft Principles, consisting 8 Principles, focus on accidents that occur
when hazardous activities are being carried out regardless of the state of origin’s
compliance with its obligations under international law. The concern is that
accidents from hazardous activities have a transboundary reach and can cause harm
and loss to other states, including their nationals. In this context, the Principles seek
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to create a regime of accountability that guarantees compensation for those who
suffer loss in case of transboundary harm resulting from hazardous activities.
The scope of the draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of
transboundary harm from hazardous activities that international law does not
prohibit are limited to ‘transboundary damage caused by hazardous activities not
prohibited by international law.’58 The principles also define the nature, threshold,
and victims of damage resulting from transboundary damage. The damage has to be
significant and to persons, property, or the environment.59 The damage can be ‘loss to
life or personal injury60’; or ‘loss of, or damage to property, including property which
form part of the cultural heritage’61; or ‘loss or damage by impairment of the
environment’62 ; or costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement of the property, or
environment, including natural resources’63; or ‘the costs of reasonable response
measures.’64
The principles have two main purposes, compensatory and preservative. In the
first place, the principles provide a legal route to ‘prompt and adequate compensation
to victims of transboundary damage.’65 Secondly, the principles seek to ‘preserve and
protect the environment in the event of transboundary damage, especially with
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respect to mitigating damage to the environment and its restoration or
reinstatement.’66
The regime of compensation envisaged under Principle 4 obliges states to ‘take
all necessary measures to ensure that prompt and adequate compensation is available
for victims of transboundary damage caused by hazardous activities located in its
territory or otherwise under its jurisdiction or control.’67 In addition, the measures
should include at least four main aspects.
In the first place, the measures must impose liability on the operator or other
person, or entity and such liability does not require proof of fault.68 Moreover, any
‘conditions, limitations, or exceptions to such liability shall be consistent with draft
principle 3.’69 In the second place, the measures should include the requirement that
the operator or person or entity ‘establish and maintain financial security such as
insurance, bonds or other financial guarantees which cover claims of
compensation.’70 In third place, the measures should include, in appropriate cases,
the requirement for the establishment of industry-wide funds at the national level.’71
And crucially, the state of origin should ensure that additional financial resources
are available in the event that measures already in place are insufficient to provide
adequate compensation.72
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Principle 5 lays out the rules governing how states should respond in the event
of ‘an incident involving a hazardous activity which results or is like to result in a
transboundary harm.’73 The first set of three rules impose obligations on the state of
origin while the last two set of rules on the state that a transboundary harm impacts
or affects. The state of origin is under obligation to ‘promptly notify all States affected
or likely to be affected of the incident and the possible effects of the transboundary
harm.’ Secondly, it ‘shall ensure, with appropriate involvement of the operator, that
appropriate response measures are taken and should, for this purpose rely upon the
best available scientific data and technology.’74 In addition, the state of origin, should
‘consult with and seek’, as appropriate, ‘the cooperation of all States affected or likely
to be affected to mitigate the effects of transboundary damage and if possible
eliminate them.’75
Principle 5 also imposes obligations on the state affected and the states
concerned in the event of a transboundary damage occurring. The state affected or
likely to be affected by a transboundary damage ‘shall take all feasible measures to
mitigate and if possible, to eliminate the effects of such damage.’76 The states
concerned should, where appropriate, seek the assistance of competent international
organisations and other States on mutually acceptable terms and conditions.’77
The draft principles, just like the draft articles on prevention of transboundary
harm, do not appear to cover injurious consequences arising out of activities that do
not fall under the “hazardous activities” category. Some examples included the
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activities of the World Bank, especially its driven economic reform programmes in
the global south, such as dam constructions which has devastating impact on both
the environment and livelihoods of the most vulnerable; the refugee encampment
activities of the UNHCR, which are not technically “hazardous activities’ and may
not have visible transboundary consequences.
4.2.2 Rules and Principles of International Law Governing the
Accountability of IOs

The existing rules and principles governing the accountability of IOs are contained
in the ILC’s draft articles on the responsibility of international organisations for
internationally wrongful acts.78 The draft articles, as their title suggests, are still in
draft, i.e., not yet become a convention or treaty, and are therefore not binding. They,
however, are so far the only source of rules concerning the accountability of IOs.
In addition, the draft articles on the prevention of transboundary harm from
hazardous activities’ and the draft principles of the allocation of loss in the case of
transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities’ that I have explained under
subsection 4.2.1.2 are also another source for the rules and principles governing the
accountability of IOs.
The draft articles, following the template of the draft articles on the
accountability of states for their internationally wrongful acts, also attempt to
embody customary law on the accountability of an international IO. The rules and
principles embodied in the draft articles cover a broad spectrum of issues concerning
the accountability of IOs, ranging from rules for attributing wrongful acts or conduct
to an international IO to rules and principles on the implementation of its
accountability. I will only focus here on rules that define what constitutes an
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international IO’s wrongful acts or conduct, and the rules and principles concerning
the attribution of wrongful acts or conduct to an IO.
I focus on these aspects of the draft articles for two for two reasons. In the first
place, reviewing the provisions of the draft articles which define what constitutes an
international organisation’s wrongful act and how that wrongful act is attributed to
the organisation provided me some insights as to what they contain and whether they
are applicable to the case of UNHCR’s accountability for the injurious consequences
arising out of its refugee encampment activities in some refugee-hosting states in the
global south. The second reason is that an analysis of the rules and principles defining
what constitutes an internationally wrongful act of an international IO and how that
act is attributable to the organisation are the main pillars upon which the whole
edifice of the rules governing the regime of the accountability of international
organisations rest.
4.2.2.1

Rules Defining the Wrongful Act of an International IO Under
the ILC’s Draft Articles

Draft article 1 of the draft article on the accountability of international organisations
for internationally wrongful acts lays out the first general rule governing the
accountability of international organisations. It defines the scope of the rules and
principles embodied in the draft 67 articles on the responsibility of international
organisations. Draft article 1 stipulates that the rules and principles shall apply only
to ‘an internationally wrongful act’ of an international organisation.79
The organising concept of the draft articles is ‘an internationally wrongful act.’
It is the same organising concept used in the draft articles on the accountability of
states. This has one important implication: it means that international law, not
national law, determines what constitutes a wrongful act.
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The draft articles on the accountability of IOs also lay out the general principle
when the accountability of an international IO is engaged. This is embodied in draft
article 3, which stipulates that, ‘Every internationally wrongful act of an international
organization

entails

the

international

responsibility

of

the

international

organization.’80 In theory individuals who suffer injury as a result of the wrongful
act of an IO may invoke its accountability under other systems of law, such as
municipal law or regional law. The draft articles, however, consider acts
characterised as wrongful acts under international law.81
4.2.2.2

Rules and Principles for Attribution of Wrongful Acts to IOs

The ILC draft articles on the accountability of international organisations (IOs)
provide for rules governing the attribution of three types or sources of acts or conduct
to an IO: acts exclusive to an IO; wrongful acts or conduct of another IO or a state; and
the wrongful acts of a state.
The general rule of attributing wrongful acts to an IO are modelled on the
template of draft article 4 (on attribution of wrongful acts to states) of the Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful acts.82
4.2.2.3

Rules and Principles on Attribution of Exclusive Acts of an IO

The general rule is framed in sub-paragraph 1 of Article 6, and stipulates that,
The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization
in the performance of the functions of that organ or agent shall be
considered an act of that organization under international law
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whatever position that organ or agent holds in respect of the
organisation.83

Thus, the acts of an organ or agent of an IO are acts of that IO. Sub-paragraph
2 of draft article 6 provides that the internal rules of the IO apply to determining
functions of its organs and agents. Based on Article 6 (1), the acts of officers of the
UNHCR or its implementing partners in refugee encampment, if acting as an agent
of UNHCR, would be attributable to UNHCR. I return to the question of attributing
wrongful acts to UNHCR in Chapter 5, but it suffices to point out here that in
practice, however, the General Counsel of the UN, would insist that acts of the
subsidiary organs of the UN, even if they are independent and enjoy some legal
personality, are attributable to the UN.84
The general rules and principles that draft 6 enunciates on the attribution of acts
of organs or agents of an IO simply codified existing customary law. Indeed, it is
settled law, under the authority of the Reparations for Injuries case,85 that the acts of an
organ or agent, whether as as particular natural or legal person, of an IO are acts of
that IO and are attributable to it. An agent according to the authority of the Reparation
for Injuries case, is ‘any person who, whether a paid official or not, and whether
permanent or not, has been charged by an organ of the Organization with carrying
out, or helping to carry out, one of its functions – in short, any person through whom
it acts.’86 In other words, draft article 6 (1) reproduces settled customary law. If this
is the law, then the acts of UNHCR’s organs, such as the Country Rep or operational
and implementing partners through whom it acts in delivering essential services to
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refugees in encampment are the acts of the UNHCR and should be attributable to
it.
It is also settled law, under the authority of the Effects of Awards case,87 that the
wrongful act of an agent of an IO engages its accountability. In the Effect of Awards
case, the ICJ held that when the Secretary-General, in his capacity ‘as the chief
administrative officer of the United Nations Organization….concludes …a
contract with a staff member, he engages the legal responsibility of the
Organization, which is the juridical person on whose behalf it acts.’ 88 Similarly, in
the Certain Expenses cases,89 the ICJ, affirming its advisory opinion in the Effect of
Awards case, held in effect that when the Secretary-General acts on the authority of
the Security Council or the UNGA, the responsibility of the UN may be engaged
‘and the General Assembly has no alternative but to honour these engagements.’90
In addition to addressing questions of attributing conduct of organs or agents of
an IO, the draft articles on the accountability of IOs also define the rule for attributing
the acts of an organ or agent of another IO or State placed at the disposal of an IO.
Draft article 7 of the draft articles enunciates this rule and stipulates that,
The conduct of organs of a State or an organ or agent of an
international organization that is placed at the disposal of another
international organization shall be considered under international
law as an act of the latter organization if the organizations
exercises effective control over that conduct.
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In other words, if IO y places at the disposal of another IO t, an organ or agent
p, and t has effective control over p, then any wrongful act that p commits in the
performance of its functions for t shall be attributable to t. The converse is also true:
even if y placed p at the disposal of t, but y controls p, then the wrongful act of p will
be attributable to y.
This aspect of attribution of wrongful acts is crucial to questions concerning
UNHCR’s accountability in respect of refugee encampment activities that are
generally implemented through organs or agents of other IOs, including private IOs
in the non-governmental organisations genre, and organs of the State. In this context,
agency relationships may be established, and this is crucial to questions of attribution
of wrongful conduct to UNHCR in the context of refugee encampment activities in
refugee camps in some refugee-hosting states in the global south.
The draft articles also address the question of to whom to attribute acts of an
organ or agent that acts ultra vires the authority or capacity conferred upon it. The
rule for attributing ultra vires acts to an IO is enunciated in draft article 8. It is settled
law, under the authority of Certain Expenses case,91 that the wrongful act of an organ
or an agent acting in excess of its authority are attributable to the entity that clothed
it with the authority to perform certain functions. In that case, i.e., the Expenses case,
the ICJ expressed the opinion that the accountability of of an IO may entail in
relation to the third parties as a result of an ultra vires act of an agent.92 And more
recently, this rule was confirmed, for example, in the DRC v. Uganda case,93 where
the ICJ held, among other things, that the conduct of the Ugandan army, the Uganda

91

Ibid.

92

Ibid at 168.

93

Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep

168.

208

Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF), regardless of whether they acted in excess of the
authority conferred upon them or in contravention of express instructions, was
attributable to the Ugandan state.94
4.2.2.4

Rules and Principles Governing Attribution of Acts of Another IO

Draft articles 14 to 17 define the rules governing the attribution of the wrongful acts
of an IO in its relationship with another IO under certain scenarios. One such
scenario is where the IO aid or assists another IO in committing an internationally
wrongful act. The rule in draft article 14 covers this scenario and it stipulate, in effect,
that an IO that aids or assists another IO in the commission of an internationally
wrongful act is accountable if it does so with the knowledge of the circumstances of
the internationally wrongful act and that that act would be internationally wrongful
if it had been committed by that organisation.95 In other words, if an IO commits a
wrongful act with the aid or assistance of another IO, the wrongful act is attributable
to the IO that provides the aiding and assistance as long as it had knowledge of the
circumstances in which the internationally wrongful act was committed.
Another scenario is where in the relationship between two IOs, one directs or
controls another in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. Draft article
15 lays out the rule for attributing such wrongful act. The internationally wrongful
act that an IO commits while another IO directed or controlled it is attributable to
the IO doing the direction or controlling as long as the controlling IO had knowledge
of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act.96 In other words, the
international accountability of the IO directing or controlling another IO in the
commission of an internationally wrongful act is engaged if it had knowledge of the
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circumstances of the internationally wrongful act and the act would be an
internationally wrongful act if it had committed the wrongful act itself but not the
other organisation.
Draft articles 16 and 17 enunciate rules governing attribution of wrongful acts
to an IO in the context of the IO’s use of coercion and circumvention of its
international obligations respectively. Draft article 16 stipulates that an IO’s
accountability is engaged if it coerces a state or another IO to commit an act that
would not be internationally wrongful, but for its coercion and its knowledge of the
circumstances in which it procured the act.97 Draft Article 17 provides that the
accountability of an IO is engaged if it circumvents its international obligations under
two situations. In the first situation, it adopts a binding decision on its member states
or IOs to commit an act it is aware would be internationally wrongful if it had
committed that act itself. In the second scenario, the IO, to circumvent its
international obligation, authorises its member states or IOs to commit an act that if
it had committed itself, would be an internationally wrongful act.98
4.2.2.5

Rules and Principles governing Accountability of a State vis-à-vis
Conduct of an IO

A state may be held internationally accountable for the acts of an IO. This happens
under several scenarios stipulated in draft articles 58 to 62 of the draft articles on the
responsibility of IOs. Under draft article 58, a state may be held internationally
accountable for the acts of an IO if the state aids or assists that IO in committing the
internationally wrongful act as long as the state had knowledge of the circumstances
under which it aided and assisted the IO in committing the internationally wrongful
act and the wrongful act would still be internationally wrongful if the state had
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committed it.99 The exception to this rule is that an act of a state member of an IO
done in accordance with the rules of the organisation does not engage the
international accountability of the State under the terms of draft article 58 (1).100
Under draft article 59, a state may be held internationally accountable for the
acts of an IO if that state directs or controls an IO’s commission of an internationally
wrongful act as long as it does the direction and control of the IO’s commission of
the wrongful act with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful
act and that if that act would still be internationally wrongful if the state committed
it.101 The exception to this rule is that an act of a state member of an IO done in
accordance with the rules of the IO does not engage the international accountability
of that state under the terms of draft article 59 (1).102
The draft articles also address scenarios where a state may coerce an IO to
commit an internationally wrongful act or circumvent its international obligations,
taking advantage of an IO’s competence in the subject matter. Draft articles 60 and
61 cover these aspects. Under draft article 60, a state is internationally accountable
if it coerces an IO to commit an act, but for the state’s coercion, would have been an
internationally wrongful act of the IO and the state does so with the knowledge of
the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act.103 In addition, a state is
internationally accountable if it circumvents its international obligation, taking
advantage of the IO’s competence of the subject matter from which arises the state’s
international obligation, thereby causing the IO to commit an act, which if the state
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had committed itself, would have constituted a breach of the state’s international
obligation. And crucially, in these circumstances, the state is held accountable
regardless of whether the act in question is an internationally wrongful act of the
IO.104
Thus, a refugee-hosting state could be held accountable for the wrongful
activities of the UNHCR under draft articles 58 – 62, such as refugee encampment,
if it can be shown that the state directed and controlled the UNHCR’s refugee
encampment activities. Many critics of refugee-hosting states would argue that I
should have focused on the accountability of states for the consequences of refugee
encampment on the environment and refugees instead of the UNHCR. My response
is that one of the main assumptions upon which the relationships between the
UNHCR and refugee-hosting states in the global south are often examined or
critiqued is fundamentally flawed. It is often assumed that UNHCR is a vulnerable
and passive actor on the international plane with no influence on states. I have
demonstrated in Chapter 3 that this is not the case in practice. UNHCR does possess
some significant influence and power over some of these, often, poor governed
refugee-hosting states in the global south.
The ILC’s commentary to draft article 61 suggest that the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on questions regarding individuals right
to access national courts to vindicate an IO’s violation of their rights vis-à-vis
immunity from legal process that the IO enjoys before national courts influence its
content. Indeed, the commentary reviews two such cases, Waite and Kennedy105 and
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the Bosphorus case.106 Waite and Kennedy, very briefly, involves a claim against
Germany for failure to protect the complainants’ right to fair hearing, which arose
from an employment related dispute where the complainants had attempted to seek
redress in Germany Courts against the decision of their employer, a regional IO, the
European Space Agency (ESA), to terminate their employment. The Bosphorus case,
in contrast, concerns a suit against an applicant brought against Ireland to protect its
right to property after Ireland implemented a regulation of the European Community
which also was implementing a resolution of the UN Security Council (UNSC).
In Waite and Kennedy the ECtHR observed that the immunity of an IO from the
jurisdiction of national courts may have ‘implications as to the protection of
fundamental rights’ and absolving Contracting States ‘from their responsibility under
the Convention’, for violations of rights by the IO that states create and clothe with
immunity ‘would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention.’107
In Bosphorus, the ECtHR stated that when States transfer functions to IOs and
immunise them, they cannot free themselves from the obligations they assumed
under the ECHR.108
4.2.2.6

Rules and Principles governing attribution of wrongful Act of an
IO to States

The last scenario considered with respect to accountability of a state for the wrongful
acts of an IO is where a state may be held internationally accountable for the
internationally wrongful act of an IO of which it is a member. Under draft article 62,
a state member of an IO is accountable for the internationally wrongful act of that
IO if the state accepts responsibility for the wrongful act towards the injured party or
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it has led the injured to to rely on its acceptance of accountability for the
internationally wrongful act of the IO of which it’s a member.109
Generally, draft articles 58 to 62 enunciate rules and principles that govern
when the international accountability a state might be engaged for the internationally
wrongful act of an IO. This aspect is often referred to as the doctrine of the derivative
or secondary accountability of the state for the internationally wrongful acts of an
IO.110
Legal opinion amongst international law scholars, however, is divided on
whether a state’s international accountability is engaged on account of the wrongful
acts of an IO of which it is a member.111 Some writers argue that, in the absence of a
general rule or theory on limited liability under international law, the wrongful acts
of an IO engage the secondary responsibility of its member States.112 Other groups,
e.g., those under the Institute of International Law (ILA) suggest that it is a
dangerous proposition to hold states accountable for the wrongful acts of an IOs of
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which it is a member.113 The Institute believes that ‘[i]f members were liable for the
defaults of the organization, its independence and personality would be likely to
become increasingly a sham.’114
The ILA has suggested that due to policy considerations and the interest to
maintain the independence of IOs, espousing a general principle of international law
attributing the wrongful acts of an IO to member states would be inappropriate and
counterproductive.115
Moreover, even leading scholars of international institutional law have changed
their views on whether member states of an IOs should be held accountable for the
wrongful acts of the organisation, thereby further destabilising the doctrinal position
on this issue. Some scholars, such as Schermers and Seidl-Hohenveldern who had
held the view that member states of an IO would be liable, except where provisions
in the constitutive instrument limit liability, now hold the view that member states
do not incur secondary responsibility or accountability for an IO’s internationally
wrongful acts.116
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Even judicial and arbitral decisions are inconsistent on whether the secondary
accountability of a state may be engaged for the internationally wrongful act of an
IO.117 In the Westland Helicopters Ltd

118

case, for example, the defendants, Arab

Organisation for Industrialisation (AOI), decided to cease operations after a peace
agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1979. Westland filed for arbitration seeking
to recover damages for breach of contract from the OAI and its four member states.
The Arbitration Tribunal found in favour of Westland, pointing out that while the
AOI had distinct legal personality, under general principles of law, member states
responsibility entailed for AOI’s liabilities.119 On appeal, the Court of Appeal of
Geneva found in favour of the AOI, pointing out that member states were not
signatory to the arbitration agreement and therefore the Arbitration Tribunal lacked
jurisdiction.120 Westland appealed to the Federal Supreme Court which upheld the
decision of the Court of Appeal pointing out that the AOI possessed distinct
personality and enjoyed total independence from member states and as a result its
activities could not be said to have been carried out on behalf of the member states.121
Another classic example of courts not embracing the doctrine of the secondary
accountability of states for the internationally wrongful acts of an IO of which they
are members is the collapse of the International Tin Council (ITC) in 1985. Several
companies and banks instituted a series of court cases in English courts against the
ITC. One of the main legal issues was whether member states of the ITC could be
held accountable for the wrongful acts of the ITC. In effect, the question whether the
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secondary accountability of states is engaged for the internationally wrongful act of
an IO of which they were members was canvased at length. Indeed, several scholars
have discussed, in greater detail, the ITC cases.122 The Court of Appeal123 and the
House of Lords,124 however, held that there was no general rule of international law
that provided for the secondary accountability of member states for the
internationally wrongful acts of an IO.
4.3

Limitations of Existing Rules and Principles Governing the
Regime of Accountability Under International Law

I now turn to discussing the theory that international law is hegemonic and
imperialistic and therefore is ill-equipped to provide an equitable legal route for
engaging the accountability of certain actors who violate its precepts. I focus here on
one of the observable implications I had identified flowing from it, namely, that the
rules and principles that constitute the existing regime of accountability under
international law are skewed in favour of protecting hegemonic and imperialistic
interests of powerful actors, states or otherwise.
4.3.1 Bias in Rules and Principles Governing what Constitutes an
Internationally Wrongful Act

The bias inherent in the rules and principles governing what constitutes an
internationally wrongful act as the basis of international accountability of states and
IOs under international law is one of the key pieces of evidence I can adduce to
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buttress the observable implication that the rules and principles that constitute the
existing regime of accountability under international law are skewed in favour of
protecting hegemonic and imperialistic interests of powerful actors, states or
otherwise. This bias can be seen at several levels, but it is most explicit in three key
areas.
First, international law is biased in placing far greater importance on private
individual interest and capital in the formulation of rules and principles of the
international accountability of the state.125 In other words, the earliest rules and
principles governing the international accountability of states in their bilateral
relations placed more emphasis on an alien’s property rights at the expense of the
indigenous communities.126
International law has since privileged the property rights of aliens, whether
natural or juridical persons, over and above the rights and interests of the indigenous
people. Yet, much of the property interests of aliens in foreign countries, especially
in territories ‘discovered’127 or ‘acquired’ or declared terra nullius in the global south
and north America, were, and continue to be, land and cultural artefacts that white
settlers of European origin forcibly took, with support of their colonial governments,
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from the indigenous communities. In many states in the global south, for example,
and especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, most of the fertile lands were taken away from
the black people, who were forced onto barren margin lands.128
International law protects these egregious acts of wanton dispossession, either
explicitly or through penalising states that attempt to reform land ownership in ways
that make it possible for the dispossessed indigenous peoples to have access to their
fertile lands. Such acts automatically constitute internationally wrongful acts of the
state and engage its accountability and consequently pay reparation or desist and
restore the land to the aliens, many of whom have acquired the nationality of
convenience of the state.129 There is more emphasis on the human rights of foreign
nationals; the rights of the indigenous people, who were injured when their lands
were forcibly taken is immaterial in the eyes of international law. Therefore, while
international provided a legal route for aliens to vindicate their rights, it had no such
avenues for the indigenous people who suffered injury at the hands of the alien.
This bias inherent in the rules and principles governing the accountability of
states for internationally wrongful acts that privileges foreign nationals’ property and
rights above that of the indigenous people has continued to the present time, but in a
different form. International law continues to protect foreign companies operating in
many parts of the world, especially in the global south using new language, such as
‘Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights’ or General
Agreement on Trade in Services.’ These legal mechanisms invidiously perpetuate
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the dominance of western transnational companies over the economies of peoples
in the global south.130 These legal frameworks on face value promote free
international trade that purportedly produces wealth for everybody, but in reality,
they perpetuate conditions of poverty and undermine standards of living.
Yet, none of the consequences of their activities that are injurious to the
economies of the states in the global south constitute internationally wrongful acts that
should engage the accountability of the transnational corporation or the state of
origin. There is, instead, strong resistance to characterising as internationally
wrongful acts of corporations that operate in various countries in the global south in
search of bigger profit margins that cause so much destruction both of the
environment and the livelihoods of thousands of people in the global south.131
The second level of bias in the rules and principles governing accountability for
internationally wrongful acts under internationally law can be observed in the
activities of supranational financial institutions such the International Bank for
Reconstruction (IBRD) or more commonly known as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, created after the second European War and with
several subsidiaries. These institutions rose to prominence, especially with the
triumph of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy that Ronald Reagan, in the United
States, and Margaret Thatcher, in the United Kingdom, championed in the 1980s
and have since then become the dominant drivers of what Baxi describes as ‘market-
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friendly’ economics globally.132 This pursuit of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy
culminated with the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995
and a global financial system that western European states engineered around the
same time. The conclusion of the WTO agreements was a triumph for neo-liberal
economic orthodoxy: it established what its proponents consider an open, rule-based,
market-friendly international trading system.
These international trade rules and norms in combination with the rules and
norms of the global financial system that western European States helped create in
the 1980s133 provide effective rights and protection for capital to move freely around
the world where it can maximise returns and profit for shareholders. While the free
movement of capital from one ‘market’ with low returns to another ‘market’ with
higher returns has benefits for some in the short-run, the majority poor are often the
losers, in the long-run, with millions condemned to poverty because their means of
livelihoods, either in the form jobs or land are lost to the highest bidders of the system.
In other words, international law has constructed a global institutional order that, as
Pogge puts it, ‘continually and foreseeably produces vast excesses of severe poverty
and premature death,’134 but without these being characterised as internationally
wrongful acts, which must engage the accountability of the architects of the system
with the relevant legal consequences.
The third level of bias in the rules and principles governing internationally
wrongful acts and international accountability is international law’s failure to
characterise as internationally wrongful acts of colonialism and imperialism, i.e., the
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acts of certain western European states and their nationals conquering the indigenous
people in far lands, dispossessing them of the lands, and subjugating and dominating
them. The colonial and imperial project, some leading TWAIL scholars argue, gave
birth to international law.135 While technically colonialism ended after the second
European war, with many former colonial projects of European colonial powers
becoming ‘independent’ states, starting from 1950s and till up to the 1990s, these
states continue to remain under the influence and control of their former colonial
powers.136
A final bias in the rules and principles governing international accountability
of states for internationally wrongful acts relates to the skewing of the rules in favour
of the strong. The ILC draft articles codify obligations ‘owed to the international
community as a whole’, a breach of which entitles a group of states to take collective
measures against the state that is claimed to have breached such an obligation.137 The
problem is that the article framing this obligation does not specify the legal means
authorised for carrying out enforcement action against the state alleged to have
breached the obligation. The intervention of NATO in Libya to effect a regime
change under the cloak of a United Nations resolution and France masterminding
another regime change in Cote D’ Voire under the cloak of another United Nations
resolution are classic reminders that the rules and principles of accountability under
international law continue to serve specific hegemonic and imperialist interests.
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4.3.2 The Limitations of the Rules and Principles Governing Liability for
the Injurious Consequences arising from Activities International Law
does not Prohibit

The idea that injurious consequences arising from activities that international law
does not prohibit can be the basis for liability has the potential to provide an
alternative legal route to holding IOs accountable under international law. Indeed,
some of the activities of entities such as the UNHCR, which engage in
humanitarian work, have the potential to cause irreparable harm both to the
beneficiaries of their work and the environment.
I, however, explained in subsection 4.2.1.2 that the ILC’s draft articles on
prevention of transboundary harm and draft principles on allocation of loss in case
of transboundary harm from hazardous activities limit the potential of this legal
route to activities considered most dangerous or hazardous and with a
transboundary reach. I believe that it is a significant omission to limit the scope of
harm from activities that international law does not prohibit to those that are
explicitly hazardous and can cross borders of states. This omission is significant
because it excludes the activities of certain global institutions, as Pogge aptly
describes it, that ‘continually and foreseeably produces vast excesses of severe
poverty and premature death.’138
Yet, I believe that the issue of liability for the injurious consequences arising
out of acts that international law does not prohibit is critical to any contemporary
system of accountability that seeks to hold accountable all those whose activities,
while technically do not appear to violate the precepts of international law or do
not cause harm across borders, do have serious negative consequences on others
and their property.

The central idea in the concept of liability for injurious

consequences arising out of acts international law does not prohibit is that
obligations might exist in situations where it would appear that there is no
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particular wrongful act or omission by a state or IO. In other words, legitimate acts
or activities of a state, a private company in a given state, or an IO, such as the
UNHCR, may give rise to injurious consequences or harm to persons, property,
and the environment. In such instances, it is imperative that the entity responsible
for causing the injury must either restore or compensate, at a minimum, the injured.
In other words, it must be possible to hold internationally accountable the specific
actor, be it a state, a corporation, or an IO, such as the UNHCR, for the injurious
consequences of their otherwise lawful or legitimate activities.
The activities of certain IOs in areas of the economy, such finance, monetary
policy, and investment; and in the area of humanitarian intervention, such as
refugee emergencies, have caused injurious consequences for millions of people
around the world.139 Some concrete examples include the refugee encampment
activities of the UNHCR in some refugee-hosting states in the global south; the neoliberal economic reform policies and conditionalities of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF); and the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
rules that compel countries to open up markets and remove any measures
considered a barrier to free movement of goods and services.
Indeed, at face value, UNHCR’s refugee emergency response policies of
refugee encampment are deliberately crafted in a language that evokes sympathy
for the refugee and may be said to serve core humanitarian principles and
objectives. The injurious consequences of encampment are invisible through the
black-letter of the policy documents that UNHCR produces. And moreover,
sometimes the momentary visitor to the refugee camp, guided to see some
particular parts of the camp, will not see or grasp that what he or she is being shown
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is a huge torture chamber, housing thousands of human beings psychologically
tortured for decades in what authors of encampment consider ‘safe’ places them.
Similarly, the injurious consequences of the economic and financial reform
policies that the Bretton Wood institutions impose on developing countries are
invisible in their reports crafted, and to borrow Malone’s expression, in ‘fairly
technical terms drawing on catatonia-inducing Communiqués.140

But there is

overwhelming evidence that both UNHCR’s refugee encampment policies and the
neo-liberal economic reform policies of the Bretton Wood institutions, for example,
often result in serious injurious consequences for the environment, refugees living
in encampment, and the citizens of countries implementing foreign imposed
neoliberal economic reforms. Crucially, the way these institutions push reforms
preclude the search for alternatives that, on the balance, might provide a far more
equitable way of resolving the economic problems or addressing the humanitarian
needs of refugees.
Despite these realities, the ILC’s draft articles on this topic do not explicitly
address the issue of the accountability of IOs for the injurious consequences arising
from their activities that international law does not prohibit. In this context, and
paraphrasing former Special Rapporteur Robert Quentin-Baxter on this topic, a
new ‘system of obligations under which the causal connections between legitimate
activity and the occurrence’141 of harm create obligations and basis for
accountability, is needed. It is possible, however, for international

law to

accommodate and foster the progressive development of such a system of
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international accountability that includes IOs for the injurious consequences of
their activities that international law itself does not prohibit.
I believe existing rules and principles of international law are woefully
inadequate for dealing with the accountability of IOs for the injurious consequences
arising from their activities that international law does not prohibit for at least two
interrelated reasons. In the first place, for a very long time, international law has
failed to see the causal connection between the activities of IO and the harm they
have caused to millions of people. In the second place, international law has failed
to identify and define obligations for IOs, such as the UNHCR, for the injurious
consequences arising from their activities that international law does not prohibit.
In addition, international law has failed to at least recognise and develop an
international tort and a duty of care that would require that IOs must, to borrow
and paraphrase Lord Atkinson’s oft-cited dictum, ‘take reasonable care to avoid
acts or omissions which IOs reasonably foresee would likely injure your neighbour.’
And ‘who, then, is an IO’s neighbour’? The answer, to paraphrase Lord Atkinson
again, ‘seems to be persons who are so closely affected by the actions of an IO that
it ought to reasonably have those persons, such as refugees, in contemplation as
being so affected when an IO, such as the UNHCR, is directing its ‘mind’ to the
acts or omission which are likely to be called into question.’
And the question is why has international law failed to see these gaps vis-à-vis
the activities of IOs and the harm they cause? I believe Rovira and Chimni, in
separate works, provide some pertinent reasons. Rovira, for example, in her book,
convincingly demonstrates the link between economic imperatives and existing
rules of international law.142 She points out, correctly, I believe, that international
legal positivist purged international law of its transcendent quality and instead
private individual interests, or capital, were given preference in the formulation of
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the rules and principles of public international law. In other words, economics is
the real framework or premise of positivist international law. 143 And if this is the
case, then, the rules will not surprisingly focus on the protection of economic
interests.
In addition, Chimni, in a recent insightful account of ‘the evolution,
formation, and function of customary international law,’ has similarly exposed the
relationship between the apparently benign character of one of the key components
of existing international law, customary international law, and economics. 144
Chimni persuasively argues, among others, that ‘there is an intimate and
inextricable link between the rise, consolidation, and expansion of capitalism in
Europe since the nineteenth century and the evolution of CIL.’ 145
4.4

Conclusion
I draw some conclusions from the preceding discussion. First that international

law does provide some legal route for engaging the accountability of actors who
violate its precepts. The regime of accountability is organised around two different
conceptual apparatus. The first is the concept of the ‘internationally wrongful act’
and the second is the concept of international liability for ‘injurious consequences’
arising from acts not prohibited by international law.’
The second main conclusion is that there are serious gaps in the existing rules
and principles governing international accountability of actors whose activities
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international law does not prohibit, but these activities nonetheless do cause serious
injury to third parties.
Third, the rules and principles governing accountability for internationally
wrongful acts originally focused on the protection of the economic interests of the
foreign nationals because the project of positive international law was always to
protect and legitimate economic interests of the powerful members of the western
European state. In other words, the rules and principles governing international
accountability, whether for internationally wrongful acts or for international liability
for injurious consequences arising from acts that international law does not prohibit,
to borrow the phraseology of Rovira, are ‘written in the idioms of private law.’
Finally, writing the rules and principles of international accountability in the
‘idioms of private law’ has consequences for the weak in society, such as refugees,
migrants, the poor, and indigenous peoples. Private law options such as tortious
liability do not receive the same treatment as private law options for commercial
transactions; private law options for commercial transactions and contract are
inherently biased towards achieving economic interests. In fact, international law has
resisted the idea of developing rules and principles to govern international torts.
A fair and just regime of international accountability must integrate several
disparate elements – social interests, economic interest, and political interests – into
one whole and in a balanced way. A starting point is an urgent realisation for the
need for rules and principles that define a duty of care for all actors vested with power
and authority that they shall do no harm and where harm occurs, deliberate or
accidental, they have an obligation to restore or mitigate the harm or damage done
to third parties.
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CHAPTER 5: THE UNHCR’S ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW

5.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, I turn squarely to the dissertation’s research question, i.e., how,
and to what extent, can the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) be held accountable, under international law, for its contribution to the harms to
the environment and lives of refugees resulting from refugee encampment in refugee camps
that it helps create, fund, and manage?
In chapters 3 and 4, I set the more immediate context for this chapter and I
believe it is necessary to recap the main themes from these two chapters. In Chapter
3, I posited two countervailing theoretical propositions to help grasp the decisionmaking processes that produced refugee encampment and locate the locus of
accountability for the consequences of refugee encampment on the environment
and refugees. In the first place, I theorised there that the UNHCR is the architect
of refugee encampment, identified possible observable implications flowing from
this theory, and demonstrated how the UNHCR appropriates the framework
governance of refugee policy of many refugee-hosting states in the global south
through its refugee emergency preparedness responses. I argued that refugee
encampment is an integral component of the UNHCR’s refugee emergency
response and as a result, refugee-hosting states have little room to manoeuvre but
to embrace refugee encampment.
In the second place, I addressed a counter theory or a competing theory that
my sceptics are likely to posit, namely that refugee-hosting states in the global south
are the architects of refugee encampment. I also identified practical or observable
implications flowing from this theory and I demonstrated, on the evidence from
Kenya, buttressed with further evidence from the works of leading scholars on
Sudan and the Algerian refugee crisis of the 1950s and 1960 in Morocco, and
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Tunisia, that refugee-hosting states in the global south are not the architects or
original authors of refugee encampment. Instead, external entities, such as the
UNHCR, with vested interests in refugee encampment, are the real authors of the
framework decisions that produce refugee encampment, but then they incentivise
and socialise these refugee-hosting states into embracing refugee encampment and
owning it up as if it is their initiative.
The main conclusion of Chapter 3 is that external entities, such as the
UNHCR, have long since appropriated the framework governance of refugee policy
and practices in some refugee-hosting states in the global south. In other words,
external entities are the authors of the framework decisions that produce refugee
encampment in refugee-hosting states in the global south. Therefore, accountability
for the injurious consequences of refugee encampment in refugee-hosting states in
the global south must follow the site where the framework governance that produces
refugee encampment is located.
Similarly, in chapter 4, I advanced two counter-vailing theoretical
propositions about the regime of accountability under international law. In the first
place, I theorised that international law provides a legal route through which to
hold accountable actors that violate its precepts. I identified some practical
implications that flow from this theory and reviewed the existing rules and
principles constituting the regime of accountability under international law. I
argued that

international law provides two possible legal routes for holding

accountable actors who violate its precepts. One route is through the concept of the
internationally wrongful act of a state or an IO. The other route is through the
assignment of liability for injurious consequences arising from acts that international law
does not prohibit.
In addition to these two legal routes for holding actors accountable under
international law, there are other possible legal routes for accountability, the socalled lex specialis or self-contained legal routes that I explained in Chapter 1. These
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self-contained legal routes can be found especially with regional entities, such as
the African Union (AU), the Organisation of American States (OAS), and the
European Union (EU). In addition to regional entities with lex specialis legal routes
of accountability, certain treaty-specific regimes also contain them. Some examples
of these include, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which
contains a provision for responsibility of member for failure to comply with
obligations or for any violations of the Convention, and the WTO and its dispute
settlement mechanism.
In the second place, I posited a competing theory, especially from a TWAIL
perspective, that challenges the theory that international law provides a legal route
through which to hold accountable actors that violate its precepts. The counter
theory posits that international law is patently hegemonic and imperialistic and,
therefore is, ill-equipped to provide an equitable legal route for engaging the
accountability of actors who violate its precepts. I argued that international law is
shrouded in inherent biases that privilege economic interests, and especially private
economic interest of western states and their multinational corporations above
other equally important interests, such as equity and justice for people in the global
south, who these multinational corporations and western States, especially former
colonial masters, have perennially dominated and exploited.
Thus, in this context, how can the UNHCR be held accountable, under
international law, for: 1) harm or damage to the environment resulting from
refugee camps; and 2) harm to the lives of refugees in the camps that it creates,
funds, and administers? I answer these questions in the rest of this Chapter. I submit
that the UNHCR can be held accountable, in principle, under international law,
using either the internationally wrongful act route or the route of the liability for
injurious consequences arising out of activities that international law does not prohibit.
I say UNHCR can be held accountable ‘in principle’ because in practice engaging
the accountability of an IO is saddled with several hurdles, and especially the
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inherent bias in the rules and principles of these two legal routes and explained in
Chapter 4.
In this Chapter, I argue, based on the evidence in Chapter 3, that
accountability for refugee encampment and its consequences on the environment
and the conditions of refugees in the camps must follow the locus of the framework
governance of refugee policy and practice. In other words, I theorise that
accountability is a function of the locus or site of power and authority that produce
refugee encampment, i.e., accountability must follow the locus of power that
produce refugee encampment. What are the practical or observable implications of
this theory? In other words, what can be observed in the real world about this
theory? At least some three observable implications can be identified. The first such
implication is that the effective control of the refugee camps is located within the
processes and structures that produce refugee encampment. This observable
implication of effective control is the same as that flowing from my theory that the
UNHCR is the architect of refugee encampment in refugee-hosting states in the
global south. If the UNHCR is the architect of refugee encampments, it must be
possible to observe in practice that it effectively controls what goes on in the camps.
Thus, to say that effective control is one of the observable implications flowing from
the theory that the UNHCR is the architect of refugee encampment means that it
must be possible to detect things the UNHCR does in the real world of refugee
encampment which leads to the conclusion that it is indeed effectively in control of
the refugee encampment system.
The second one, which is related to the first observable implication, is that a
significant amount of the resources – financial and material resources – for running
the camp system are not only being mobilised within the site or processes and
structures that produce refugee encampment, but also that the entity that exercises
the framework governance of the camps has effective control over these resources. And the
third practical implication, albeit not explicit from the theory that accountability is
a function of the locus or site of power and authority that produced refugee
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encampment, is that, the entity, the UNHCR in my case, enjoys a large measure of
competence or capacity and independence to perform its functions on the
international plane, i.e., carry out activities in the territories of states, both signatory
and non-signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention.
This last practical implication is important because it goes to the core of the
question of engaging the international accountability of an IO. If the UNHCR does
not enjoy a measure of capacity and independence, questions arise whether it can
be held accountable as an independent entity for its internationally wrongful acts
or injurious consequences arising out of its activities that international law does not
prohibit.
In order to organise its argument as systematically as possible, the chapter is
organised as follows. Following the present introductory section, section 5.2
addresses the question of the basis of the UNHCR’s accountability. In section 5.3
the questions of the UNHCR’s accountability for internationally wrongful acts is
considered. Section 5.4 explicates the feasibility of achieving UNHCR’s
accountability via the route of assigning responsibility to it for the injurious
consequences arising out of activities that international law does not prohibit. In
section 5.5 the question of attributing wrongful acts to the UNHCR as a necessary
condition for engaging its accountability under international law is considered.
Section 5.6 takes on the intimately connected question of the UNHCR’s exercise
of effective control over refugee encampment as a necessary requirement for
engaging its accountability. In section 5.7 the procedural aspects and obstacles to
the UNHCR’s accountability are considered and section 5.8 concludes the
discussions in the chapter.
5.2

The Basis of the UNHCR’s Accountability Under International Law

A sceptic may concede that international law does provide some legal routes for
holding accountable actors who violates its precepts, but still challenge the basis for
the UNHCR’s accountability under international law. A key concern here would
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be that the UNHCR is not a state, but is merely a subsidiary organ of the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA), another creation of states.1 In other words,
because the UNHCR is a subsidiary organ of the UN, it is not an independent
international organisation (IO) in possession of international legal personality.
Therefore, it is not subject to the regime of accountability under international law.
I argue that the legal basis of the UNHCR’s accountability under international
law is a function of its status, capacity, and the obligations incumbent upon it under
international law. The legal status of the UNHCR is distinct from its capacity under
international law. I argue, on the authority of the Reparation for Injuries case, that in
explicating the status and capacity of the UNHCR under international law, it is
imperative to scrutinise both its constituent instrument as well as what it does in
practice. When approached in this way, however, it will be discovered that the
UNHCR is a unique entity that has capacity to act on the international plane with
a great measure of autonomy from its parent organ, the United Nations, and
performs activities on the international plane of a universal nature.
5.2.1. The Status of the UNHCR Under International Law

The obvious aspect of the UNHCR’s status is that it is, as already alluded to, a
subsidiary organ of the UNGA.2 The matter, however, is not as straightforward as
it appears because the Charter of the United Nations, which provides for the
creation of subsidiary organs under Article 7, does not define the expression
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‘subsidiary organ.’3 Moreover, subsidiary organs, and as Szasz has rightly observed,
come in various forms, both simple and complex.4 According Szasz, these complex
subsidiary organs, or what he describes as quasi autonomous bodies (QABs), ‘are
in effect, mini-intergovernmental organisations.’5 In other words, QABs are miniinternational organisations because they ‘consist of at least one political body and
an executive head who directs a special secretariat for the organisation.’ 6 Some of
the examples of QABs include, the UNHCR, United Nations International
Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), and the United Nations University (UNU).7
The Repertory of the Practice of the United Nations Organs,8 however, defines a
subsidiary organ to mean:
one which is established by or under the authority of a
principal organ of the United Nations in accordance with Article
7, paragraph 2, of the Charter, by resolution of the appropriate
body. Such an organ is an integral part of the Organisation.’9
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According to the Repertory, subsidiary organs that the principal organs of the
United Nations establish are an integral part of the UN.10 Indeed, the practice seems
to support this view. In some of the cooperation agreements that the UNHCR
concludes with refugee-hosting states, for example, it is often stipulated that the
UNHCR ‘is an integral part of the United Nations.’11 Moreover, a 1996 legal
opinion of the Office of Legal Affair, UN Secretariat, concerning the UN Institute
for Training and Research (UNITAR), opined that, ‘As a subsidiary body of the
United Nations, UNITAR is not an international organisation established by
intergovernmental agreement.’12 From this perspective, an entity acquires the status
of an IO only if it is established vide intergovernmental agreement. In this context,
the question of the status of UNHCR, as a subsidiary organ of the UN, from the
perspective of the Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat, is moot because it is an
integral part of the UN. In other words, it is neither a mini-intergovernmental
organisations, whatever that means, as Szasz suggest, nor a fully-fledged separate
IO.
The status of the UNHCR, and of any other subsidiary organ of an IO for that
matter, I argue, however, is contestable from a functional perspective. Under the
authority of the Reparations for injuries case,13 I argue that the status of an IO, even
if expressly provided for in its constitutive instrument, may be deduced from its
competence, functions, intention of its creators, and what it does in practice. In the
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Reparations for injuries case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was asked to
answer the question whether the United Nations had ‘the capacity to bring an
international claim’ against a State in the event of one of the United Nations’ agents
suffering injury in circumstances involving the responsibility of that state. Although
in this case the ICJ was not asked to address questions of the status of the United
Nations per se, its approach to answering the question of capacity placed before it is
instructive and provide, I would argue, a general template that can be applied to
other types of legal questions concerning IO, principal or otherwise, such as about
the status of a subsidiary organ under international law. The Court said it was
necessary to look beyond the black-letter of the Charter of the UN, but at the same
time read the Charter in context to answer the question whether the UN had
capacity to bring an international claim. The Court said it is necessary to look at
the nature of the organisation; its purposes and principles; its characteristics; its
functions and activities; the needs of the community (in this case the international
community); and the intentions of those who created it be able to answer the
question before it. Based on these criteria, the Court concluded that the United
Nations was vested with the capacity to bring an international claim as of right
when one of its agents suffers injury in circumstances involving the responsibility
of a member state of the United Nations.
I believe it is possible to transpose these criteria to the question of the status of
a subsidiary organ of an IO, such as the UNHCR, which is a subsidiary organ of
the UN. The UNHCR was created by a resolution of the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) and its functions defined in a Statute annexed to the
resolution.14 The functions of the UNHCR are stipulated in Chapter II of the
Statute and involve undertaking activities of a global nature, such as promoting any
measures, through agreements with governments, calculated to improving the
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situation of refugees, promoting the admission of refugees into the territories of
states, and promoting the conclusion and ratification of international conventions
on the protection of refugees. I return to say more on this aspects in subsection
5.2.3, but suffice to point out here that evident that a subsidiary organ, such as the
UNHCR, is an international organisation when one considers its functions and
activities, its characteristics, and the intentions of its creators. It follows that the
mere fact of a principal organ of the United Nations creating a subsidiary organ
does not preclude the subsidiary organ so created from possessing legal status of an
IO.
The idea that formal constitutive instruments are not the only basis for
determining the status of an IO finds support amongst several writers. 15 Dale, for
example, has observed that ‘perhaps the most striking examples of international
bodies with no formal constitution are the many subsidiary organs of the United
Nations, established by resolution of either the General Assembly or the Security
Council, usually the former.’16 And Dales goes on to give five examples of
subsidiary organs that the United Nations has created, including the UNHCR.17
Dale and Verdirame are perhaps the only scholars to assert that subsidiary organs
have international status. Dale argues that the largest of the subsidiary organs have
the attributes of IOs. Moreover, ‘subsidiary organs tend to be as highly organised
as the United Nations itself; and there is no reason to deny them the status of
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international organisation.’18 Verdirame, discussing the legal nature of operational
or subsidiary programmes of the UN, has argued that, ‘[a] programme that has
complete control over its activities… should be treated as a discrete legal
person…’19
In addition to a functional approach to determining the status of an entity such
as the UNHCR, and taking a cue from the Reparation for injuries case, I argue that
international law determines whether an entity is an IO. In the Reparation for injuries
case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) opined that fifty states representing
the vast majority of the international community created the United Nations in
accordance with international law.20 In the relevant literature, much emphasis has
been placed on the point that subsidiary organs are not separate international
entities or organisations because they are creatures of resolutions and
accompanying statutes of principal organs and not treaties.21 I argue that
resolutions of IOs are part of the corpus of international law and an entity created
through such legal route, i.e., a resolution of the principal or parent organ, is an IO.
Against this background, I conclude that on the basis of what the UNHCR
actually does in practice over the decades since its creation in 1951 and
international law, it possesses the status of an international organisation. This is not
the same as saying it possesses international personality, an aspect I now turn to in
the next subsection.
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5.2.2 The Capacity of the UNHCR Under International Law

Whether the UNHCR can be held accountable under international law also
depends on whether it has the capacity to perform its functions upon the
international plane. That, in turn, implies that the UNHCR must possess a measure
of international personality.
In the relevant literature, however, it is often claimed that a subsidiary organ
does not have a separate international personality, but partakes that of its parent
organ. The Office of Legal Affairs, at the Secretariat of the UN, for example, has
opined that subsidiary organs do not possess separate international legal personality
from that of the UN even if they have the legal capacity to perform certain functions
on the international plane.22 The Secretariat, in the final analysis, takes the position
that regardless of what subsidiary organs do in practice on the international plane,
they,
do not possess international personality separate from that of
their parent organizations and thus cannot perform international
acts or incur international obligations, except as expressly
authorized by their parent bodies upon demonstrations of
possessing “full powers”. Their capacities are therefore derived
from the personality of the parent body.23

Some scholars have also taken a similar view or position, namely, that
subsidiary organs do not have separate legal personality. Szasz, for example, argues
that while subsidiary organs of the United Nations do ‘enjoy considerable degree
of autonomy from their parent organs,’ they ‘lack independent legal personality but
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partake that of the United Nations.’24 Goodwin-Gill, observes that while the
capacity of certain subsidiary organs to act in the private sphere is beyond doubt,
‘they do not possess a legal personality of their own.’25 And crucially, GoodwinGill states that ‘UNHCR’s standing in international law – its international legal
personality – derives directly from the United Nations.’26
I beg to, however, differ from the conventional position on this matter.
Drawing from the jurisprudence of the ICJ and the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ), I argue that subsidiary organs created in accordance
with international law and performing functions upon the international plane with
a significant degree of autonomy should be treated as separate international
persons. And crucially, there is nothing inherent in the nature of the constitutive
documents establishing subsidiary organs or international law to support the claim
that subsidiary organs must always derive their international personality from that
of their parent organ. In fact, the idea that an entity derives its international
personality from a principal entity does not find support in the jurisprudence of the
international courts.
Thus, I will first briefly review the jurisprudence of the international courts on
how they have approach the question of capacity and international personality
under international law and then conclude the discussion with what I believe to be
the capacity of the UNHCR under international law.
The PCIJ, for example, dealt with four cases between 1922 and 1926
concerning interpretations of the powers of the International Labour Organisation
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(ILO) with respects to certain of its activities.27 I focus on the advisory opinion on
the Competence of the ILO to Regulate Incidentally the Personal work of the Employer.28 At
issue before the PCIJ was ‘whether it is within the competence (compétence) of the
International Labour Organization to “draw up and propose labour legislation
which, in order to protect certain classes of workers, also regulates incidentally the
same work when performed by the employer himself.’29 Several arguments were
placed before the Court, but the Court held that ‘so far as concerns the specific
question of competence now pending’ before it, ‘it may suffice to observe that the
Court in determining the nature and scope of the measure, must look to its practical
effect rather than to the predominant motive that may be conjectured to have
inspired it.’30 In other words, the Court has to factor in praxis in determining the
competence of the ILO to draw up and propose labour regulation that may
incidentally affect work that an employer performs.
Similarly, in the European Commission for the Danube case, the PCIJ was called
to answer, among other questions, the question concerning the territorial extent of
the authority or jurisdiction of the European Commission into the sectors of the
Danube between Galatz and Braila vis-à-vis the jurisdiction of the Romanian
authorities. The Court made some very pertinent observations about the legal
capacity of an international organisation I found relevant to the issue at hand, and
I quote a little bit more in detail:
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When in one and the same area there are two independent
authorities, the only way in which it is possible to differentiate
between their jurisdictions is to differentiate between their
functions allotted to them. As the European Commission is not a
State, but an international institution with a special purpose, it only has
the functions bestowed upon it by the Definitive Statute with a view to
the fulfilment of that purpose, but it has power to exercise these functions
to their full extent, in so far as the Statute does not impose restrictions
upon it (my emphasis).31

Thus, taking a functional approach in the light of the explicit provision of the
Definitive Statute establishing the powers of the European Commission of the
Danube, the PCIJ ruled in effect that as long as the constitutive or definitive
instrument defining the powers of an IO places no restriction on it, its legal capacity
to perform certain tasks assigned to it may be implied from both the constituent
document and upon its functions in practice.
The ICJ put the matter to rest in its pioneering advisory opinion in the
Reparation for injuries case,32 namely, that the powers and legal capacity of an IO,
whether principal or subsidiary, do not depend on whether it is an integral part of
another entity, but on the powers, express or implied, and functions that the
constitutive instrument bestowed upon it and what it does in practice to achieve the
purpose for which it was created.
In Reparations for injuries case, the UN General Assembly, in a resolution, in
December 1948 noted with concern that a ‘series of tragic events which have lately
befallen agents of the United Nations engaged in the performance of their duties’
and the needs for better protection and reparation for those agents fallen in the
course of duty. The UN General Assembly decided to submit two broad legal
questions to the ICJ for advisory opinion, one on the capacity of the UN to espouse
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an international claim in its own name and the second question, depending on
whether the answer of the Court to the first question is affirmative, how to reconcile
the UN’s action and the rights of the agent’s state of nationality.33
For present purposes, however, the most relevant question, is the first legal
question on the capacity of the UN to espouse an international claim, framed as
whether the United Nations, ‘as an organisation, has the capacity to bring an
international claim against the de jure or de facto government with a view to
obtaining reparation due in respect of damage (a) to the United Nations, (b) to the
victim or to persons entitled to claim through him.’ In other words, at issue were a
set of related questions, such as ‘in the international sphere,’ has the United Nations
‘such a nature as involves the capacity to bring an international claim?’ 34; ‘has the
Charter given the Organization such a position that it possesses, in regard to its
Members, rights which it is entitled to ask them to respect’; and crucially, ‘does the
Organization possess international personality?’ (my emphasis).35
The Court acknowledged that these questions were not ‘settled by the actual
terms of the Charter’ of the United Nations and some concepts, such as the concept
of international personality are shrouded in doctrinal controversy. The Court
suggested that the answers to these questions lay in understanding ‘what
characteristics’ Members of the United Nations ‘intended thereby to give the
Organization.’ In the first place, the Court said it understood the concept of
international personality to ‘mean that the Organisation,’ i.e., the United Nations,
‘is recognised as having that personality, it is an entity capable of availing itself
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obligations incumbent upon its Members.’36 The Court concludes with an oftquoted passage, that ‘international personality is indispensable’ if an IO is to
perform its functions:
The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in
their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon
the needs of the community. Throughout its history, the
development of international law has been influenced by the
requirements of international life, and the progressive increase in
collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of
action upon the international plane by certain entities which are
not States. This development culminated in the establishment in
June 1945 of an international organization whose purposes and
principles are specified in the Charter of the United Nations. But
to achieve these ends the attribution of international personality is
indispensable (my emphasis).37

If international personality is an indispensable attribute of being an IO, it must
follow that such an IO must have the power and legal capacity to espouse a claim
‘against the de jure or de facto government with a view to obtaining reparation to the
victim or to persons entitled to claim through him.’38 In yet another oft-quoted
passage, the Court stated:
The Charter does not expressly confer upon the Organization the capacity
to include, in its claim for reparation, damage caused to the victim or
persons entitled through him. The Court must therefore begin by
inquiring whether the provisions of the Charter concerning the
functions of the Organization, and the part played by its agents
in the performance of those functions, imply for the Organization
power to afford its agents limited protection that would consist in
bringing a claim on their behalf for reparation for damage
suffered in such circumstances. Under international law, the
Organization must be deemed to have those powers, which though not
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expressly provided in the Charter, are inferred upon necessary implication
as being essential to the performance of its duties (my emphasis).39

Thus, the ICJ, building on what the PCIJ had already started in the competence
of the ILO and the European Commission of the Danube cases, enunciated this principle
of law governing questions about the nature and capacity of an IO to this effect:
that whether an organisation possesses international legal personality is contingent
upon the powers, express or implied in its constitutive instrument, and the functions
that its creators clothed it with and the activities that it carries out in practice on the
international plane.
The Court makes some pertinent conclusions relevant to my argument on
personality and capacity of IOs, principal or subsidiary. First, that the United
Nations ‘was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying,
functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of
a large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon the
international plane.’40 Moreover, the Court further concluded, the United Nations,
‘could not carry out the intention of its founders if it was devoid of international
personality.’ And crucially, in ‘entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant
duties and responsibilities,’41 members of the United Nations, ‘have clothed it with
the competence required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged.’ 42
Second, the Court draws a clear difference between the personality of a state
and that of an IO; ‘a State possesses the totality of international rights and duties
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recognized by international law,’43 whereas the ‘rights and duties of an entity’ such
as the United Nations, ‘must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified
in or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice.’44 Thirdly,
‘Member have endowed the Organization with the capacity to bring international
claims necessitated by the discharge of its functions.’45
I argue that applying these legal principles to the UNHCR, it possesses some
measure of international legal personality, independent of that of the United
Nations, necessary for it to discharge its mandate of providing international
protection to refugees and helping states to find durable solutions to the problem of
refugees. In fact, the UNHCR has undertaken monumental tasks of providing
international protection to refugees and finding in some contexts, solutions to the
problem of refugees in many countries around the world,46 while compounding the
situation for other refugees, especially those under its encampment regimes. In
other words, the UNHCR has been able to perform its functions with considerable
autonomy and independence, and despite fundamental problems with its refugee
encampment policies, upon the international plane.
The UNHCR has a worldwide presence and the capacity to establish such a
global footprint is explicitly stipulated in Articles 1, 8 (b), 10, 12, and 16 of its
Statute47 and in subsequent resolutions of the UNGA which have not only removed
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temporal limitations, but also expanded the scope of its substantive mandate.48
Moreover, UNGA resolutions 319 (IV) of November 1949 49 and 428 (V) of 14
December 1950, which are the constituent documents of the UNHCR, enjoin
Member States ‘to cooperate with the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees in the performance of his functions concerning refugees falling under the
competence of his Office…’50
In addition, the UNHCR has concluded several agreements with refugee
hosting states, both those that are party and non-party to the 1951 Convention in
order provide international protection to refugees, and now increasingly persons of
concern to it, and finding permanent solutions to refugee problems. 51 These
agreements vary in nature and scope. Under Article 8 (b), for example, UNHCR is
vested with the power to promote ‘the conclusion and ratification of international
conventions for the protection of refugees.’52
The various aspects of the UNHCR’s competence, function, participation in
making international rules, acquisition of rights and subjection to obligations under
international law, capacity to dispatch representatives to refugee hosting states, and
enjoying privileges and immunities for its staff and installations, taken together lead
to the conclusion that UNHCR possesses rights and duties on the international
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plane and may be regarded as an actor, separate from the United Nations. If this is
the case, then, it should be held accountable, under international law, for its
internationally wrongful acts or the injurious consequences arising out of its
activities international law does not prohibit.
5.2.3 The UNHCR’s Obligations under International Law

Accountability under international law is a function of a breach of an international
obligation. For UNHCR to be held accountable under international law for its
contribution to harm to refugees in encampment conditions and environmental
harm that results from the encampment of refugees in refugee camps that it helps
create, fund, and manage in refugee-hosting states in the global south, I have to
demonstrate the UNHCR has international obligations incumbent upon it in
relation to the protection of the environment and refugees and locate or identify the
sources of its obligations.
The ILC in its commentary to the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of IOs
opines that IO’s international obligation ‘may result from a treaty binding an
international organization or from other source of international law applicable to
the organization.’53 If this is the case, what is the source of the UNHCR’s
international obligations? I submit that UNHCR, as an IO, has obligations under
general international law and specific instruments – resolutions and treaties – that
define its competences. I consider each in turn.
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5.2.3.1 The UNHCR’S Obligations under General International Law

I submit that the UNHCR, as an actor on the international plane, with rights and
duties, has international obligations incumbent upon it under general international
law, under the authority of the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951.54
In this case, the key legal issue, which the Court re-wrote, in essence, was
about the WHO’s ‘power to exercise…the right to select the location of the seat of
its headquarters or a regional office’55 and whether the ‘power to exercise that right
is or is not regulated by reason of the existence of obligations vis-à-vis Egypt.’56 This
issue arose because Sub-Committee A of the Regional Committee for Eastern
Mediterranean region of the World Health Organisation (WHO) comprising 20
Arab States, including Egypt, adopted, during a special session held in Geneva,
May 1980, a resolution by 19 votes to 1 recommending that the WHO Regional
Office for the Eastern Mediterranean be transferred from Alexandria, Egypt, to
Amman, Jordan ‘as soon as possible.’57 Sub-Committee A adopted this resolution
after the 1978 Camp David Agreement between Egypt and Israel, which most Arab
states opposed. The recommendation, however, divided members of the WHO,
including its World Health Assembly, and eventually the United States suggested
that the matter be submitted to the ICJ for an advisory opinion before the transfer
of the regional office could be implemented.
The most relevant aspect of this case to the issue of the UNHCR’s obligation
under discussion here is the Court’s observations with respect to the powers and
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obligations of IOs vis-à-vis states and also the obligations of IOs generally under
international law. The Court made four pertinent observations that are relevant
here. In the first place, the Court took judicial notice, based on the written and oral
statements presented before it, that there is amongst some officials of IOs ‘a
disposition to regard international organizations as possessing some form of absolute power
to determine and, if need be, change the location of the sites of their headquarters and regional
offices’ (my emphasis).58 This observation, namely, that IOs tend to assume that
they possess some form of absolute power is critical to the questions about their
obligations and international accountability under international law, at least from
my professional experiences,59 and possibly the experiences of many scholars and
researchers in the global south, where IOs carry out many of their functions.
In the second place, the Court reminded proponents of such an attitude or
view that states actually ‘possess sovereign power’ to accept or reject the location
of the headquarters or regional offices of an IO in their territories.60 In other words,
states, despite transferring some of their sovereign power to IOs, retain the ultimate
indicia of authority on key decisions with respect to IOs. In the third place, and
related to the second observation, and following its observation on this issue in the
Reparation for injuries case, the Court reiterated its position on the status of IOs, that
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‘there is nothing in the character of international organizations to justify their being
considered as some form of “super-State.”’ Fourth, and crucially, the Court stated
that:
International organizations are subjects of international law and,
as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under
general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under
international agreements to which they are parties (my
emphasis).61

Some scholars agree with the court’s conclusion that IOs are subjects of
international law and, therefore, under international law, owe international
obligations and are bound by principles of general international law. Verdirame,
for example, submits that the court’s conclusion that IOs are bound under general
rules of international law implies ‘customary international law of universal or
quasi-universal applicability and for general principles of law.’ 62 Benvenisti argues
that IOs as international legal persons are subject to general international law.63
Some scholars, however, are less optimistic and even question the significance of
the Court’s oft-cited statement for the conclusion that the principles of general
international law bind IOs. Daugirdas, for example, argues that the Court’s
‘opinion offers nothing to bolster its statement that international organisations, as
subjects of international law, are bound by general rules of international law.’ 64
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5.2.3.2 The UNHCR’s Obligations under its Statute, the 1951 Refugee
Convention, and Principle of International Environmental Law

I argue here that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and
Statute establishing the Office of the UNHCR, subsequent resolutions of the
UNGA, Article 35 of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, and the principles
of international environmental law, do create international obligations for the
UNHCR.
5.2.3.2.1 The UNHCR’s Obligations Under Its Statute

Article 1 of the Statute provides that the UNHCR ‘shall assume the function of
providing international protection to … refugees who fall within the scope of the
present Statute…’ This article makes UNHCR’s obligation to refugees implicit:
providing them international protection. The obligation to provide international
protection encompasses a whole set of activities undertaken by UNHCR in order
to realise the protection of refugees. Although such activities are often cast as
humanitarian, they impose legal obligations on the UNHCR.
In addition, Article 8 (a) of the Statute enjoins the High Commissioner to not
only promote the ‘conclusion and ratification of international conventions for the
protection of refugees’ but also to ‘supervising their application…’ Thus, in addition
to the obligation of providing international protection, the UNHCR has the
obligation of supervising international conventions for the protection of refugees.
This obligation has a direct correlation with UNHCR’s primary obligation of
providing international protection to refugees because international conventions
are one means of realising the international protection of refugees.

5.2.3.2.2 The UNHCR’s Obligations Under the 1951 Refugee Convention

The 1951 Refugee Convention reiterates UNHCR’s supervisory obligations.
Paragraph 6 of the Preamble of the 1951 Convention recalls that ‘the United
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Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is charged with the task of supervising
international conventions providing for the protection of refugees…’ The
supervisory obligation envisaged in the Statute and the preamble is broad and
covers any international convention for the protection of refugees and I would
argue that international human rights conventions form part of the genre of
conventions that enhance the protection of refugees. If this is the case, then
international human rights law does impose some international obligations on
UNHCR, a breach of which constitutes an internationally wrongful acts, which in
turn engages UNHCR’s international accountability.
Under Article 35(1) of the 1951 Convention Contracting States ‘shall in
particular facilitate’ the UNHCR’s ‘duty of supervising the application of’ the 1951
Refugee Convention. I argue that one of UNHCR’s duties of supervising the
application of the Convention includes ensuring that States protect and promote
the right of refugees to freedom of movement and choice of residence within their
territories that Article 26 of the Conventions guarantees for refugees lawfully in the
territories of States parties.
Similarly, Article II (1) of the 1967 Protocol requires States to cooperate with
UNHCR, including cooperation in relation to facilitating the UNHCR’s ‘duty of
supervising the application of the present Protocol.’ In addition to the duty of
Contracting States to facilitating UNHCR’s duty of supervising the Convention and
Protocol, Contracting States are obliged under Article 35 (2) to provide the
UNHCR, ‘in the proper form, with information and statistical data’ concerning the
condition of refugees, the implementation of the 1951 Convention, and laws and
regulations relating to refugees in force in the territory of a Contracting State.
My thesis is that UNHCR’s duty of supervising the 1951 Convention and its
1967 Protocol and making reports on the conditions of refugees, the application of
the Convention, and laws and regulations in force in host States are all
interconnected and collectively perform one critical purpose: enhance the powers
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and UNHCR’s effectiveness in discharging its primary function of providing
international protection to refugees.65 In this respect, the duties are owed to refugees
and members of society. UNHCR’s duty of supervision and reporting is to ensure
that Contracting States fulfil their obligations under the Convention, such as
guaranteeing refugees the right to freedom of movement, which is a critical right
because it provides a legal route for refugees to accessing and enjoying other
fundamental human rights.
UNHCR’s encampment policies, seen from this perspective, in fact, subvert
the core principles of refugee protection and as some of the cases in the global south,
and in countries such as Kenya, demonstrate, contributed to significant damage to
the environment around refugee hosting areas. Crucially, encampment undermines
the well-being of refugees, especially the creation of situations where refugees are
stack in camps without any feasible solution for decades, what the UNHCR calls
‘protracted refugee situations.’66
5.2.3.2.3

The UNHCR’s Obligations Under International Law Relating
to the Environment

I next consider the rules and principles of international environmental law in
creating obligations for UNHCR vis-à-vis its refugee encampment activities. There
is no general international legal instrument which defines the obligations of the
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various actors – states, IOs, multinational or transnational corporations, and
individuals in relation to protection of the environment.
Since the seminal case of the Trail Smelter Arbitration,67 general rules and
principles of international environmental law have emerged from ‘international
treaties, agreements, and custom.’68 Soto has identified and summarised these
principles and I adopt his formulation.69 These principles include, prohibition on
causing damage to the environment, good neighbourliness and international
cooperation, preventive action, precautionary principle, duty to compensate for
harm to the environment, sustainable development, and common but differentiated
responsibility.70 I argue, with Soto, that the international community may apply
these principles to matters of protecting the environment.71 I specifically argue that
even if these principles originally targeted states, some of them can be extrapolated
to other actors on the international plane, such as IOs, transnational corporations,
and individuals; and that they too have an international obligation not to damage
the environment.
The Trail Smelter Arbitration case enunciated the general principle of customary
international law prohibiting states from causing transboundary damage to the
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environment of another state or other states. In this case a Canadian company
operated a smelter on Canadian territory, but fumes from the smelter caused
damage across the Canada/US border in Washington State, in the United States of
America. At issue, among other issues, was ‘whether the Trial Smelter should be
required to refrain from causing damage in the State of Washington in the future
and, if so to what extent?’72 The Tribunal observed that addressing this question
raised yet another issue, namely, ‘whether the question should be answered on the
basis of the law followed in the United States or on the basis of international law.’73
The Tribunal, having reviewed some of the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in cases on air and water pollution involving some of the US states,
answered:
The Tribunal, therefore, finds that… under the principles of
international law, as well as of the law of the United States, no State
has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such as manner as
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties
or persons therein, when the case is of a serious consequence and
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence (my
emphasis).74

This oft-quoted conclusion of the Tribunal is generally considered to have
enunciated the rule that defines a general duty or obligation of a state or states not
to cause damage to the environment of other states; or not to cause damage or allow
its territory to be used to cause damage to the environment in other states or areas
beyond its national jurisdiction.75 This principle has been followed in cases such as
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the Corfu Channel case and the Legality of the Threat or the Use of Nuclear Weapons case.
In the Corfu Channel case, two British warships struck mines in Albanian waters.
The ICJ held, among other things, that the Albanian authorities obligations to
notify both the British warships and the shipping community in general of the
existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters was based on ‘certain general
and well-recognised principles,’ including the principle that ‘every State’s
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other States.’76
And in the Legality of the Threat or the Use of Nuclear Weapons case, the ICJ was
asked to give advisory opinion on whether ‘the threat or the use of nuclear weapons
in any circumstances is permitted under international law.’ 77 Some of the states, in
their written and oral submissions before the Court, argued that ‘any use of nuclear
weapons would be unlawful by reference to existing norms relating to the
safeguarding and protection of the environment.’78 The Court reaffirmed the
existence of a general obligation incumbent upon states to protect the environment:
The existence of the general obligation of State to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the
environment of other States or areas beyond national control is
now part of the corpus of international law relating to the
environment.79

This rule also finds expression in the two international United Nations
declarations on the environment, the Stockholm Declaration on Human
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Environment, 197280 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
1992.81 Both Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment
and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, acknowledges the sovereign rights of states
to exploit their own natural resources and to pursue their own environmental
policies, but reminds them of their ‘responsibility to ensure that activities in their
jurisdiction and control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or
areas beyond the limit of national jurisdiction.’ 82
Thus, there is a rule of international law laying down a general obligation on
states to ensure that activities carried out within their jurisdiction do not cause
damage to the environment across borders in another state’s territory or
jurisdiction. Fitzmaurice has argued that this rule is ‘one of the few uncontested
norms of customary international environmental law in the environmental field.’83
I submit, however, that this general rule on the obligation of a state not to
cause damage to the environment of other states has transformed into a general
principle of international law, which should now bind all actors , including IOs.
Since the Trail Smelter case through to the Stockholm and Rio Declarations on the
environment, for example, there is ample evidence, which demonstrates that the
activities of certain IOs, such as the World Bank and the UNHCR, do cause
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damage the environment.84 In this context, the status quo is no longer tenable,
period. In other words, we can no longer justify restricting these norms to states
exclusively, thus ignoring the evidence that the activities of some IOs, such as the
UNHCR and the World Bank, in the territories of these states do cause harm to the
environment and to human beings.
I argue, however, that, from a New Have School of Thought approach to law,
a general rule of international law imposing obligations on both states and IOs for
causing environmental damage is already in existence. If I take the New Haven
School’s idea of law as a process of authoritative decision and control aimed at
achieving common community goals,85 and that law serves social values and ends
for the community, then, I submit that the Stockholm and Rio processes on the
human environment and development of 1972 and 1992 respectively have laid
down a general principle of international law that defines the obligations of all
actors, states, IOs, and individuals not to cause damage to the environment.
5.3

The UNHCR’s Accountability for Internationally Wrongful Acts

To hold the UNHCR accountable based on the concept of the internationally
wrongful act, I must do three things. First, identify an act(s) or omission(s),
observable in practice, that, viewed from an international law perspective, would

84

See, e.g., Regis Garandeau, Stephan Edwards, & Mark Maslin, “Biophysical, socioeconomic and

geopolitical

impacts

assessment

of

large

dams:

an

overview,”

(undated)

online

(pdf)<

https://www.ucl.ac.uk/hazard-centre/sites/hazard-centre/files/mega-dam-overview.pdf>.
85

For an introduction to this school of thought, see, e.g., E. Suzuki, “The New Haven School of

International Law: An Invitation To A Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence,” (1974) 1 Yale Studies in World Public
Order 1 9; On the central ideas of this school, see, Harrold D Lasswell & Myers S McDougal, Jurisprudence
For a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science, and Policy (Dordrecht; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992)
vol 1; Myers S McDougal, Harold D Lasswell, & W Michael Reisman, “Theories About International Law:
Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence,” (1968) 8 Virginia Journal of International Law 188.

260

constitute an internationally wrongful act; second, the act(s) is attributable to
UNHCR; and third, the act breaches UNHCR’s international obligation. 86
To identify and define the internationally wrongful acts UNHCR has
committed for which it has to be held accountable under international law, I return
to Chapter 3,where I theorised that UNHCR is the chief architect of refugee
encampment policies and practices in many refugee-hosting states in the global
south.
I identified seven practical or observable implications flowing from this
theory, but three, most relevant here, however, are: (a) the observable implication
that if the UNHCR is the architect of refugee encampment, it is likely that it no
longer is an impartial guarantor of refugee rights and freedoms; (b) the observable
implication that UNHCR in private or behind-the-scenes actively incentivises and
socialises refugee-hosting states in the global south into embracing and owning up
refugee encampment as their initiative; and (c) the practical observation that
UNHCR exercises some power and influence on the international plane and
capable of identifying its interests and defending those interests.
The criteria for determining whether a particular act of the UNHCR vis-à-vis
refugee encampment is wrongful, are the specific rights and freedoms of refugees
provided in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter,
1951 Refugee Convention) as amended in 1967. Additional criteria can be found in
the Statute of the Office of the UNHCR and instruments and principles of
international environmental and human rights law.
Thus, it is possible to determine the nature of the internationally wrongful
act(s) for which UNHCR should be held internationally accountable applying the
criteria from the above sources to the practical implications. Two possible such acts
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are the violation of refugees’ right to freedom of movement and choice of residence
and the act of inducing refugee-hosting states in the global south to embrace refugee
encampment in breach of their obligations to refugees under the 1951 Refugee
Convention to the extent of reservations entered on specific articles.
5.3.1 Refugee Encampment and the Violation of Refugees’ Right to Freedom
of Movement and Choice of Residence As Wrongful Act

The essence of the observable implication (a) that if UNHCR is the architect of
refugee encampment, it is likely that UNHCR is no longer an impartial guarantor
of refugee rights and freedoms in practice is that the UNHCR cannot at one and
the same time be both the author of the framework decisions that produce refugee
encampment in refugee-hosting states in the global south and an advocate for the
freedom of movement and choice of residence of these refugees. In other words,
the UNHCR, at least in some of the refugee-hosting states in the global south, has
not unequivocally promoted certain refugee rights that are inconsistent with its
institutional interests, such as the right to freedom of movement and choice of
residence for refugees in the global south. Since the UNHCR has vested
institutional interest in refugee encampment,87 it could not at the same time be
inclined to promote the right to freedom of movement and choice of residence for
refugees.
What are these interests? The UNHCR, I argue, has two interests in refugee
encampment. First, from an operational perspective, UNHCR is interested in
ensuring cost-effective delivery of aid to refugees in situations of refugee
emergencies, access to refugees, and the repatriation of refugees to their countries
of origin. In other words, costs, logistics, security, accessing refugees, and organised
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repatriation are key considerations in refugee encampment. 88 One participant said
thus, when asked what where the main considerations for refugee encampment:
Two main considerations. The first consideration was
accessing refugees; camps make it is easier for us to access
refugees and monitor violations of refugee rights when they
are in one place. It also makes it easier for refugees to access
UNHCR. The second was logistics – transporting
humanitarian aid is expensive, but having refugees in one
place in the camp makes it easier to deliver assistance to
them.89
There is, for sure, some valid case to be made for these underlying
assumptions for refugee encampment; they, however, are justifiable in the short
run. Second, and the main reason, refugee camps provide visibility for the work of
the UNHCR and visibility in turn justifies the UNHCR’s continued relevance and
existence.90 Indeed, thanks to the millions of refugees held in camps in some
refugee-hosting states in the global south, the General Assembly of the United
Nations gave UNHCR a permanent mandate ‘until the refugee problem is solved. 91
In UNHCR speak, camps are a means ‘to uphold UNHCR’s protection mandate.’92
I must place this submission in historical context. UNHCR has learnt from
experience, a turbulent experience right from birth, how to navigate the treacherous
terrain of international politics, and especially how to make states see its relevance.
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Thus, from 1958 to mid-1960s, for example, UNHCR actively campaigned for the
end of refugee encampment in a Europe that was emerging from a bloody war and
embarking on a reconstruction process that received support through the Marshal
Plan.
Yet, at the same time, from 1958 – 1962, the UNHCR was appropriating the
framework governance of refugee policy and practice in Tunisia and Morocco, moving
refugees into refugee camps because its High Commissioner at the time, Felix
Schnyder, had concluded that repatriation, not resettlement, was the only solution
for the Algerian refugees, which as Loescher rightly argues, provided the blue-print
for its subsequent interventions in Africa and the global south.
The end of refugee encampment in western Europe had consequences for the
UNHCR’s relevance because integrating refugees into host communities allowed
local and central authorities in these countries to reclaim their framework governance.
The UNHCR was reduced to the supervisory role that the 1951 Refugee
Convention assigned to it. UNHCR’s role diminished and that meant reduction not
only in staff and activities in western developed countries, but also in livelihoods
for retrenched UNHCR staff.
The UNHCR’s involvement with refugee crises in the global south, starting
with the Algerian refugee crisis of 1954 – 1962, however, provided it the life-line
that made it relevant and became a global actor in refugee issues. Therefore, if the
UNHCR is to launched a similar campaign in the global south to end refugee
encampment, promoting the capacities of refugee-hosting states, such as Kenya
which had already open-door policies that allowed refugees in their territories to
settle anywhere in the country, UNHCR’s significance and relevance will diminish
and there are those within the organisation that do not wish to lose the better paying
jobs that UNHCR provides.
Regardless of the justification for refugee encampment, however, it is a
flagrant violation of the rights of the affected refugees’ to freedom of movement and
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choice of residence that article 26 of the 1951 Refugee Convention protects. It is
also a breach of the UNHCR’s supervisory obligations under Article 35 of the 1951
Refugee Convention and its mandate to provide international protection to refugees
as stipulated in its Statute.
Therefore, whether seen from the refugee rights lens or the UNHCR’s
supervisory obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention or its overall mandate
under its Statute, I argue that refugee encampment constitutes an internationally wrongful
act.
The UNHCR has made material assistance to refugees contingent upon their
accepting to live in the refugee camps. From the 12 focus group interviews,
participants unanimously said they would not have come to the camp if they had
options to live anywhere, or had the resources with which to meet their everyday
basic needs such as food and accommodation on arrival. One elderly participant in
one of the focus groups shared his family’s experiences of why they ended up in the
camp: ‘We came here because we were told that it is here, that we shall find help.’93
And when asked, ‘Who told you to come here?, she responded, ‘It was UNHCR.’
And another participant in this group interjected:
The decision to come here is not ours. We could have gone to
Nairobi, Garissa, or simply lived amongst the community but we
needed help and we were told the only way to get help was if we
moved to a refugee camp.94

In the end, all the eight other participants in this focus group all agreed with
what the first participant said, namely, that they ended in the camp because
UNHCR told them that if they need material help, they must go to the camp.
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It had become known to most refugees arriving in Kenya after 1991 that if they
needed material help, they can go to the “UN”, but the “UN” can only help them
if they go to a refugee camp, where they will be provided with everything. A
participant in another focus group put it this way:
We considered alternatives, such as going to find a place in towns
or villages amongst the Kenyans, but we quickly realised that we
had no alternatives. We did not have money or identity
documents to choose to live in other places, such as in town or
villages here in Kenya. And, moreover, we had been already told that
if you want help from the UN, they will take you to the camp. So, we
simply decided to come here in this camp (my emphasis).95

The “UN” here meant the UNHCR; indeed, most refugees often referred to
UNHCR simply as the UN.
I inferred from the twelve focus group interviews that the decision to live in
camps, for most refugees, was not voluntary. Refugees were faced with a stark
reality of take it or leave it, and in their most vulnerable state, they accepted to go
to the camps, where many have lived now for over two decades, with no solutions
in sight. One participant in a focus group interview captured the essence of this
point:
We came here because UNHCR said that if we do not come here,
we cannot get help. We ran because of war from our country and
we had nothing and needed help. So, we came here.96

Seven other participants in this group agreed that UNHCR told them that they
must go to the refugee camps if they want help. In other words, going to the camp
was conditioned on their getting, what is supposed to be international help.
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In yet another focus group interview, one participant used the UNHCR logo
to capture the apparent contradiction in terms in the plight of refugees vis-à-vis their
right to freedom of movement and choice of residence and the mandate of the
organisation that is supposed to provide them with international protection:
A refugee is a vulnerable person. Have you seen the UNHCR
Logo? Does the image of the person – supposedly a refugee
between the purportedly protecting hands of the UNHCR have
eyes, legs, hands? Even the food the refugees receive, they don’t
know where it comes from. I was brought up here after riot police
attacked Thika refugee transit camp. I did not want to come
here.97

And my follow up question, if this participant had not wanted to come to the
camp, how did others come to live here in the camp, elicited a response from
another participant in the group that refugees understood that their encampment
constrained them from enjoying their human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including the right to freedom of movement and choice of residence:
This question is like asking a refugee how did come to be a
refugee? Like my colleague has said, we refugees are formless
under the UNHCR logo – no hands, no eyes, no legs, no rights,
no freedoms, etc. We are simply being carried from place to place as
UNHCR chooses (my emphasis).98

The consequences of refugee encampment are, however, dire for refugees: they lose
being human; they lose fundamental freedoms of being human, such as the freedom
of movement and choice of residence. Indeed, the restriction on freedom of
movement for refugees in the DRCC was one of the dominant themes that emerged
from the twelve focus groups I interviewed in Kenya in 2017 and 2018. In a focus
group interview, one of the participants captured the sentiments of the group when
responding to my question, ‘How do you find living here?’:
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It is like we are in a prison. It is like an open prison though; and
yet, we cannot leave this apparently open place any time we
would wish to go out and look for solutions to some of our
pressing and sometimes emergency needs. We are entirely
dependent on UNHCR for everything.99

Yet another participant in the group sought to emphasise the issue of limitation
on freedom of movement and the dependency it engenders:
I would say one of the main challenges of living here, in this
place, is limited freedom of movement. As my colleagues have
said, we are here like in an open prison, yet we cannot leave this
place. We depend entirely on UNHCR and its agencies.100

Refugees who ventured outside the camps without permission risked arrest,
detention, and even torture. One participant explained the extent of restriction on
freedom of movement and the consequences of being caught outside the camps
without permit:
We are not allowed to leave this place; I mean the camp; We
cannot leave this place for 1 Km away. If they find a refugee
outside the 1 km radius, he or she will be arrested and beaten.101

The situation is no better even if one had decided to seek permission before leaving
the camp. Indeed, those refugees who sought to leave the camps following the
rules find obstacles along the way that make it impossible to leave the camp:
We are not allowed to leave the camps. Yet, the Government of
Kenya has given us alien identity cards. These cards are useless
because when we attempt to leave the camps, the real cards that
matter are cash. In most cases, when we attempt to leave the
camp for whatever reason, the security agents at the various road
blocks do not recognise the alien identity cards; instead they will
ask us for a written movement permit, which is a document that
has to be approved by six government officers: the deputy County
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Commissioner (DC); the Sub-County security head; the Refugee
Affairs Secretariat manager, the police/CID.102

The experiences of refugees living in urban areas, such as Nairobi, on freedom
of movement, sharply contrasts with those of refugees under encampment in refugee
camps. Refugees residing in urban places, such as Nairobi, do face the challenges
of everyday living, but they are far more confident and optimistic about prospects
of life than their counterparts in the refugee camps. The freedom to move freely
without having to seek movement permits and the ability to make critical life
decision, including choosing where to live, emerged the dominant themes from the
two focus group interviews I conducted in Nairobi in 2017 and 2018.
One participant, in the 2017 focus group interview, for example, stated that
‘generally living here is much better than living in camps.’103 And when I further
probed ‘why or how living here is better than in the camps?’, the response was
exuberant: ‘There is freedom of movement. I can choose to move to any part of
Kenya without having to go through that cumbersome and corruption ridden
process to get a movement permit.’104 The other seven participants nodded in
agreement.
5.3.2 Inducing refugee-hosting states in the global south to embrace refugee
encampment as an Internationally Wrongful Act

The essence of my theory that UNHCR is the author of the framework decisions
on refugee encampment in refugee-hosting states in the global south and the essence
of one of the practical or observable implications, which I identified flowing from
this theory is that the UNHCR in private or behind-the-scenes actively incentivises
and socialises refugee-hosting states in the global south into embracing and owning
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up refugee encampment as their own initiative. One participants who was involved
in the creation of the DRCC explained how UNHCR in Kenya succeeded in
securing the acquiesce of the GoK in refugee encampment:
During the course of negotiations for the use of Kenyan land,
UNHCR recognized the obvious limitations of the GoK. HCR
readily offered to provide equipment and materials to strengthen
the capacity of both the security forces as well as the civilian
authorities. Vehicles, radios and communication equipment, and even
shelter and food were provided as incentives in order to secure the firm
decision and ultimate approval of the GoK in acquiring the relatively
large Dadaab Refugee Camp Complex. Suffice to say that subsequent
land negotiations between HCR and GoK for additional refugee camps
transpired far more easily, with the Kakuma site negotiations passing
relatively smoothly and without controversy. By that stage, UNHCR
had earned the GoK’s respect and, needless to say, the GoK had
recognised the many benefits (hundreds if not thousands of jobs;
financial support; the goodwill of the international community,
etc) that befell the country and the GoK in offering asylum to
refugees (my emphasis).105

Once a refugee-hosting state has received incentives from the UNHCR and
the advantages of refugee encampment communicated to the relevant government
officials responsible for refugee affairs in the country, their governments own up
refugee encampment as their own initiative. Kenya, after resisting for some time
refugee encampment, is now an avid proponent of refugee encampment giving all
sorts of justifications.
The UNHCR breaches its obligation to supervise the 1951 Refugee
Convention whenever it induces refugee-hosting states in the global south to
provide land for refugee camps, contrary to the provision of the 1951 Refugee
Convention, such as Article 26 which guarantee the right to freedom of movement
and choice of residence. In other words, the UNHCR’s acts of inducing refugeehosting states, using incentives, to embrace refugee encampment contrary to the
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international obligations of those states under the 1951 Refugee Convention
constitute an internationally wrongful act.
5.4 The UNHCR’s Accountability for Injurious Consequences arising
from its Activities that International Law Does Not Prohibit
I now turn to addressing UNHCR’s accountability using the concept of the
injurious consequences arising out of activities that international law does not
prohibit.

I proceed on the premise, for purposes of my dissertation, that

international law does not, technically speaking, prohibit the encampment of
refugees; indeed, the status of refugee camps under international law is
ambiguous.106 I focus on two main areas: accountability for harm to the
environment resulting from refugee encampment and conditions for refugees in
camps amounting to what the European Court of Human Rights has characterised
as torture within the framework of the Convention on Human Rights. I address
each aspect in the subsections that follow.
5.4.1 The UNHCR’s Accountability for Harm to the Environment

Refugee encampment is all- recognise too-often both a cause of environmental
harm to surrounding lands or areas and a factor that may also exacerbate already
ongoing harm to the environment in the area and vicinity of encampment. In
Kenya, for example, as the discussion below shows, the UNHCR, GoK, and the
Dadaab subcounty officials that the Dadaab Refugee Camp Complex (DRCC) has
negatively impacted the environment.
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Refugee encampments, by the UNHCR’s own reckoning, have resulted in, to
use the UNHCR’s own terminology, ‘environmental degradation’ in Dadaab.107
The UNHCR notes that the DRCC is ‘located in an ecologically fragile area
characterized by low rainfall, prolonged droughts and seasonal flooding.’ 108 And
crucially, the DRCC ‘has been in existence for over a protracted period of time
which, when coupled with the high population density, has resulted in significant
environmental Degradation’ (my emphasis).109
Some of the local officials in Dadaab were even more forceful and concerned
about the negative impact or destructive impact that the DRCC has had on the
environment. One participant stated that when the decision to establish refugee
camps in Dadaab were being made, the consequences of the the camps on the
environment were never discussed. Another participant stated that,
[b]efore devolution, there was a gap between the UNHCR and
the local community. Indeed, there was no collaboration between
UNHCR and the various government units and players in this
region. This was a real issue. Proper engagement with UNHCR
only started after devolution in 2013. But it is too little too late. If
there was proper coordination, there could possibly have been
less destruction and damage resulting from refugee camps. Sadly,
the impact of refugee camps on the environment is vast; it goes up to a 50km radius (my emphasis).110
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The destructive impact of refugee encampment on the environment in Kenya,
for example, and as I noted in Chapter 3, caught the attention of some Members
of Parliament from the regions were refugee camps were located. In October 1995,
for example, it was raised under “Question 494: Hosting Somali Refugees” and
the Minister of Home Affairs and National Heritage, as it was then known, under
whose docket refugees fell, was asked, among other questions, whether the GoK
had any estimates about the monetary impact of the damage that refugees and
encampment has caused to environment. 111 The Minister responded that,
…in 1993 the UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva sent an expert
to do costing as a result of the destruction of forests at Dadaab,
Kakuma, another camp near Malindi. We have not received the
report yet… We shall get the money and we shall re-afforest the
area were destruction has been caused by the refugees. But right
now, I do not have the figure.112

It is plausible to infer from the Minister’s statement to Members of Parliament
that UNHCR is aware of the environmental consequences of its refugee
encampment policies and practice. Indeed, in 2017 UNHCR developed a threeyear, $6,430,000, project proposal on ‘environmental rehabilitation of Dadaab
refugee hosting region.’ The project’s ‘overall objective …is to restore the ecological
integrity of the region that has been impacted negatively as a result of hosting a large
population of refugees for a period of over twenty-five (25) years.’113
Therefore, there is ample evidence that UNHCR actively contributed to the
damage to the environment in refugee hosting areas, in Kenya. It is likely that
refugee camps in other refugee-hosting states in the global south have a similar
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impact on the environment. Indeed, in taking to steps to rehabilitate the
environment of the Dadaab refugee-hosting region of Kenya, the UNHCR has
acknowledged the role of refugee encampment in contributing to to the harm to
the environment.
5.4.2 The UNHCR’s Accountability for Harms to the Lives of Refugees in
Encampment

The conditions of life for refugees in encampment, to use the description of one
refugee participant, is ‘very harsh.’ I set out in full what this participant said in one
of the focus group interviews, which other participants in the group unanimously
agreed with, when I asked the group the question, ‘How do you find living in this
place?’:
Living here is terrible; it is very harsh life. We have no income,
no freedom of movement, no food. If we had alternatives, we
could leave this place immediately. We are basically forced to
live here because they restrict assistance to be given to refugees if
they accept to live in camps. If this assistance could be given
where we choose to live, it would be far much better. But they
decided that assistance can be received if we live in such a hostile
place. Desperate, what can we do? It is better than nothing.114

And when I further probed, ‘Who are “they”’? The response almost came in a
chorus, “UNHCR”, save one participant who added, ‘And the government of
Kenya.’115 Sometimes simple things, such as renewing an identity card (ID card)
and how material assistance in the camp is managed, can be tortuously agonising
experiences for refugees in the camps in some refugee-hosting states in the global
south. A participant in one focus group interview demonstrates illustrates this
experience:
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I would say that there is a total lack of responsibility on the part
of UNHCR on how the affairs of the refugees are managed. I
have been trying to renew my ID for the last three years but
without success. Here in the refugee camps, we have no choice.
We take what we are given. Sometimes a refugee is seriously sick
and may need to have a balanced diet, including eating lots of
vegetables. But it is very difficult to find these here in the camps;
vegetables are scarce here.

Food security and health emerged major issues causing lots of anxiety amongst
refugees in all the focus group interviews. In one focus group, a participant
articulated a point that other participants agree with unanimously:
We face lots of challenges here. First of all, the food they give us
here is inadequate. We are given 4 kg per person for a month.
And this does not include other basic needs, for example, sauce,
fuel for cooking. Secondly, there are no health services here for
critical health problems or cases that cannot be treated here in the
camp. Seeking alternatives outside the camp is very difficult.116

The issue of inadequate food in refugee camps caught the attention of the UN
Human Rights Council Advisory Committee in a 2008 report. The Committee
found that ‘large numbers of refugees and displaced persons in many camps run by
the Office of the United Nations High Commission (UNHCR) are seriously and
continuously underfed.’117 In addition, it further found that in ‘some camps over 80
per cent of all children under 10 suffer from anaemia and are incapable of following
the UNHCR school programmes, for example.’118
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And crucially, the former High Commissioner, Antonio Guterres,
acknowledged the intolerable levels of malnutrition in ‘several refugee camps’ 119 in
his address to the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 9
November 2009. Yet, decades later, the situation of food security for refugees in
encampment remains precarious.
Another participant in another focus group emphasized the issue of health and
especially access to certain life-saving services, such as blood transfusion:
In addition to the food problems, we have very poor health
services here. MSF is in charge of health here. There are cases
when refugees have serious illnesses that require blood
transfusion, but they don’t have blood. In some cases, refugees
die.120

I tried to establish which branch of MSF this participant was referring to and I
found out that MSF Switzerland (MSF-CH) Kenya Mission (MSF-CH Kenya
Mission) was handling health services in DRCC. My request to them for interviews
so that I could corroborate some of these concerns was, however, declined on the
ground that they ‘cannot participate in the interview due to its background of LAW
nature rather than a medical nature as we are a humanitarian medical
organisation.’121
There is nothing more stressful than living in uncertainty. Refugee participants
in the focus group interviews raised the issue of uncertain future in the camps in
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various ways, but one particular participant in one focus group put it succinctly,
‘We live in uncertainty in this place. We don’t know what will happen tomorrow
because we are always being told that we shall be moved to another camp.’122
Thus, the evidence discussed here supports the argument that conditions in
refugee camps, taken as a whole, all-too-often constitute torturous, inhuman and
degrading treatment and offend both national and international human rights law.
I use the expression ‘international human rights law’ to cover regional instruments
as well. In fact, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has ruled in the
Sufi and Elmi case of 2010 that conditions in Dadaab Refugee Camp Complex (DRCC)
in Kenya amount to torture within the ambit of Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.123 I agree.
The Sufi case involves two separate cases of two Somali nationals, Abdisamad
Adow Sufi and Abdiazizi Ibrahim Elmi who were to be deported to Somalia following
their conviction and sentencing for a number of offences in the United Kingdom
(UK). Sufi and Elmi applied to the ECtHR for protection against their eminent
deportation to Somalia after they lost their initial appeals and were aware that other
available legal remedies under the Immigration law of the UK will not be
successful. Sufi and Elmi argued before the ECtHR that they will be at real risk of
ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 or 2 of the European Convention for Human
Rights (ECHR) if deported to Somalia.
The main issue in this case was whether substantial grounds have been shown
for believing that Sufi and Elmi would face a real risk of being subjected to
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR if expelled or returned to Somalia. The
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Court considered the arguments and evidence of the parties and especially the
contention of the UK government that even if Mogadishu is not safe, internal flight
alternatives would be available to both Sufi and Elmi elsewhere in Somalia, such
as the southern part of Somalia.124 The applicants in response argued that because
of the high level of violence and insecurity in Mogadishu and across Somalia, there
was at least a reasonable likelihood that they would be forced into IDP camps. In
this context, the dire humanitarian conditions in the IDP camps, namely ‘lack of
basic necessities of life such as food, water, and healthcare’, and the makeshift
settlements be taken into account in assessing compliance with Article 3. 125
The Court also assessed conditions in Dadaab Refugee Camps, thereby going
beyond reviewing the humanitarian conditions in IDP camps in Somalia to
determine whether the internal flight alternative was feasible for Sufi and Elmi. The
Court’s assessment of conditions in Dadaab Refugee Camp Complex supports my
submission that refugee encampment constitutes an act of torture and an
internationally wrongful act under international law.
The Court methodically evaluated the huge documentary evidence that the
parties submitted and found that despite the presence of the UNHCR in Dadaab
camps, the ‘camps are severely overcrowded’126 and the ‘allocation of water
insufficient.’127 In addition, the Court further established that there was ‘insecurity
within the camps with high levels of theft and sexual violence’ 128 and that there
were reports that ‘the Kenyan authorities had been taking advantage of vulnerable
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refugees by recruiting them to fight for the Transitional Federal Government in
Somalia.’129 Furthermore, the Court established that ‘refugees were not permitted
to leave the camps, except in exceptional circumstances, and refugees found outside
the camps without “movement passes” were arrested, fined and imprisoned for
months at a time.’130
On the basis of the evidence, the Court:
…considers that the conditions both in the Afgooye Corridor and in
the Dadaab camps are sufficiently dire to amount to treatment reaching
the threshold of Article 3 of the Convention. IDPs in the Afgooye
Corridor have very limited access to food and water, and shelter
appears to be an emerging problem as landlords seek to exploit
their predicament for profit. Although humanitarian assistance is
available in the Dadaab camps, due to extreme overcrowding
access to shelter, water and sanitation facilities is extremely
limited. The inhabitants of both camps are vulnerable to violent
crime, exploitation, abuse and forcible recruitment. Moreover,
the refugees living in – or, indeed, trying to get to – the Dadaab
camps are also at real risk of refoulement by the Kenyan authorities
(my emphasis).131

In the final analysis, the ECtHR took judicial notice of the terrible conditions
in the DRCC, and I would argue that conditions in similarly situated refugee camps
are the same. Critics would argue otherwise, but any semblance of difference
between similarly situated refugee camps in refugee-hosting states in the global
south is semantical. Indeed, in reviewing the relevant conservations on the subject
in Chapter 1, the evidence shows that refugee camps negatively affect the dignity of
refugees who live in them, albeit proponents of refugee encampment such as
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UNHCR ignore the evidence.132 Crucially, the ECtHR pronounced itself on these
conditions as constituting cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment within the
ambit of Article 3 of the ECHR.
Sceptics may argue that the Sufi decision was handed down a decade ago and
that the conditions in the DRCC may no longer be the same, especially given that
some of the refugee have been repatriated to their countries of origin. In which case,
some of the key considerations that influenced the Court’s decision, such as
overcrowding, limited access to safe water, and restriction on refugees’ freedom of
movement133 no longer exist. The evidence, however, shows that some of these
issues are inherent in the nature of encampment itself so much so that any modicum
changes resulting from repatriation do not radically and suddenly eliminate these
problems. As recent as 2018, refugees in DRCC still lack basic needs such as water
and food and restriction on freedom of movement remain:
Life here is hard with many challenges. We lack certain basic
needs, such as water, food, health services, and difficulty
travelling because we lack transport and there are also restrictions
imposed on our freedom of movement.134

Even when some food items are provided, they are often of poor quality or
not the staple food:
We receive certain food items, such as sorghum but we do not
have the money to pay for grinding; how do we eat it? We do not
have firewood to cook the food; how do we eat it? If we go to
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look for firewood in the community, we are harassed and even
our women are raped. How do we live?135

Another participant described their situation in the camp this
way:
There is no freedom of movement here and yet food provided for
us here is inadequate. And food rations are given after long delays,
sometimes after 40 days and only 2kg of sorghum, half litre of
cooking oil, and a piece of soap. They have been giving us sorghum
for the last four years.136

And while the Court was not asked to address itself to the responsibility and
accountability of the actors who created the conditions it declared illegal, its
evaluation of the evidence and conclusions drawn confirm that internationally
wrongful acts are being committed in refugee camps.
The picture that emerges of the refugee camp is that it is a space of
asymmetrical power relations, helplessness, and torture for refugees. The refugee
camp, as Agamben aptly captures in his theorisation of the camp, is indeed a
phenomenon that is both a paradox and ‘a political juridical structure.’ The refugee
camp is a paradox because it is a state of exception where the rule of law is
suspended and yet this state of exception is the result of the exercise of power that
the law defines and validates or sanctions. Second, the camp is not simply or merely
a humanitarian space where well-meaning organisations and individuals, having
travelled thousands of miles, leaving the comfort of their homes and loved ones in
the far flanged ends of one world, claim to protect and save lives of vulnerable camp
inhabitants; no, the refugee camp is a ‘political juridical structure’ where power is
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exercised without the slightest sense of fear of being held accountable for its abuse.
This state of affairs, I argue, is the same for all similarly situated refugee camps.137
5.5 The Attribution of Wrongful Acts to the UNHCR
I now turn to the question of attributing to the UNHCR wrongful acts or omissions
as part of the process of engaging its accountability under international law. The
critical question is whether the acts such as refugee encampment, violation of
refugees’ right to freedom of movement and choice or residence, and the torturous
life under conditions of encampment, which I identified and explained in the
preceding sections of this Chapter are attributable to the UNHCR.
Under the rules and principles governing the regime of accountability I
explained in Chapter 4, committing an internationally wrongful act is one of the
ways the international accountability of an IO is engaged.138 An internationally
wrongful act of an IO consists of two elements.139 The first element is that the
wrongful act or omission is attributable to the IO under international law and the
second is that the act or omission constitutes a breach of the IO’s obligation.140
The rules and principles for attributing wrongful acts to IOs are laid out in
draft articles 6 to 9 of the ILC draft articles on the accountability of IOs. As
explained in Chapter 4, Article 6 (1) lays the general principle that the acts of an
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organ of an IO are the acts of that organisation and are attributable or imputable to
it. It is worth quoting the article here for clarity:
The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization
in the performance of functions of that organization shall be
considered an act of that organization under international law,
whatever the position the organ or agent holds in respect of the
organization.

The ILC uses the term “conduct” to mean both acts or omissions of an IO or
State.141 I use these terms interchangeably throughout this section of my
dissertation. Thus, the general principle is that the acts or omissions of an official
or agent of an IO are the acts of that IO. It follows that the acts or omissions of
organs or agents of UNHCR are considered acts or omissions of UNHCR, under
international law.
Three types of internationally wrongful acts, however, can be attributed to
UNHCR: its exclusive acts; the acts of another IO; and the acts of a state. I focus
here on UNHCR’s exclusive acts, which covers the acts and omissions of its organs
and agents in the performance of their official functions. I will not discuss
attribution of ultra-vires acts or omission of UNHCR’s organs or agents here due
to space limitations.
5.5.1 Attributing to the UNHCR Wrongful Acts of its Organs

I treat the UNHCR processes and structures that produce refugee encampment
decisions I discussed in Chapter 3 as organs of UNHCR. I focus especially on
UNHCR structures and processes at the branch offices located in refugee-hosting
states in the global south.
The branch offices in refugee-hosting states are under the leadership of the
UNHCR rep and are the organ that implements UNHCR’s refugee encampment
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policies. This is because, as I demonstrated in Chapter 3, the UNHCR Rep ‘in each
country is accountable for initiating and leading timely preparedness for refugee
emergencies.’142 In Kenya in 1991, for example, it was the UNHCR rep that
activated the UNHCR’s emergency response strategy and demanded for land for
refugee encampment and initiated negotiations with the GoK for land for refugee
camps, with of course, the approval of UNHCR headquarters.143 In addition to the
branch office in Nairobi, UNHCR also has sub-offices in Dadaab Refugee Camp
Complex (DRCC) and Kakuma Refugee Camp. In this context, the refugee
encampment activities of the UNHCR officers in both the branch and sub-offices
in Kenya, carried out in the performance of their official functions, are acts of the
UNHCR’s organs and are attributable to it.
In Chapter 4 I asserted that it is settled law that the wrongful acts of the organ
of an IO are attributable to that organisation and went on to explain how draft
Article 6 (1) enunciates existing rules principles of customary international law on
attribution of acts of organs or agents of an IO to that organisation. In other words,
draft Article 6 simply codified existing customary law. I buttressed that claim with
some leading authorities from the ICJ and I return here to two of these authorities
the Effect of Awards144 and Certain Expenses145 as authority to support my argument
that the wrongful acts of the internal organs of the UNHCR are attributable or
imputable to it. In the Effect of Awards case, the United Nations Secretary-General
requested for supplementary appropriations of $179,420 for financial year 1953 ‘for
the purpose of covering awards made by the United Nations Administrative
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Tribunal in eleven successful cases that United Nations staff had filed against the
Organisation for wrongful termination of services. Some ‘important legal questions’
were, however, said to ‘have been raised in the course of debates in the Fifth
Committee with respect to that appropriation.’146
The General Assembly decided to request the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) for an advisory opinion on the matter. The key question it asked the ICJ to
advise on was whether the General Assembly had ‘the right on any grounds to
refuse to give effect to the award of compensation made by’ the Administrative
Tribunal ‘in favour of a staff member of the United Nations whose contract of
service has been terminated without his assent.’147 The ICJ held that when the
Secretary-General, in his capacity ‘as the chief administrative officer of the United
Nations Organization….concludes …a contract with a staff member, he engages
the legal responsibility of the Organization, which is the juridical person on whose
behalf it acts.’148 In other words, if the officials of the UN wrongfully terminate the
services of a staff member without his or her assent or consent, then, the wrongful
act of the official in whichever departments or divisions of the United Nations, is
attributable to it.
In the Certain Expenses case, the ICJ reiterated its decision in the Effect of Awards
case, namely, that the acts of the Secretary-General, as chief administrative officer
of the United Nations, are attributable to the United Nations.
Both cases involved expenditures of the United Nations, but in the Certain
Expenses case, the expenditures concerns operations of the United Nations in the
Congo and the Middle East. The General Assembly, through various resolutions,
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had authorised certain expenditures for ‘financing the United Nations operations
in the Congo and the Middle East.’ The legal question the ICJ was requested to
answer was ‘whether certain expenditures which were authorized by the General
Assembly to cover the costs of the United Nations operation in the Congo…and
the operations of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East…,
“constitute ‘expenses of the Organization’ within the meaning of Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.”’149
The Court observed, among other things, that when the Secretary-General of
the United Nations acts on the authority of a resolution of the Security Council or
the UNGA, and incurs financial obligations, the ‘amounts must be presumed to
constitute “expenses of the Organisation.”150 In other words, the acts of the
Secretary-General of the United Nation, performed in the exercise of his functions,
are attributable to the United Nations. Indeed, the Court noted that if the SecretaryGeneral incurs obligations when acting on the authority of the Security Council or
the General Assembly, ‘the General Assembly “has no alternative but to honour
these engagements.”’151
Similarly, the wrongful acts of the organs of the UNHCR are attributable to it.
Thus, when organs of the UNHCR, such as the branch offices and the sub-offices
in refugee-hosting states in the global south, acting on the authority and direction
of other internal organs such as the Division of Emergency Security and Supply
(DESS) and the Division of Resilience and Solutions (DRS), for example, initiate
and implement refugee encampment, their wrongful acts or omissions are
attributable to the UNHCR because their acts are acts of the UNHCR.
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5.5.2 Attributing to the UNHCR the Wrongful Acts of its Agents

The UNHCR implements its material assistance activities for refugees in
encampment through third parties, mainly foreign international non-governmental
organisations,

characterised

as

implementing

or

operational

partners.

Implementing partners are those NGOs the UNHCR funds the bulk of their work;
there is an agreement and reporting obligations on the part of the implementing
partner. Operational partners, in contrast, are NGOs who have their own sources
of funding, but do receive some limited funding from the UNHCR. I treat both
categories of partners as agents of the UNHCR because they are simply the means
through which the UNHCR acts to carry out its function of providing international
protection to refugees in refugee camps.
The International Law Commission (ILC) defines an agent of an IO is ‘an
official or other person or entity, other than organ, who is charged by the
organization with carrying out, or helping to carry out, one of its functions, and
thus through whom the organization acts.’152 I use the term “agent,” in this section
of my dissertation, with some modification of the ILC definition, to mean an ‘entity
the UNHCR contracts to carry out the activities under one of its main functions of
providing international protection to refugees in the refugee camps that the
UNHCR helps create, fund, and administer.’
In DRCC, for example, UNHCR has several agents, most of which are foreign
entities, both NGOs and governmental agencies, for implementing its programmes
for refugees in the refugee camps.153 Some agents with operations in the DRCC
included, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Danish Refugee Council (DRC),
International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Fafi Integrated Development
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Association (FaIDA), German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ),
formerly GTZ. As agents through whom UNHCR acts, their wrongful acts are acts
of UNHCR, under international law.
The GTZ, for example, was responsible for clearing the land were the initial
camp, Ifo I, in the Dadaab Refugee Camps Complex was established and, which a
participant acknowledged, caused much harm to the environment:
It was much easier to provide protection and assistance to
refugees by concentrating them in one area. And by
concentrating the refugees in the Dadaab areas, it became easier
to focus our limited resources in one area… In a short time, we
realised that more camps were needed and had to be made. But
by the time we developed Ifo I, we realised that we made grave
mistakes. The Germany organisation, I believe it was GTZ, were
hired to prepare the site for the establishment of Ifo I but they
simply brought bull-dozers and razed everything to the ground –
it cleared all the vegetation and creating some of the serious
problems of environmental concern.154

Thus, GTZ’s acts of clearing the site where the first camp was established
without due regard to environmental concerns when it ‘simply brought bull-dozers
and razed everything to the ground – it cleared all vegetation,’ are acts of the
UNHCR. In other words, the wrongful acts of GTZ of destroying the vegetation
are attributable to the UNHCR because it was the agent through whom the
UNHCR acted to establish the refugee camps in Dadaab.
5.5.3 Attributing to the UNHCR the Wrongful Acts of Organs of a State

Under article 7 of the ILC draft articles on the accountability of IOs,
[t]he conduct of organs of a State or an organ or agent of an
international organization that is placed at the disposal of
another international organization shall be considered under
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international law as an act of the latter organization if the
organizations exercises effective control over that conduct.

I consider acts of organs a refugee-hosting state acting at the behest of the
UNHCR to enforce refugee encampment as acts of the UNHCR. The evidence,
both documentary and from fieldwork discussed in Chapter 3, shows the UNHCR’s
revealed preference for refugee camps; it has a vested institutional interest in refugee
encampment although in public it claims camps are not good for refugees. The
UNHCR believes that refugee camps help it implement one of its main function of
providing international protection to them, is given as one the main reasons.155 The
UNHCR, however, does not have its own security or coercive apparatus with
which to compel and confine refugees to camps. So, it has to request the refugeehosting state’s government to provide that coercive apparatus. Again, using Kenya,
as an example, the UNHCR incentivised the GoK into embracing refugee
encampment and provided resources, including providing ‘equipment and
materials to strengthen the capacity of both the security forces as well as the civilian
authorities …in order to secure the firm decision and ultimate approval of the
GoK.’156
In this context, the activities of the different agents of the refugee-hosting
states, such as the police and the camp commandants, whose salaries the UNHCR
either fully or partly subsidies,157 enforcing refugee encampment, especially
enforcing restrictions on refugees’ freedom of movement, are acts of the UNHCR.
In other words, their wrongful acts, as the case of the DRCC in Kenya
demonstrates, such denying refugees movement permits if refugees don’t pay a
bribe or beating up a refugee if they are found outside the 1 Km radius, are acts
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attributable or imputable to the UNHCR. Indeed, as explained in the preceding
subsections of this chapter, participants in the focus group interviews I had in the
DRCC raised the issue of restriction on their freedom of movement as one of the
main factors making life in the camp miserable. One participant in particular
captured the concerns of other participants:
In addition to what my colleague has enumerated, there is vetting
of applicants for movement permits every Tuesday. These
vettings are problematic. The problem is that when the officials
at the vetting ask a refugee applicant questions, the questions are
deliberately aimed at rejecting the refugee’s application. There
are only two reasons the authorities consider valid for giving a
refugee a movement permit: medical and educational. But even
when you try to leave the camp for health reasons when you feel
that you are not getting the right treatment, they require a refugee
to produce a clearance from the agency providing health services
in the camp. If a refugee wants to go to Nairobi, he or she can
buy his or her way by paying between twenty to thirty thousand
Kenyan shillings.

The officials that this participant refers to are the agents through whom the
UNHCR achieves its goal of gathering refugees in a specific place where it can
access them and control their movements, pending the refugees’ repatriation to
their countries of origin. Without the UNHCR funding and direction, these officials
can do nothing. Their activities are attributable or imputable to the UNHCR.
5.6 The UNHCR’s Degree of Effective Control over Refugee Encampment
The question of the degree of control that the UNHCR exercises over the
encampment of refugees in refugee-hosting states in the global south is relevant to
the question of attributing wrongful acts to it and engaging its accountability under
international law for the consequences of refugee encampment on the environment
and lives of refugees. In other words, I must demonstrate that UNHCR has effective
control of the framework governance and activities of the refugee camp system that it
helps create, fund, and administer in refugee-hosting states in the global south if I
am to make the case for its accountability under international law.
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For the alleged wrongful acts of an entity to give rise to its legal accountability
under international law, it must be proved that that entity had effective control over
the activities alleged under the authority of the Military and Paramilitary Activities
case.158 In this case, Nicaragua instituted proceedings against the United States in
the International Court of Justices in respect of disputes concerning United States
responsibility for military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. 159
The Court stated, amongst other key points, that for the alleged activities of the
United States ‘to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States it would in
principle have to be proved that the United States had effective control of the military or
paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed’ (my
emphasis).160
My thesis is that there is ample evidence demonstrating that the UNHCR has
had effective control of the framework governance of refugee policy and practice and
the encampment system it helps create, fund, and administer in refugee-hosting
states in the global south. Verdirame and Harrell-Bond are possibly the first scholars
to highlight the issue of the UNHCR’s effective control of refugee policy and
practice in refugee-hosting states in the global south. They demonstrated, in their
study of refugee law, policy, and practice in Kenya and Uganda, that in Kenya, the
UNHCR, and not the GoK, actually established the refugee camps and the GoK
had no effective control of the camps. If anything, and at least at the time they
conducted their study 1997 - 2000, the GoK had to negotiate with the UNHCR to
be allowed to visit the refugee camps.161
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My study confirms Verdirame and Harrell-Bond’s findings that the UNHCR,
and not the GoK, had effective control over the framework decisions that produce
refugee encampment in Kenya. One participant stated that the UNHCR was de facto
in charge, in response to my question who is in charge of refugee policy and practice
in Kenya:
From the 1990s to 2006, UNHCR was de facto in charge of
refugee policy and management in Kenya. It was responsible for
camp administration and coordination and management, which
involved registration of refugees, conducting RSD, and providing
material assistance. So, basically, all records on refugees in
Kenya are with UNHCR. We are now trying to hand over to the
GoK.162

My requests for GoK refugee policy documents and annual reports, both
during the interviews were denied and my e-mail follow ups were never
answered.
Indeed, even refugees were aware of who is in effective control in the camps.
One participant responded rhetorically to my question, ‘Who is in charge or control
of this place?’:
If you look around this camp generally, you will see that every
vehicle has a UNHCR logo or something written on it that says
that it belongs to UNHCR. Even GoK vehicles have UNHCR
logo on it. Have you seen any vehicle on refugee work since you
came to this place which bears a GoK logo saying that it belongs
to the GoK and was given to UNHCR or MSF for refugee work?
What does that tell you about who is in charge?163

One might wonder how keeping UNHCR logos on vehicles can be evidence
of a shift in balance of power between UNHCR and a refugee-hosting state in the
global south and demonstrating UNHCR’s effective control of refugee policy and
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practice, including refugee encampment. The evidence shows that this was not a
practice exclusive to Kenya, and that the UNHCR’s use of logos on vehicles used
in refugee work in other refugee-hosting countries can provide further insights into
the power dynamics and asymmetrical relationships between actors in refugee
encampment and who is in effective control of the camp system. Verdirame and
Harrell-Bond, for example, demonstrate in the case of Uganda the host
Government’s efforts to ‘conceal the disempowering consequence’ of its apparent
surrender of its framework governance on refugee policy and practice to UNHCR
through receipt of incentives, both monetary and material, from the UNHCR and
maintain appearances or ‘maintain at least the vestiges of control.’ In the case
Uganda, it was a dispute about number plates on vehicles that the UNHCR
supplied to Uganda Government’s Directorate of Refugees (DoR). Verdirame and
Harrell-Bond observe that:
The deputy director had put government of Uganda number
plates on the vehicles supplied by UNHCR as symbolic evidence
that the government was in charge. UNHCR did not appreciate
this. Its representative wrote to the deputy director, and, while
describing the vehicle as a ‘donation’, reminded him that the
vehicles were actually ‘owned by UNHCR and temporarily
seconded (on loan) to your office… Until then, UNHCR had also
paid for the fuel, including customs duty. However, the deputy
director was informed that there ‘can be no longer a budget line
for duty-included fuel in the agreement so long as the vehicles
continued to display government licences.164

In the end, UNHCR gave Ugandan government two options: ‘either changing
the plate numbers…and receiving duty-free fuel or keeping the Government plate
numbers and accept to use only government coupons.’165 In other words, and as
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond put it, if the Ugandan government were prepared to
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‘revert to UN number plates,’ thereby ‘giving up the symbol of government
authority, it could benefit from tax-free fuel.’166
The ‘visual symbolism of power’, to borrow Landau’s expression,167 and as
already stated, was also very visible in Kenya. In DRCC, for example, almost every
vehicle UNHCR’s implementing partners used to implement refugee programmes
had a UNHCR ownership right written on it: ‘Property of UNHCR in Use by Care
International for refugee operations.’ So, whether it was Care International, LWF,
or Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS) of the GoK, it bore that clear message.
Despite the evidence, however, a GoK participant stated that the GoK was
in charge of refugee policy and practice in Kenya:
The government of Kenya is in charge of the designated areas.
We have camp managers. If you want to visit the camp and
interview refugees, you write to us and then we write to the camp
managers granting you permission to access the camps interview
our officers. UNHCR has offices in the camps but they must also
ask for our permission to allow their people to come to the
camp.168

The UNHCR seeking ‘permission’ from the GoK for its officers to go to the
camps, I would argue is a mere formality. My interactions with participants from
the GoK during interviews revealed their discomfiture and reticence when
answering my question, ‘Who is in charge of refugee policy and practice in Kenya?’
Or when I asked, ‘Kenya never had refugee encampment policies until 1990, whose
idea is refugee encampment?’ There was an attempt, as Verdirame and Harrell-
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Bond observed in the Ugandan situation, for these participants to ‘conceal the
disempowering consequences’ of Kenya having surrendered its framework
governance on refugee policy and practice to the UNHCR. Thus, participants
attempted to present the picture of a government in control of the vestiges of refugee
policy and practice in Kenya. To some extent the GoK now has some say in refugee
policy and practice in terms of permission to visits the camps. I had to obtain the
permission of both the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS) and the UNHCR to visit
the DRCC. This, however, must be understood in context: the UNHCR, according
to one participant, started handing over to the GoK 2006.169 This is significant
because the apparent transfer of refugee policy to GoK starts to happen a year after
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond published their book, Rights in Exile in 2005. It is not,
I would argue, a coincidence that this happened just a year after Right in Exile was
published because it exposes the asymmetrical relationships between the UNHCR
and the GoK. From my fieldwork in Kenya in 2017 and 2018, however, the
UNHCR is still in effective control of the refugee camp system. Indeed, the
participant who stated that the UNHCR started handing over to the GoK in 2006
also added that as of 2018, handing over is still in progress.170
Even some refugee participants never fully grasped the extent of UNHCR
power in their encampment. At least one participant in one of the twelve focus
groups I interviewed also believed that the GoK was in effective control of refugee
encampment:
I would say it is Kenya, I mean the government of Kenya is in
charge. UNHCR is also a beggar like us. UNHCR and
international actors are simply helping. Kenya realised that it can
get a lot of money from confining refugees in camps. May be
other countries have not realised this. That is why, I suppose,
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Kenya created threats to close the camps. That allowed them to
ask for further funding.171

This participant’s view generated reproaches from other participants who
vehemently rejected any idea that the GoK is in effective control of their
encampment. The overwhelming response from the other participants was that the
GoK, like them, is the beggar and depends on the UNHCR for everything.
Similarly, one participant in one focus group interviews stated that, ‘I would say it
is the chairman of the camp who is in charge of this place; he makes most decisions
in the camp.’172 Several other participants put up their hands, itching to give a
response in rebuttal or in support immediately. One particular participant had this
reaction:
I don’t think my colleague is right. The chairman simply handles
matters between refugees and informs UNHCR and RAS of
problems in the camp. When it comes to who really is responsible
for how things are done in this camp, who has the power and
authority to decide on our rights, I would say that the real power
lies with UNHCR. It is UNHCR that is in charge.173

The key question becomes whether the evidence is sufficient to support the
claim that UNHCR has effective control of the framework governance of refugee policy
and practice in many of the refugee-hosting states in the global south and therefore
the act of refugee encampment and its harmful consequences on the environment,
violation of the refugees’ right to freedom of movement, and the torturous
conditions of life in the refugee camps are attributable to it. I submit, without fear
of contradiction, that the evidence I have assembled in this chapter and Chapter 3,
demonstrates that the relationship between the UNHCR and refugee-hosting states
in the global south is such that the enjoys a level of freedom, independence, and,
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crucially, access to resources, that allows it to pull the strings and appropriate the
framework governance of refugee policy from these hapless States. In other words, the
UNHCR has effective control not only of the framework governance of refugee policy
and practice, but also the encampment system. Therefore, the wrongful acts of the
UNHCR’s organs and agents administering the encampment of refugee are
attributable to it and would engage its accountability under international law.
5.7 The Procedural Aspects and Obstacles to the UNHCR’s Accountability
I have demonstrated in the preceding sections that UNHCR’s act of encamping
refugees in refugee camps and the consequences of refugee encampment, such as
harm to the environment and the deplorable conditions of life in the camps,
constitute internationally wrongful acts. I have argued that these wrongful acts are
attributable to the UNHCR under existing rules of international law because it has
effective control of the refugee encampment system in some of the refugee-hosting
states in the global south. In addition, I have also demonstrated that even if these
acts are not considered wrongful because international law does not prohibit
UNHCR’s activities to provide international protection to refugees, the UNHCR
still could be held accountable for the injurious consequences of those activities on
the environment and the condition of life for refugees living in the refugee camps.
I now turn to addressing the procedural aspects and obstacles to UNHCR
accountability under existing regime of accountability under international law in
this section. I start with addressing my mind, albeit briefly, to three main
interrelated questions: first, who has an interest or a right in holding UNHCR
accountable for refugee encampment and the damage refugee camps cause to the
environment and the suffering of refugees in the camps?; second, how does one
proceed to hold UNHCR accountable; and third, what are the likely obstacles that
one might encounter while doing so? My focus is on the second and third questions,
in the light of individuals, whether as refugees or communities in whose area
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refugee camps are located and where the environmental impact is greatly felt,
claims for redress.
I believe states, refugees, communities where refugee camps are located and
bear the immediate impact of environmental harm resulting from refugee
encampment, and NGOs are some of the main actors who may have an interest in
or right to engaging the international accountability of UNHCR for its
internationally wrongful acts or the injurious consequences arising out of its refugee
encampment activities that international law does not prohibit.
In the first place, states, especially states Parties to the 1951 Refugee
Convention, are possibly the first set of actors to have an interest in and right to
holding the UNHCR accountable for its wrongful acts because these acts breach
the UNHCR’s international obligations. In the second place, refugees follow
closely states in having an interest in and right to holding the UNHCR accountable
for their encampment and the torturous conditions of life in the camps. In the third
place, communities where refugees are encamped, and NGOs also have an interest
in holding the UNHCR accountable.
5.7.1 Procedural Aspects of Engaging the UNHCR’s Accountability

The procedure for submitting a claim against the UNHCR or kick-starting the
process of engaging the international accountability of the UNHCR for its breach
of international obligations as a result of refugee encampment and the forum to
which such claims may be submitted remains unclear. Indeed, in general most IOs
do not have a system of judicial review of their decisions or acts or even have
internal remedies for third parties who suffer injury as a result of the acts of an IO.174
It is plausible to conclude that in practice, the procedure for individuals to file
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complaints against IOs and the forum to which such claim may be submitted is
unclear. This contrasts sharply with the regimes under international human rights
treaties, which provide for individual complaint procedures against states parties to
the respective human rights treaties.175
The procedural steps for filing a complaint against an IO may be clear for
states, however. Indeed, Wellens observes that ‘States have access to a number of
mechanisms to submit claims based on political or policy-related grievances against
the UN.’176 States can usually address their concerns or complaints through organs
of the IO, such as the General Assembly of the United Nations, or the Executive
Committee of the High Commissioners Office (ExCom).
Despite this, individuals, especially refugees, face daunting procedural
challenges if they seek to engage the international accountability of an IO for injury
they suffered as a result of the acts or omissions of the IO. The existing rules and
principles constituting the regime of accountability under international law define
the nature of the obligations and consequences to the key actors, states and IOs, but
do not provide for procedural steps for individuals who suffer damage as a result of
the acts of an IO for engaging the accountability of the specific IO.
5.7.2 Private Law Options and Obstacles to the UNHCR’s Accountability

First, I consider the basis for private law options under existing rules of
international law and whether IOs have made provision for such options. Then I
move on to discussing the existing barriers to deploying private law options for
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holding international an IO, such as the United Nations or some of its independent
subsidiaries such as UNHCR, the subject of my dissertation.
5.7.2.1

The Basis for Private Law Options for Holding IOs
Accountable Under International Law

In theory, it is possible to use private law options to hold IOs accountable under
international law because certain international legal instruments do require that IOs
establish alternative dispute settlement mechanisms, including for dispute of a
private law character. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations (the General Convention), which implements the provisions of
Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations, for example, requires
that the United Nations establish alternative dispute settlement mechanisms,
including ‘other disputes of a private law character to which the United Nations is
a party.’177 Similarly, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialised Agencies requires that the specialised agencies, such as the World Bank,
the IMF, the ILO, etc, provide for dispute settlement mechanism, including ‘other
disputes of a private law character to which the specialised agency is a party.’ 178
Thus, international law, in theory, provides for mechanisms for settling disputes of
a private law nature, such as in contract, tort, property, and commerce between IOs
and third parties.
Not all the IOs, including the United Nations, however, have implemented
the requirement that they make provision for modes of settlement of disputes of a
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private law character or nature.179 Indeed, one former UN official argues that the
UN’s duty:
to make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of private
law disputes does not imply that the United Nations is under an
unconditional duty to submit to arbitration or to any other
acceptable mode of settlement any claim which might arise.180

Crucially, even those IOs that claim to have internal accountability
mechanisms do not have explicit procedural steps on how individuals can initiate
private law-based complaints or claims against one of their officials or the
organisation as a whole. The World Bank, after immense pressure from activists
eventually established an Independent Inspection Panel in 1993.181 Through the
Inspection Panel, people affected by Bank funded development project can request
for an independent investigation. There are still access problems to the panel,
however, especially for individuals. In fact, individuals have no standing before the
panel; in other words, individual victims of Bank funded projects cannot submit a
complaint to the panel.182
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Similarly, the United Nations reviewed its procedures for third party claims
with respect to is peacekeeping operations in September 1996183 and May 1997,184
which covers certain aspects of claims of a private law character, such as ‘nonconsensual use and occupancy of premises’ or ‘personal injury’ and ‘property
loss.’185 This follows the General Assembly’s request of 7 June 1996 that the
Secretary-General ‘develop revised cost estimates on third party claims and
adjustments’ after the Legal Counsel undertakes ‘a thorough study’ of the matter.186
From the reports, the UN is aware that it is likely to incur tortious liability for
damage caused in the ordinary operation of the force and describes the procedures
– Standing Claims Commissions or internal UN procedures or local claims review
boards for third parties to seek redress.187 At the same time, they also seek to limit
the extent of UN liability.
The UNHCR also claims to have an internal system of accountability.
Indeed, Turk and Eyster, for example, claim that UNHCR has ‘a rich set of policies,
tools and guidance that make up its current system of accountability.’ 188 These
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include, for example, the ‘Code of Conduct and UNHCR’s policy on Age, Gender
and Diversity Mainstreaming… introduced in 2002,’189 the Audit Services (ASU),
the Results Based Management (RBM) launched in 2005, the Policy and
Evaluation Services, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and the
‘Accountability Framework for Age, Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming’
(AGDM) launched in 2006. In practice, however, this system is inaccessible to
refugees. In most cases, it is the same officer that is the first step in the process of
seeking redress against the wrongful acts of the very officer and even where refugees
attempt to bypass the officer gatekeeper and communicate their grievances directly
to UNHCR headquarters in Geneva, Geneva will send back the accusation to the
very same officer for verification.190
5.7.2.2 The Problem of Immunity of IOs and the UNHCR’s Accountability

In the absence effective mechanisms for settling any private law disputes within it
or the wider UN system, individuals who have suffered injury as a result of
UNHCR’s activities relating to refugee encampment, could resort to private law
options available through national courts. Any attempts, however, to use private
law options to seek remedies or hold UNHCR accountable for the damage suffered
from UNHCR’s refugee encampment activities in some refugee-hosting states in
the global south through national courts are beset with a number of procedural and
substantive issues.
Some of the procedural and substantive issues likely to arise in the event
individuals seek to pursue private law options, such as suing the UNHCR or the
United Nations, in a national court in the tort of negligence, include issues of
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jurisdiction, choice of forum, cause of action, standing, and crucially, immunity.
Indeed, while some of these procedural issues are surmountable, such as the
question of standing and cause of action, it is the question of the immunity that the
UNHCR enjoys from the jurisdiction of national courts that is the most formidable
obstacle to deploying private law options for holding the UNHCR accountable
under international law for its wrongful acts and injurious consequences arising of
its activities international law does not prohibit. I will focus here on the question of
immunity from jurisdiction of national courts.
In the first place, the United Nations and its specialised agencies enjoy near,
if not, absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts. Article II, Section
2 of the General Convention unequivocally stipulates that:
The United Nations, its property and asserts wherever located and
by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of
legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly
waived its immunity shall extend to any particular case it has
waived its immunity (sic). It is, however, understood that no waiver
of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.191

The Office of the Legal Affairs, at the Secretariat of the United Nations, argues that
the expression ‘every form of legal process’, ‘include every form of process before
national authorities, whether judicial, administrative or executive and irrespective
of whether the Organization itself is named as a defendant or is asked to provide
information or to perform some ancillary role.’192 Even though there is possibility
for waiver of immunity,193 in practice, the IOs rarely waive immunity.
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Thus, immunity law operates as a barrier in relation to private law options for
third parties seeking redress against an IO in two interrelated ways. In other words,
immunity law is an obstacle to holding IOs accountable for their wrongful acts or
injurious consequences arising out of their activities international law does not
prohibit. First, it closes the doors to the temples of justice, namely, courts of justice,
national or international. An individual or a group of individuals in a class action
suit, cannot successfully litigate a private law claim against an IO, such as the
UNHCR, because the claim will be dismissed on a preliminary point of law:
immunity from the jurisdiction of a national court.
I illustrate this point with some cases, both individual suits and class action
suits in US courts, including the landmark decision of the US Supreme Court on
the immunity of IOs from suit under US law delivered in 2019. In addition, the
archives of IOs also enjoy immunity and that can frustrate a private law claim if
key evidence in the suit depends on the documents in the archives of an IO. I
demonstrate this aspect with a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
involving the World Bank.
5.7.2.2.1 Immunity from Every Form of Legal Process

On 22 February 2019, the United States Supreme Court delivered a landmark
decision, in the case of Jam v. IFC194 [Jam] on the extent of immunity from suit that
IOs enjoy under US immunity law, the International Organisations Immunities Act
(IOIA), 1945, 59 Stat. 669. To set the context, it is, however, best to start with a
few earlier cases before discussing this landmark decision.
Prior to the Jam case, IOs sued in the US enjoyed virtually absolute immunity
from suit that foreign governments enjoyed when the International Organisations
Immunities Act (IOIA) was enacted in 1945. I review at least three cases, albeit
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briefly, where the US courts dismissed suits against IOs for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, namely, the IOs invoked their immunity before US courts and the
courts agreed. I then conclude with the the Jam case.
I will start with the case of two former UNHCR employees suing the UN in a
US court in 2008. In Brzak & Ishak v United Nations195 [Brzak], the complainants,
former employees of the UNHCR, filed a suit against the UN and eight other
defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York for inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress and indecent battery.
Brzak alleges that ‘she was grabbed in a sexual manner by Lubbers,’ a former UN
High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘at the conclusion of a business meeting in
Lubbers’ office in Geneva in December 2003.’196 She further alleges that her attempt
to seek redress using the internal mechanisms within the UNHCR and the United
Nations resulted in retaliatory measures taken against her and the second plaintiff,
Ishak, a former official of UNHCR’s Office of the Inspector General, from whom
she had sought advice after the incident and who had advised her to ‘file a
complaint with the U.N.’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)’. 197
The United States District Court for the Southern District for New York
dismissed the suit, holding that under the General Convention, ‘the United Nations
is cloaked with absolute immunity from ‘‘every form of legal process except insofar
as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity.” Because ‘the United
Nations has not waived its immunity, the General Convention mandates dismissal
of plaintiff’s claims against the United Nations for lack of subject matter
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jurisdiction.’198 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Second
Circuit,199 contending that the General Convention was not self-executing in the
US, and absent any specific legislation to bring it into effect, it cannot be enforced
in the US courts and that if upheld grant of immunity violates the US Constitution,
the Court affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Southern District for
New York. The Court of Appeal held that the General Convention is selfexecuting under US law and that the General Convention ‘makes clear, the United
Nations enjoys absolute immunity from suit unless “it has expressly waived its
immunity.”’200
I now move to the tragic events of the Haitian cholera of 2010 and the failed
attempts to hold the United Nations accountable for the deaths and illness of
thousands of Haitians. In Georges v. United Nations201 [Georges] and LaVenture v.
United Nations202 [LaVenture], the complainants, comprising individuals who
suffered from cholera or whose relatives died from cholera during the outbreak in
Haiti in 2010, brought putative class actions against the UN and the UN
Stabilisation Mission in Haiti in US courts, seeking to hold them responsible for
negligently causing the cholera outbreak in Haiti that killed over 8,000 Haitians and
making over 600,000 ill. The Georges case was the first of the two to be filed in the
United States Southern District of New York and was decided in January 2015.
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One of the key legal issues was whether the defendants, the United Nations, the
United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, and the UN Secretary-General, were
immune, under international law, from the complainant’s suit. The Southern
District Court held that the UN and its officials involved in the Haitian cholera
epidemic were ‘absolutely immune from suit in this court’ because Article II,
Section 2 of the General Convention expressly provides that the United Nations
and its officials and agents and property are immune from every form of legal
process, unless immunity is expressly waived. Since the complainants failed to
provide evidence of the UN having waived its immunity, the suit must be dismissed
under the relevant procedural rules of the Court. On appeal, the US Court of
Appeal for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court for the
Southern District of New York.203
In the LaVenture case, the complainants filed a putative class action against
the United Nations, the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH), and other former or current UN officials, in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, ‘seeking redress for injuries
and death that resulted from an outbreak of cholera in Haiti in 2010.’ The District
Court dismissed the suit, holding that the defendants enjoyed immunity from suit,
and they had not waived that immunity. The complainants appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Court of Appeal affirmed the
decision of the District Court, holding that ‘the United Nations enjoys absolute
immunity from the instant suit and that UN has not expressly waived its immunity.’
In 2018 the complainants appealed to the United States Supreme Court, whose
decision is yet to be given.
These cases, and several others I have not discussed here, share one common
feature: they were all dismissed at the preliminary stage because the IOs moved to
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dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Brzak, Georges, and LaVenture cases
were based solely on the General Convention and were dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
The Jam case, however, appears to break new ground in US IOs immunity
law. In 2015, a group of farmers, fishermen, and a local village in the Indian state
of Gujarat sued the International Finance Corporation for negligence, nuisance,
trespass, and breach of contract in the US District court for the District of
Columbia. The petitioners claimed that pollution from a coal-fired power plant that
the IFC financed, such as ‘coal dust, ash, and water from the plant’s cooling system
had destroyed and contaminated much of the surrounding air, land, and water.’
The IFC maintained that it was immune from suit under the IOIA and moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The District court affirmed,
concluding that the IFC was immune from suit ‘because the IOIA grants IOs the
virtually absolute immunity that foreign governments enjoyed when the IOIA was
enacted.’ The petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeal for the DC Circuit court
was dismissed and they appealed to the Supreme Court in 2018.
The IFC maintained that it was immune from suit under the IOIA because
the IOIA ‘grants IOs the same immunity’ from suit that foreign governments
enjoyed in 1945.’204 The petitioners, however, contended that the IOIA grants IOs
the “same immunity” from suit that foreign governments enjoy today. The US
Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners’ interpretation of the IOIA thus:
We think the petitioners have the better reading of the Statute.
The language of the IOIA more naturally lends itself to the
petitioners’ reading. In granting international organizations the
“same immunity” from suit “as is enjoyed by foreign
governments,” the Act seems to continuously link the immunity
of international organisations to that of foreign governments so
as to ensure ongoing parity between the two. The statute could
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otherwise have simply stated that international organizations
“shall enjoy absolute immunity from suit,” or specified some
other fixed level of immunity. Other provisions of the IOIA, such
as the one making the property and assets of the international
organizations “immune from search,” use noncomparative
language to define immunities in a static way…Because the IOIA
does neither of those things, we think the “same as” formulation
is best understood to make international organization immunity
and foreign sovereign immunity continuously equivalent. 205
The IFC fought very hard to defend the absolute immunity IOs had enjoyed
before US courts. It further argued that ‘interpreting the IOIA provision to grant
anything less than absolute immunity would lead to a number of undesirable
results.’ And crucially, the IFC contended that:
affording international organizations only restrictive immunity
would defeat the purpose of granting immunity in the first place.
Allowing international organizations to be sued in one member
country’s courts would in effect allow that member to secondguess the collective decisions of the others. It would also expose
international organizations to money damages, which would in
turn make it more difficult and expensive for them to fulfil their
missions.206
The Court, however, opined that:
[t]he IFC’s concerns are inflated. The privileges and
immunities accorded by the IOIA are only default rules. If
the work of an international organization would be impaired by
restrictive immunity, the organisations charter can always specify
the level of immunity (my emphasis).207
After responding to the contentions of the IFC, the Court held that the IFC ‘is not
absolutely immune from suit.’208 And more generally, that the IOIA grants IOs the
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“same immunity” from suit “as is enjoyed by foreign governments” at any given
time. This means that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) now governs
the immunity of IOs in the US.
What, then, are the implications of the Jam v IFC case for third party private
law options against IOs? A detailed discussion of the implication of this case is
beyond the scope of my dissertation. I argue, however, that the decision has no real
significant impact on the immunity of IOs whose charters and specific instrument
guarantee for them absolute immunity. In fact, the majority of the Court said
explicitly that, ‘[i]f the work of an international organisation would be impaired by
restrictive immunity, the organisation’s charter can always specify the level of
immunity.’209 In this context, the UN will not be affected because the General
Convention guarantee it absolute immunity from suits in national courts.
Crucially, even if the restrictive immunities begins to bite, the IOs will fight
all the way to the ICJ. The case of MBF Capital Bhd. & Anor v. Dato’Param
Cumaraswamy,210 a case that ended up in the ICJ, is illustrative. In this case the
plaintiff companies in Malaysia filed a multi-million dollar suit for defamation
against the defendant, a Malaysian jurist, appointed by the then UN Human Rights
Commission (now UN Human Rights Council) as its Special Rapporteur on the
Independence of the Judges and Lawyers. 211 In response to the defamation charge,
the defendant pleaded immunity, invoking the provisions of Article VI, Section 22
of the Convention on the Immunities and Privileges of the UN to which Malaysia
was party.
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The

Malaysian High Court, disregarding the certificate issued by the

Secretary-General of the UN, held, inter alia, that the question of immunity was not
one that could be addressed in summary proceedings but at the trial of the suit
against the Special Rapporteur and ordered that he file his defence in 14 days.
The United Nations sought the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the matter.212
The Court stated that ‘questions of immunity are… preliminary issues which must
be expeditiously decided in limine litis. This is a generally recognised principle of
procedural law…’213 The Court confirmed that the Secretary-General alone has the
exclusive right to make a determination of a) whether acts or words uttered by UN
experts where in the course of performing their official functions and b) whether in
the interest of justice immunity may be waived.
5.7.2.2.2 Archives of International Organisations are Inviolable

The international law of immunity not only shields IOs from suits in domestic
courts but also may be a huge barrier to accessing vital evidence in the possession
of an IO, such as the UNHCR, to prosecute a private law related claim because the
archives of IOs are inviolable. The Jam v IFC case, discussed earlier, does not
modify this law. The Court said that the IOIA still makes the property and assets
of IOs immune from searches.214
In World Bank Group v. Wallace215 [Wallace], the respondents, employees of a
Canadian company seeking to win a contract for supervising the construction of a
World Bank funded bridge in Bangladesh, were charged with corruption under the
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Canadian legislation, The Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act. The Crown’s
evidence consisted of intercepted communication that Canadian police
investigators had intercepted following a tip from the World Bank. The defence
sought an order requiring, among other things, the production of the records of the
World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency unit, whose mandate is to investigate
allegations of fraud, corruption, and collusion in relation to World Bank funded
development projects. It was this unit that tipped the Canadian police that the
respondents had conspired to bribe Bangladeshi officials to award the contract to
SNC-Lavalin, the company the respondents were working for.
The agreements establishing two of the other separate entities comprising the
World Bank, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
and the International Development Association (IDA), however, stipulate that the
archives of the IBRD and IDA shall be inviolable 216 and that their officials shall be
immune from legal process in relation to acts in the performance of their official
functions, save in contexts were immunity is explicitly waived. 217
The most relevant legal issue to my discussion here is whether the World Bank
Group was immune to production orders that a Canadian court issues against it.
The trial court held that the Bank had immunity, but effectively waived that
immunity when it participated in the Canadian police investigations of the
respondents’ involvement in bribing Bangladeshi official to secure that contract for
inspecting the construction of the Bank funded bridge. The Bank appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the
trial judge’s decision. As regards the inviolability of the Bank’s archives, the Court
said:
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As regards the inviolability of the organization’s archives, the
trial judge erred in construing so narrowly an immunity that is
integral to the independent functioning of international
organizations. The immunity outline in s.5 shields the entire
collection of stored documents of the IBRD and IDA from both
search and seizure from compelled production…Partial or
voluntary disclosure of some documents by the World Bank
Group does not amount to a waiver of this immunity. Indeed,
archival immunity is not subject to waiver.218

Similarly, all the UNHCR premises, property and assets, and funds are
inviolate. The agreement between the UNHCR and Uganda is illustrative:
UNHCR, its property, funds and assets, wherever located and by
whosoever held, shall be immune for every form of legal process
except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its
immunity; it being understood that this waiver shall not extend
to any measure of execution.219

Since the UNHCR concludes agreements with virtually all refugee-hosting states in
the global south ‘generally based on the Model UNHCR Co-operation
Agreement,’220 which incorporate immunity provisions, it is legitimate to conclude
that the UNHCR enjoys virtually absolute immunity from any form of legal process
in these states. Although there is always a provision that purports to give the
impression that immunity may be waived, in practice that is unlikely to happen. In
Brzak, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) confirmed her allegations
against Lubbers, yet the Secretary-General rejected the report and did not waive the
immunity of the High Commission from suit. The case was dismissed.
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5.7.2.2.3 The Immunity of IOs from suit: Shield or Sword?

Reviewing some of the case law on the immunity from suit of IOs and the works of
the leading authorities on the law of IOs, I am tempted to conclude that regardless
of the totality of the evidence one may gather, IOs, including the UNHCR will,
most of the time, if not all the time, escape accountability for their wrongful acts
and omissions that injure the weak in society. I believe it is imperative that the time
is now for questioning the basis of the virtually absolute immunity from suit in
national courts that IOs enjoy.
The leading scholars on the subject assert that functional necessity is the basis
upon which the privileges and immunities of IOs rest. These scholars claim that
functional necessity is a clearer and specific criterion.221 It is further claimed that
functional necessity allows for ‘how much immunity from municipal jurisdiction
an international organisation requires in exercise of its functions’ 222 to be
determined with some precision.223
I argue that functional necessity, like any other concept, has also some
weaknesses that should be reviewed in the face of the mounting evidence that
immunity of IOs from suit in national court is defeating the cause of justice,
especially for the weak in society.
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In the first place, what is claimed to be functionally necessary is indeterminate
or as Klabbers notes, is open-textured.224 Reinisch has stated that functional
privileges and immunities mean ‘different, and indeed contradictory, things to
different people, or rather different judges and states.’225 Klabbers has noted,
correctly in my view, that ‘[t]he determination of the functional needs of an
organization is essentially in the eye of the beholder.’226 In other words, what is
functionally necessary for the beneficiary of immunities may not be so for a third
party who is denied justice because the court tells him or her that its hands are tied;
it cannot entertained the matter because the defendant is immune from suits before
it.
In the second place, under the functional necessity theory, immunities were
meant to be limited in scope – as are necessary for fulfilment of their purposes and
functions. In practice, however, IOs’ immunities are framed in virtually absolute
terms, ‘from every form of legal process.’ Whether it is the General Convention or
the Specialised Agencies Convention, immunities are framed in absolute terms and
one scholar has said that the privileges and immunities of IOs represent ‘an
autonomous system of law.’227
In the third place, functional necessity makes an IO judge in its own cause
thereby subverting a cardinal principle that protects against unfairness: ‘that a man
may not be a judge in his own cause.’ This may not be a principle of universal
application, having been developed in common law legal systems, namely, English
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courts.228 The practical implication of an IO being judge in its own cause may,
however, be illustrated thus: a group of refugees from Dadaab refugee camp in
Kenya decide to challenge their encampment in a Kenyan court; who decides
whether the UNHCR’s immunity should be waived? Under existing international
immunity law, it is the UNHCR and the UN Secretary-General that decides
whether the acts that the refugees are challenging were performed in the course of
exercising official functions and weather immunity should be waived.
In the fourth place, under the functional necessity theory the wrongful acts
of an IO, as long as performed in exercise of its functions, cannot be challenged
unless the IO waives its immunity, which apparently may be declined. Indeed, in
the cases of Brzak, LaVenture, and George the complaints did not produce evidence
in court that the UN had waived its immunity. Absent proof waiver of immunity,
the cases were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The conclusion from this brief commentary on the implications of the
immunity from suit that IOs enjoy is that the institution of immunity serves as IOs
both a shield and a sword.
5.8 Conclusion
In the first place, UNHCR, albeit a subsidiary organ of the United Nations
General Assembly, is an independent legal entity under the authority of the
Reparation for injuries and the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 cases.
Therefore, the UNHCR has capacity under international law to perform its
functions on the international plane. As an independent legal entity, it has
obligations incumbent upon it, both under its Statute, the 1951 Refugee
Convention, and general international law. In this context, its legitimate to inquire
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and scrutinise issues surrounding its accountability for breach of its obligations
under international law and how it can be held accountable.
In the second place, UNHCR as an independent actor on the international
plane can be held accountable, in principle, under international law using two legal
legal routes: (a) accountability for internationally wrongful acts and (b)
accountability for injurious consequence arising out of activities international law
does not prohibit. If UNHCR accountability is to be pursued under the regime of
internationally wrongful acts, then it is a necessary requirement that the wrongful
acts must have resulted from its breach of its international obligations and that the
wrongful acts must be attributable to UNHCR under international law. The
wrongful acts that must be attributable to UNHCR in order to engage its
international accountability may be the acts of its organs, namely, its officials, such
as the UNHCR Rep; or its agents, namely, those through whom its acts, such as
NGOs or refugee-host state government entities, to implement activities.
In the third place, UNHCR has effective control of the framework governance of
refugee encampment in most refugee-hosting states in the global south. In other
words, the evidence shows that UNHCR has effective control of the encampment
system in some refugee-hosting states in the global south.
In the fourth place, the encampment of refugees and the injurious
consequences to the environment and the lives of refugees constitute internationally
wrongful acts. The ECtHR in the Sufi case found that conditions in the Dadaab
Refugee Camp Complex constitute torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.
Refugee encampment created the conditions that caused damage to the
environment, violated the rights and freedoms of refugees, and controlled their
lives, subjecting them to torturous conditions of life for decades, and in some cases
up to twenty-five years or more.
In fifth place, there are procedural and substantive barriers to engaging the
accountability of the UNHCR for its refugee encampment and the resulting harm
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to the environment and the lives the lives of refugees living in camps for decades in
uncertainty. Procedures for third parties private law claims against IOs generally
are either absent of inadequate. The regime of immunity shields IOs from every
form of legal process against them in domestic courts. In theory IO must provide
mechanisms for settling disputes of a private law character; in practice none of the
organisations have established a robust, independent, and effective mechanism.
Therefore, there is a serious gap within the existing regime of accountability under
international law.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction
I now conclude the analyses I undertook in the previous chapters of my dissertation
and the way forward in terms of future research. I do this in two steps. In the first
place, I revisit the analyses in the preceding chapters and summarise the main
argument in each. In the second place, I state the main conclusions and the prospects
for further research.
6.2 Summary of themes from each chapter
In developing and writing my dissertation I took several steps, but I could summarise
these into five main steps. My first step started with defining the problem and
clarifying the conceptual issues relevant to answering my main research question,
namely, how UNHCR can be held accountable, under international law, for the
injurious consequences of refugee encampment and the environment and the
conditions in refugee camps that it helps to create, fund, and administer. Thus, in
Chapter 1, I demonstrated that the problem is that there is ample evidence to show
that refugee camps adversely affect the environment and the lives of refugees living
in them and yet refugee camps remain UNHCR’s preferred default technology for
providing international protection to refugees. And while proponents of refugee
encampment often presented encampment as a humanitarian imperative, I agree
with Malkki and Agamben that refugee camps are not merely humanitarian spaces
where well-meaning people rally to save lives. No, refugee camps are ‘devices of
power’ or ‘biopolitical spaces’ or ‘political juridical structures’ where human beings
are subjected to perpetual screening, control of movement, disciplinary measures,
and are denuded of power and live at the mercy of those exercising power over them.
Scholars such as Agier, Verdirame, and Barbara provide ample evidence of
unaccountable power that the UNHCR and other actors exercises in refugee camps.
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The status quo, as I have demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 5 has not changed much
to date, however.
From this I proceeded to argue that if refugee camps are devices of power, it
must follow that the exercise of power must entail the accountability of those who
‘run the show’ in the camps.229 In other words, the authors of refugee encampment
must be held answerable for their exercise of power in the camps. I preferred the term
“accountability” to “responsibility,” which is the traditional terminology accepted in
international law scholarship and practice. My reasons for doing so are simply and
basic. First, a critical reading of the responsibility literature demonstrates that the
underlying or overarching objective of responsibility is actually to hold actors
accountable. I decided that since accountability is the underlying theme, it is best to
foreground it as the real terminology for capturing the essence of holding answerable
those who violate the precepts of international law. Second, from a TWAIL
perspective, accountability, rather than responsibility, connotes expressions of
disapproval of acts or conduct that are wrong or that perpetuates injustice and evokes
action and requirements of equity.
At least four main themes emerged from Chapter 1: refugee encampment or
refugee camps damage the environment and the lives of refugees; refugee
encampment involves the exercise and abuse of power; the exercise of power entails
accountability; and few scholars have studied the accountability of UNHCR for its
encampment of refugees and the consequence of that on the environment and the
lives of refugees in the refugee camps.
In the second step, I reflected on issues of method and theory in Chapter 2. I
needed a map that would guide me through the process of learning and thinking
required to produce the dissertation and theory and method provided that map. As
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in everything man-made, however, there are good and bad maps and so was my
experience with identify the right theory and method in law, especially international
law, with which to navigate the intellectual journey leading to the production of this
dissertation. I quickly discovered that the method and theory terrain in international
law is rugged, with competing meanings and assumptions that the reader already
knows. Nonetheless, I found solace in four schools of thoughts – New Haven, Sociolegal, Political Economy, and Third World Approaches to International Law
(TWAIL) and borrowed from their theoretical commitments and methods to
complete the process of writing the dissertation.
In addition, I agree with Epstein and King that if lawyers insist that law is a
science, then they must embrace the tenets of scientific inquiry, which involves
integrating theory, method, and empiricism; these are not antithetical to each other.
Rather, lawyers need to embrace empirical research, which is nothing more than
observing the real world and that calls for following certain basic rules. And I realised
how much more I need to learn about methods and rules of inference if I am to
produce legal scholarship that will be truly empirical work.
Having defined the research problem and clarified the conceptual issues and
decided what the best method and theory for gathering data and analysing that data,
I moved to the third stage or step, namely locating the framework governance of refugee
encampment and the locus of accountability. It was imperative that I determine the
site where refugee encampment decisions are made because it also determined the
locus of accountability and the allocation of responsibility for the consequences of
refugee camps.
I borrowed from TWAIL and political economy schools of thought to explain
where and how decisions on refugee encampment are made. From TWAIL I
specifically borrowed Okafor’s theory of the ‘relative appropriation of the “third
world” framework governance by entities external to the third world’ and from
political economy, I appropriated Mosco’s theory of processes and structures in
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understanding social relations. Thus, using ideas from these theories, I demonstrated
that refugee encampment is an integral part of UNHCR’s refugee emergency
response. The UNHCR refugee emergency response is initiated, coordinated and
implement through a set of processes and structures located within UNHCR and it
is one of these structures and process that will finally ‘sell’ the idea of refugee
encampment to refugee-hosting states in the global south, who are then incentivised
to embrace the encampment of refugees.
Thus, Chapter 3 demonstrates four main themes or conclusions: the UNHCR
is the architect of refugee encampment or refugee camps in some of the refugeehosting states in the global south; the UNHCR appropriates the framework governance
of refugee policy and practice in most refugee-hosting states in the global south; the
UNHCR incentivises refugee-hosting states, taking advantage of their weaker
governance areas and technical limitations and other resources needed for
responding to a refugee emergency; and refugee-hosting states, once incentivised,
embrace refugee encampment and own it and enforce the restrictions on freedom of
movement for refugee living in the camps. It is this last aspect which gives the false
impression that it is refugee-hosting states that are the architects of refugee
encampment. Thus, it is clear that the UNHCR is the dominant actor and therefore
it is legitimate to focus on its accountability for refugee camps and the impact of the
camps on the environment and the condition of life for the refugees living in the
camps.
In the fourth step, I focused on the rules and principles constituting the regime
of accountability under international law. In Chapter 3 I had now established the
sites where the framework governance decisions that produce refugee encampment are
made; they are located within the internal structures and process of the UNHCR and
therefore, the UNHCR is the architect of refugee encampment and legitimate subject
for an accountability inquiry. If that is the case, what are the rules and principles of
international law needed to inquire into and engage its accountability? Chapter 4 is
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where I attempted to explicate the relevant rules and principles of international law
for engaging UNHCR accountability.
In Chapter 4, after reviewing, albeit briefly, the historical origins of the rules
and principles constituting the regime of accountability under international law and
the codification work of the ILC on international accountability of states and IOs, I
discovered that there are at least two main legal routes for engaging the
accountability of actors on the international plane. The first legal route, and the more
commonly known one, is the internationally wrongful act route. It is a concept the ILC
borrowed from both state practice and doctrinal writing of some of the leading
publicists in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The second is the liability
for injurious consequences arising out of activities that international law does not prohibit
route. Thus, in principle these two legal routes should suffice to engage the
accountability of UNHCR under international law for its encampment of refugees
and the consequences of refugee camps on the environment and the conditions of life
for the refugees who live in the camps for year on long.
It also emerged from my analyses of the existing rules and principles governing
the regime of accountability that there are limitations to the rules that militate against
prospects of holding IOs, including the UNHCR, accountable. In the first place, the
concept of internationally wrongful acts upon which accountability is anchored is
inherently biased towards certain interests, that ignore historical injustices. Second,
the scope of liability for injurious consequences arising out of activities that
international law does not prohibit is limited to transboundary hazardous activities.
With a better understanding of the sites where the framework governance
decisions on refugee encampment are made and the existing rules and principles
governing the regime of accountability under international law, I moved to the final
step – addressing how the UNHCR can be held accountable, under international law,
for the injurious consequences of refugee encampment on the environment and the
lives of refugees under encampment. Chapter 5 was devoted to achieving this.
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Several themes emerged in the analyses in Chapter 5. I, however, limit myself
to four pertinent ones. In the first place, the UNHCR is an international organisation
(IO), with capacity to act independently on the international plane. This goes against
the conventional position which insists that the UNHCR is simply a subsidiary organ
of the UN and therefore lacks independent legal status and personality; instead, it
derives its personality from the UN. I contend, however, that subsidiary organs are
creatures of international law and therefore, we must not focus just on the nature of
the constitutive instruments, but also look at what they do in practice. I base this
contention solidly on the jurisprudence of the ICJ and the PCIJ. Right from the
outset in Chapter 1, I had argued that UNHCR should be held accountable for the
consequences of refugee camps because it is an independent actor on the
international plane. In Chapter 5, I developed this further, delving into the legal basis
of that claim and the obligations incumbent upon the UNHCR. I concur with
Verdirame and Dale that subsidiary organs can acquire an independent status based
on the nature of their activities. I also agree with the ICJ that IOs have obligations
incumbent upon them under general international law (Interpretation of the Agreement
of 25 March 1951 case230). I trace the sources of the UNHCR’s obligations under
international law to its Statute, the 1951 Refugee Convention, international human
rights law, and international environmental law. On the latter aspect, I drew from
the theories of the New Have School of Thought to argue that the UN conferences
on the environment, starting with the Stockholm conference of 1972 to Rio in 1992,
are examples of authoritative decision-making that produced legal standards and
rules which create binding obligations on both states, IOs, and individuals not to
damage the environment.

230

Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the World Health Organization and Egypt [1980] ICJ

Rep 73.

325

Second, in principle it is possible to hold the UNHCR accountable for the
consequences of refugee camps on the environment and the conditions of refugees
living in the camps. The UNHCR can be held accountable for both its internationally
wrongful acts and for the injurious consequences arising out if its activities that
international law does not prohibit. The UNHCR’s internationally wrongful acts,
which would engage its international accountability are, first, its encampment of
refugees and the resulting harm on the environment and the violation of fundamental
rights and freedoms of refugees who live in the camps and, second, its inducing of
refugee-hosting states, such as Kenya, to abandon laissez faire, refugee-friendly
policies, to embrace refugee encampment.
I, however, envisaged a possible barrier to using the internationally wrongful
act legal route: that international law does not prohibit UNHCR’s activities
performed in the exercise of its mandate to provide international protection to
refugees, including refugee encampment, and therefore precludes wrongfulness. If
this is the case, then one would proceed under the second legal route, namely,
liability for injurious consequences arising out of activities that international law does
not prohibit. Indeed, the UNHCR itself concedes that refugee camps do harm the
environment and the ECtHR has held that conditions of life in the Dadaab refugee
camp complex violate the precepts of international law. Seen from a private law
prism, the harm camps cause to the environment and the human beings who live in
them constitute a tort for which private law remedies could be sought in courts of
law.
Third, the UNHCR has effective control of refugee encampment in most of the
refugee-hosting states of the global south. Under the authority of the Military and
Paramilitary case,231 effective control is a key element in the law of attribution of
wrongful acts to an entity. Therefore, the acts that cause damage to the environment
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and the lives of refugees in the camps are attributable, under international law, to
UNHCR because it has effective control of the encampment system it helps create,
fund, and administer in the refugee-hosting states in the global south.
Fourth,

there are both procedural and substantive obstacles to holding

UNHCR accountable. Most IOs have not created internal mechanisms for handling
disputes with third parties of a private law character. Save for the World Bank
Group’s pioneering Independent Inspections Panel created in 1993 and the United
Nations mechanisms for handling disputes of a private law character arising out of
its peacekeeping operations, most IO, such as UNHCR do not have internal dispute
settlement mechanism to handle complaints from third parties. The alternative could
be seeking private law options in domestic courts. The legal route is, however,
immediately blocked because IO enjoy absolute immunity from every form of legal
process in national courts. The Jam decision of the US Supreme Court enunciates
that IOs in the US enjoy restrictive immunity from the jurisdiction of US courts,
raising the hopes of those who have been fighting the injustice of absolute immunity
for decades. The reality, however, is that the Jam decision is a domestic court
decision; it does not disturb the absolute immunities that IOs enjoys under the
international law of privileges and immunities.
6.3 Prospects for further research
My goal in undertaking this study was modest: to understand how the UNHCR can
be held accountable under international law for its acts which cause damage to the
environment and the lives of refugees who are compelled to live in the camps under
conditions of uncertainty and destitution for decades. In the process of learning and
thinking along the way, however, I discovered two things that I realised require
further research beyond the scope of my dissertation.
In the first place, that in addition to the traditional legal route of accountability
of states for internationally wrongful acts, the ILC had developed for codification
rules and principles on the liability of states and IOs for the injurious consequences
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arising out of activities that international law does not prohibit. I had been
contemplating over this question for some time because I had witnessed the impact
of the activities of IOs, such as the UNHCR, the World Bank, and the IMF on the
environment and lives of ordinary people, including refugees. I had no clue how I
could challenge these IOs since their activities were considered legitimate or lawful
under international law. Could there be an international law of torts, I pondered.
I believe that the issue of accountability for the injurious consequences arising
out of acts international law does not prohibit law is critical to any contemporary
system or regime of international accountability that seeks to hold accountable all
those who violate the precepts of international law. The central idea in the concept
of liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts that international law does
not prohibit is that obligations might exist in situations where it would appear that
there is no particular wrongful act or omission by a state or IO. In other words,
legitimate acts or activities of a state, a private company in a given state, or an IO
may give rise to injurious consequences or harm and must entail the accountability
of the specific actor, be it the state or IO.
A classic illustration of this may be activities in the area of the economy, such
finance, monetary policy, and investment, and humanitarian policies of certain
IOs, such as the UNHCR’s humanitarian activities for refugees, that international
law does not prohibit, but have caused injurious consequences for millions of
people around the world. Some concrete examples include the refugee encampment
activities of the UNHCR, which I discussed in Chapter 5; the neo-liberal economic
reform policies and conditionalities of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF); and world free trading system rules of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO).
The ILC, however, limits the scope of accountability for injurious
consequences arising out of activities international law does not prohibit to
significant transboundary hazardous activities, such as emission of transboundary
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hazardous gases or chemicals. This leaves out the activities of IOs such as UNHCR,
the World Bank Group, the IMF, and the WTO. It is imperative that TWAIL
scholars should not consider this topic closed and that many TWAIL scholars will
be interested in working in collaboration not only amongst themselves but also with
sympathisers in the global north to research into ways of developing better rules
and principles of international law that engage the accountability of these IOs. In
this context, the focus of research might be on how to translate and integrate the
ideals of the sovereignty of the people as the as basis of authority and imperative
necessities of accountability and some level of independence for IOs to perform
their functions.
In the second place, in addressing my main research question, I posited
theoretical propositions and then identified some observable or practical
implications necessary to confirm or refute my theories. Given time limitations and
the modest goal of my dissertation, it was not possible for me to pursue each of the
observable or practical implications for each theory. I believe each of the observable
implications provide bases for further research.
6.4 Conclusion
The main conclusion is that in theory at least, the UNHCR can be held accountable,
under international law, using two possible legal routes: (a) internationally
wrongful acts, and (b) liability for injurious consequences of activities that
international law does not prohibit. In practice, however, several procedural and
substantive obstacles make it practically impossible to hold the UNHCR
accountable for its contribution to the harm to the environment and the suffering
of refugees resulting from the encampment of refugees in refugee camps that it helps
create, fund, and manage.
In the first place, the existing rules and principles governing the regime of
accountability under international law focus on clarifying what constitutes an
internationally wrongful act, preventing transboundary harm from hazardous
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activities that international law does not prohibit, rules of attributing wrongful acts
or

conduct,

reparation,

countermeasures,

and

circumstances

precluding

wrongfulness, etc. The rules and principles, however, do not address how an
injured third party might start the process of engaging the accountability of the IO
that has caused it damage or harm.
In the second place, third parties, such as refugees cannot seek remedies
against the UNHCR because most IOs have not developed internal procedures for
settling third party disputes of a private law character. Where IOs, including the
UNHCR, have internal mechanisms, such mechanisms are often inaccessible to
third parties, such as refugees. Crucially, the option of private law remedies through
domestic courts is also unavailable, despite the recent Jam decision of the US
Supreme Court

because IOs tend to enjoy near absolute (or even absolute)

immunity from every form of legal process in national courts. The result: a huge
gap of accountability in international law. The international law on the privileges
and immunities of IOs creates the space for impunity and double standards
whereby, on the one hand international law demands that those who violate its
precepts should be held answerable, but on the other hand, it selectively shields
certain natural and juridical persons from being held accountable, giving them an
unduly privileged status and in effect mocking the idea that all persons are equal
before the law.
As I have pointed already, for some, however, there is reason to be optimistic
that the status quo of absolute immunity for IOs may change sooner or in the
foreseeable future in the light of the Jam decision of the United States Supreme
Court delivered in February 2019. The Court held that the scope of immunities
from suit that IOs can enjoy in the US is restrictive, i.e., ‘the same immunity’ from
suit that foreign government dignitaries on US territory enjoy. For those who have
closely followed the struggles of many people seeking redress against IOs in
national courts, this decisions gives a glimmer of hope that finally, IOs have been
stripped of absolute immunity from suit. I am, however, cautiously optimistic. In
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the first place, the decision is that of a national court, albeit the highest court of the
land, and so it may have limited judicial value upon the international plane.
Secondly, the Court left it open to IOs to ‘always specify a different level of
immunity,’ if a given IO ‘would be impaired by restrictive immunity.’ Thus, in
theory, IOs in the US have restrictive immunity, but in practice they can enjoy
absolute immunity because they can elect to specify the level of immunity they
want.
Seventy-five years ago, it was legitimate to shield the decisions of IOs from
rigorous external scrutiny through an independent, impartial, and transparent
system, such as a court of law. Then, institutionalist were rightly worried that the
very states that created these IO might use their national courts to undermine the
independence of the IOs. I do believe that the necessity to shield IOs from some
form of interference still remain valid, but on a lower threshold. The problematic
issue is that IOs are given the power to decide whether they will waive immunity
and allow justice to take its course. Since the question whether a given foreign
government is entitle to immunity from suit is subject to scrutiny by courts of law,
it is time we vest courts of law with the authority to also determine whether the
immunity of an IO should be waived.
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Participant

Dadaab

Nairobi
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UNHCR

05

01

06

Former

0

01

01

01

03

04

0

02

02

Refugees

02

02

04

Refugee Focus

74

15
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Local NGO

0

02

02

International
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01

01

Total

83
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109

UNHCR official
GoK
Former

GoK

official

Groups (12)

NGO
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